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THE CONFLICT BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT AND THE RIGHT OF THE
CHILD TO HEALTH
LAURA WESTRA*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This paper will examine the relation between development and human rights;
specifically the right to health, as it applies to the most vulnerable, especially the
child. Those most affected are local, land-based communities and indigenous
groups located in resource-rich areas in South and Central America and Asia. So
there are two main questions that arise: one is the precise meaning and reach of the
right to development, as well as its feasibility; the other is the implications of
public health in industrial development, especially in the light of scientific
research, and the emergence of recent reports such as the World Health
Organization Summary for decision-makers, State of the Science of Endocrine
Disrupting Chemicals 2012 ("WHO EDC Report"), which clearly indicates that
the child is at grave risk from the spread of industrial activities, during the period
of its development; from embryo, to fetus, to born child.'
Section 2 traces the rights of indigenous peoples and of local communities to
the right to self-governance and the right to say no to intrusive and hazardous
corporate activities in their own region. Section 3 focuses specifically on the child
as the victim of so-called development, particularly in relation to mining and other
extractive operations. Many of these involve Canada, whose human rights record
is increasingly poor. Section 4 turns to a different perspective on the problem of
the right to health, as Professor Benjamin Mason Meier, after arguing for the
problems raised by neoliberal development, proposes another approach and a
better hope. Professor Meier proposes that perhaps the Right to Development
instrument2 itself might be used to prescribe appropriate remedies to mitigate or

* Laura Westra, Ph.D. (1982) in Philosophy, University of Toronto, and Ph.D. (2005) in Law, Osgoode
Hall Law School, currently teaches environmental law at the University of Windsor and international
law at the University of Milano (Bicocca). She has published thirty-one books, monographs, and
collections, on environmental justice, human rights issues, and international law, and over ninety
articles and chapters in books.
1. See WORLD HEALTH ORG. & UNITED NATIONS ENV'T PROGRAMME, STATE OF THE SCIENCE
OF ENDOCRINE DISRUPTING CHEMICALs-2012 (Ake Bergman et al. eds., 2013); see also PHILIPPE
GRANDJEAN, ONLY ONE CHANCE: How ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION IMPAIRS BRAIN
DEVELOPMENT-AND How TO PROTECT THE BRAINS OF THE NEXT GENERATION (2013).
2. The Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128, Annex (Dec. 4,
1986). See Benjamin Mason Meier & Ashley M. Fox, Development as Health: Employing the
Collective Right to Development to Achieve the Goals of the IndividualRight to Health, 30 HUM. RTs.
Q. 259, 342 (2008).
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even eliminate the difficulties I discuss. Finally, Section 5 notes the results of the
impacts of globalization and neoliberal development on the public health services
previously provided by state governments. As their services are increasingly
privatized, rather than remaining within the ambit of state obligations, the poor, the
unemployed, and the populations of so-called developing countries, fare poorly,
especially the children and the others among the population who are the most
vulnerable.
II.

THE RIGHT TO SAY

"NO"

AS THE RIGHT TO NON-DISCRIMINATION

Just as indigenous peoples have the right to pursue their own
initiatives for resource extraction, as part of their right to selfdetermination and to set their own strategies for development, they have
the right to decline to pursue such initiatives, as many do and no doubt
will continue to do. Today, however, much more than being faced with
the choice of whether or not to pursue their own resource extraction
initiatives, indigenous peoples face resource extraction projects that are
advanced by the State and third party business enterprises, typically
when the State claims ownership of the resources. 3
State responsibility includes both positive and negative obligations; given the
grave differences in the economic situation of the citizens of various regions of the
world, the issue of development is one of central importance. In September 2000,
an open-ended working group on the right to development, established by the
Commission on Human Rights, 4 produced a report on the Right to Development.5
While attempting to cover all aspects of poverty and hunger alleviation, this report
also indicates clearly the grave problems present in such a right, and in the concept
of "development" as such.6
It might be best to start viewing the major problems that arise within the
concept, let alone with terming it a "right." The first question that arises is: whose
"right" is it? Presumably, one should think of "development" as being a right of
those who are not yet "developed," that is, poor people in "developing countries."
In fact, that right is intended as a remedy for the problems those persons encounter,
to redress "the effects of poverty, structural adjustment, globalization, financial
3. Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Report of the Special Rapporteur on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Extractive Industries andIndigenous Peoples, at 6-7, Human Rights
Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/24/41 (July 1, 2013) (by James Anaya).
4. The Commission on Human Rights has since been replaced by the Human Rights Council,
G.A. Res. 60/251, 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/251 (Mar. 15, 2006).
5. Independent Expert on the Right to Development, The Right to Development, Report of the
Independent Expert on the Right to Development Pursuantto GeneralAssembly Resolution 54/175 and
Commission on Human Rights Resolution E/CN.4/RES/2000/5, Comm'n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2000/WG.18/CRP.1 (Sept.11, 2000) (by Arjun Sengupta) [hereinafter Sengupta Report],
available
at
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsfl0/4490c26031920601cl2569610048a2a0/$FILE/GO015
327.pdf; see also The Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128, Annex (Dec.
4, 1986) (article 10 authorizes the Commission to establish an open-ended working group).
6. See Sengupta Report, supra note 5,132.
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and trade liberalization and deregulations, on the prospects of the enjoyment of the
right to development in developing countries." 7
Development then is related to the "removal of poverty," hence it is from the
start, an economic goal, one to be implemented as a "process" of economic, social,
cultural, and political development, so that "all human rights and fundamental
freedoms can be fully realized."8 Much of the language of the working group's
report is patterned on the work of Amartya Sen.9 But reliance on the work of even
a famous economist carries its own pitfalls. The working group's report affirms
that "[t]o have a right means to have claim to something of value on other people,
institutions, the state, or the international community, who in turn have the
obligation of providing or helping to provide that something of value."' 0
No doubt, Sen would acknowledge that "something of value" would include
more than the obligation to provide the economic means to relieve hunger or thirst.
But it is unclear, with its globalizing drive to develop the undeveloped, whether
this report takes into serious consideration the right of people not to "develop," if
they so choose.
Economic development goes hand-in-hand with certain grave costs. First and
foremost, the rights of peoples' own traditions and cultural lifestyle is indubitably
at stake. One needs only to consider the abundant jurisprudence that demonstrates
unequivocally the number of indigenous and local communities who try to say
"no" to development, but whose voice is neither heeded nor respected." "The
'something of value' these people treasure is the right to be free not to develop, not
to lose the freedom to choose their own lifestyle and their children's future."l 2 In
these cases, the "perfect obligation"13 of states and other non-state agents, should
be to respect agents' choices, especially when they represent the will of these
communities.
Similarly, the preferred means of viewing state obligations, that is "the
Kantian view of imperfect obligations," applicable to anyone who is in a position
to help, is no better, if it excludes the choice not to develop following Western
economic patterns.14 What remains problematic is the starting point of this report:
the assumption that "development" unqualified (that is, not educational, moral,

7. See id. 12.
8. Id. 115.
9. See id.

6-8 (referencing AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999)).

10. Sengupta Report, supranote 5, 6.
11. See Human Rights Committee, Chief Bernard Ominayak and the Lubicon Lake Band v.
Canada, Comm. No. 167/1984, 2.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/38/D/167/1984, (Mar. 26, 1990); Chagos
Islanders v. Attorney General, [2003] EWHC (QB) 2222, [98]; Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470,
473 (2d Cir. 2002); Bancoult v. McNamara, 370 F. Supp. 2d. 1, 2-3 (D.D.C. 2004); Jota v. Texaco, Inc.,
157 F.3d 153, 154-56 (2d Cir. 1998); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1295-96 (D.C. Cal.
2000), vacated, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005); Frederick v. N. Am. Res. Co., 60 P.3d 758, 760-61 (Colo.
App. 2002).
12. LAURA WESTRA, FACES OF STATE TERRORISM 89 (2012).

13. SEN, supra note 9, at 230.
14. Id. at 230-31.
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artistic, cultural, etc.), is the answer to poverty and hunger, despite the numerous
ongoing examples to the contrary.
Consider first who truly benefits from the commercial activities that are
viewed as bringing "development." It is, first, the multinational corporations
("MNCs") who come to mine, extract, log, build, and-in general-"develop" an
area rich in resources." The impassioned pleas of those who are suffering the
effects of those activities, mostly unrestrained by either environmental or public
health mandates, ought to demonstrate that freedom is and must be understood as
both negative and positive: the right to develop as well as the right to embrace and
maintain the status quo, and refuse modem development.
The second group who benefits from "development" activities, includes the
bureaucracies and governments of the affected countries, who may receive a part
of the profits enjoyed by the corporate actors involved, at best, or roads and other
infrastructure, as well as military or para-military support for their warlike action,
at worst. When these elites are undemocratic or they represent outright military
dictatorships, then any hope of even the least "trickle down" benefit is eliminated.
This happened for instance in Ogoniland at the time of the rule of dictator
Sani Abacha in the 1990s.17 It was only in 2009 that finally Royal Dutch Shell
Petroleum paid $15.5 million over the Saro-Wiwa killing, but without even
admitting their guilt for the multiple murders, rapes, and other violence, and the
truly incompensable harms they had perpetrated.' 8 The Vienna Declaration states
categorically, "[h]uman rights and fundamental freedom are the birthright of all
human beings; their protection and promotion is the first responsibility of
Governments." 9
When Shell arrived to bring its "development" to Ogoniland, the Ogoni
people had a comfortable traditional lifestyle, cultivating their land and fishing,
before the advent of what Saro-Wiwa termed the 'ecocide' and 'omnicide' that
ensued once the oil extraction and open flares eliminated all possible cultivation in

15. See, e.g., Suzana Sawyer & Edmund Terence Gomez, Transnational Governmentality in the
Context of Resource Extraction, in THE POLITICS OF RESOURCE EXTRACTION: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES,
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, AND THE STATE 1, 1-2 (Suzana Sawyer & Edmund Terence Gomez

eds., 2012).
16. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 295
(S.D.N.Y 2003).
17. LAURA WESTRA, ENvIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES:
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 281 (2008).

18. Ed Pilkington, Shell Pays Out $15.5M over Saro-Wiwa Killing, GUARDIAN, June 8, 2009,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/08/nigeria-usa.
19. World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna Declaration andProgramme
ofAction, 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993) (this Declaration came out of a two week
conference in 1993 that was based upon strengthening human rights around the world); see also U.N.
Charter arts. 55-56; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S 3
[hereinafter ICESCR]; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(IlI) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
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the area. 20 They eventually received some compensation, 21 but not all local
communities today are so lucky.
For the most part, today, "development" is aimed at economic profit, not at
the health and freedom from want of peoples, 22 as it often destroys, alters, or
removes the resources upon which local communities depend.23 In addition, even
when the community is neither an island nor a coastal one nor yet one that is
located in the high Arctic, climate change effects can be felt across the globe, as it
imposes extreme weather events and temperatures.24
Essentially then, if the "imperfect obligations" of state and non-state actors
("the claims are addressed generally to anyone who can help"), according to the
working group's report, the Right to Development must ensure freedom to (a)
maintain and retain the cherished values of communities; and (b) to eliminate or at
least reduce poverty and hunger.25 This should have started long ago, before the
present impasse was reached. The obligations would have included their own "no"
to activities that harm the natural ecological basis upon which most of the world's
people depend; "no" to international instruments that like the World Trade
Organization, which place environment and public health behind trade; 26 ,no" to
the political and economic support of corporate bodies whose activities and whose
human rights records demanded careful 'scrutiny and regulation, rather than
friendly cooperation.
All that the working group's report on the Right to Development demands is
that the right to development be understood as the right to a "process," which
demands cooperation among all interdependent states, and that the form
"development," should include "a sharp increase in GDP, or rapid industrialization
or an export-led growth." 27
Yet paragraph fifteen of the working group's report acknowledges that despite
the listed forms of development, poverty may not be reduced, and there might be
20. See, e.g., M.A. MOHAMED
CONTEMPORARY AFRICA 77 (1999).

SALIH, ENVIRONMENTAL

POLITICS AND

LIBERATION

IN

21. See Pilkington, supra note 18; see also Ogoniland: FG Begins Implementation of UNEP
Report,

NIGERIAN

TRIBUNE,

Feb

6,

2014,

http://www.tribune.com.ng/news20l3/index.php/en/news/news-headlines/item/32704-10.html
(highlighting that the Nigerian government has started to provide remedies to communities that have
been adversely affected by oil industrial activities).
22. See, e.g., Helena Nygren-Krug, A Human Rights-Based Approach to Non-Communicable
Diseases, in HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN A CHANGING WORLD 567, 574 (Michael A. Grodin et al.

eds., 2013).
23. See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, Civil Remedies, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW
183, 229 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007).
24. Climate Change Impacts: The effects of Warming on Our World Can Be Seen Today, ENVTL.
DEF. FuND, http://www.edf.org/climate/climate-change-impacts (last visited Feb. 12, 2014).
25. See Sengupta Report, supra note 5,
8-11.
26. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 (allowing states to opt out of GATT requirements in order to protect the environment and
human life and health, thus highlighting that the primary concern of this agreement is economic
development).
27. Sengupta Report, supranote 5, 15.
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no commensurate "improvement in social indicators of education, health, gender
development or environmental protection." 28 The placement of environmental
protection last, rather than first, as a basic right is a further symptom of the
misunderstanding of what constitutes a real "basic right," 29 which would indeed be
"the entitlement of every human person as a human right."30 Hence, we can
conclude that the Right to Development's perception of the meaning of
"development" even with the unremarkable additional of "sustainable"
(unspecified and mostly misunderstood), is flawed and incomplete.
The loss of cultural and ecological integrity is not compensated by the
introduction of some Western "improvements" especially when these arise from an
unconsented project. In fact, the overwhelming use of resources and energy
already in existence, fostered by the overconsumption of Western affluent
countries (as indicated by ecological footprint analysis), casts all further industrial
development in doubt.3 ' Not only are most of its effects extremely deleterious to
life on Earth in general, and specifically, to the most vulnerable people in
impoverished developing countries,32 but also there is neither enough energy nor
materials on Earth to continue to expand the industrial enterprise and to bring it to
all countries, to "raise" them to the level of growth present in the West today.
Hence, sustainable development remains an oxymoron, as any form of
development (beyond the intellectual/cultural/moral kind), is intrinsically
unsustainable and physically unachievable. Perhaps the only positive aspect of the
Right to Development is the fact that the right to development is viewed as a
collective rather than an individual right.34 But even that "plus" cannot begin to
offset the numerous deficiencies discussed above.
However, international
instruments aimed primarily as collectives are few and far between, hence it is

28. Id.
29. See HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 19
(2d ed. 1996) ("The reason is that rights are basic in the sense used here only if enjoyment of them is
essential to the enjoyment of all other rights.").
By minimum economic security, or subsistence, I mean unpolluted air, unpolluted
water, adequate food, adequate clothing, adequate shelter, and minimal preventive public
health care. . . . [T]he basic idea is to have available for consumption what is needed for a
decent chance at a reasonably healthy and active life of more or less normal length, barring
tragic interventions.
Id. at 23.
30. LAURA WESTRA, GLOBALIZATION, VIOLENCE AND WORLD GOVERNANCE 39 (2011).
31. See MATHIS WACKERNAGEL & WILLIAM REES, OUR ECOLOGICAL FOOTPRINT: REDUCING
HUMAN IMPACT ON THE EARTH 13-16 (1996); see also William E. Rees & Laura Westra, When

Consumption Does Violence: Can There Be Sustainability and Environmental Justice in a Resourcelimited World, in JUST SUSTAINABILITIES: DEVELOPMENT IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD 99, 99-101 (Julian

Agyeman et al. eds., 2003).
32. Fiona Harvey, World's Poorest Will Feel Brunt of Climate Change, Warns World Bank,
GUARDIAN, June 19, 2013, http://www.theguardian.comlenvironment/2013/jun/19/climate-changedeveloping-countries-world-bank.
33. See WACKERNAGEL & REES, supranote 31, at 7-8.
34. The Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, art. 2(2), U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128, Annex
(Dec. 4, 1986).
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necessary to devote careful study to each existing one, in order to see whether any
support can be found for the position of collectives today.
III. THE CHILD AS A VICTIM OF DEVELOPMENT
In March 2010, a M6decins Sans Frontidres (Doctors Without
Borders) team in Nigeria noticed an alarming number of children were
dying in the northern state of Zamfara. It turned out to be a leadpoisoning outbreak-reportedly the worst in recorded history-and
more than 400 children are estimated to have died as a result.35
UNICEF's, The State of the World's Children: Excluded and Invisible 2006
Report ("UNICEF Report") does not even mention "development" as a possible
source of problems for children's life and health. 6 But this Nigerian disaster is
simply the result of gold mining and of industrial practices that release lead.37 This
is only one of the multiple grievous harms imposed on vulnerable populations.
Nor is this an isolated example of such abuses resulting from "development."
Canada, a so-called democratic country, was scheduled for its "universal periodic
review" at the Human Rights Council on April 26, 2013:
The abuses by Canadian mining companies are a systemic part of
an economic development policy that disregards human rights and
disdains the environment. It is no coincidence that Canada is now home
to 75% of the world's mining companies, the majority operating
overseas. The Canadian government has accelerated its pursuit of
investment treaties in the global south to serve the interests of the
extractive industry. 38
Most indigenous groups want to be left alone to live their lives in the
traditional ways they have practiced since time immemorial, not to "develop" in
some forced and foreign direction. For instance, an indigenous Mayan group in
Guatemala, the Sipakapa of San Marcos, live peacefully in their little country,
practicing agriculture and animal husbandry. 39 In 2005, Montana Exploradora, a
subsidiary of the Canadian/U.S. transnational corporation Goldcorp, received $45
million from the World Bank Group to exploit an open pit gold mine in their

35. Jennifer Yang, Lead-Poisoning Outbreak Turns Corner in Nigeria, TORONTO STAR, July 5,
2013, at A15; see also DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS, LEAD POISONING CRISIS IN ZAMFARA STATE
NORTHERN NIGERIA (2012).
36. UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S CHILDREN: EXCLUDED
at
available
UNICEF],
[hereinafter
(2005)
2006
INVISIBLE
AND
http://www.unicef.org/sowc06/pdfs/sowcO6 fullreport.pdf.
37. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2013: EVENTS OF 2012, at 144-45 (2013), available
at https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/wr20l3 web.pdf.
38. Meera Karunananthan, U.N. Must Challenge Canada'sComplicity in Mining's Human Rights
Abuses, GUARDIAN, Apr. 24, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/povertymatters/2013/apr/24/un-canada-mining-human-rights.
39. See Lyuba Zarsky & Leonardo Stanley, Can Extractive Industries Promote Sustainable
Development? A Net Benefits Framework and a Case Study of the Marlin Mine in Guatemala, 22 J.
ENV'T & DEV. 131, 134 (2013).
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area.40 A video documentary about this project clearly demonstrates the vast gulf
between the arguments and proposals of the mine representatives and the responses
of the local people.41 In the final analysis, the people's "no" should have meant
just that. The ILO Convention No. 169 and, even the Constitution of Guatemala,
demand a consultation with the indigenous peoples.42 The result was not
consensus but a resounding "no" to the project, but that was not respected and the
exploration and work continued.4 3
While the Guatemalan Courts are still to pronounce themselves on the topic,
in April 2006, the open pit mining was in full operation with its highly toxic
cyanide ponds required for the operation, and its heedless use of the scarce local
water for industrial activities." Repeated in the video, the people ask "what is our
advantage?"AS The answer to this question remains unclear, while the damages
inflicted emerge clearly, and the courts deliberately proceed at a slow pace, the
corporations continue with their unwanted and harmful "development."
It is instructive to note that the only disease or pre-birth issue that harms the
child and is openly discussed in the UNICEF Report, is HIV/AIDS, which contains
a strong element of choice at least for the infected parent, rather than the numerous
industrial exposures which, as noted, adversely affect the child in multiple
irreversible ways, but which hold no element of choice for the transmitting mother,
or for the developing child.46
The UNICEF Report states that a great portion of the mortality of children
under five is due to armed conflicts, not only directly, but through "poor

40. Nick Dearden, Guatemala's Chixoy Dam: Where Development and Terror Intersect,
GUARDIAN,
Dec.
10,
2012,
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/povertymatters/2012/dec/10/guatemala-chixoy-dam-development-terror.
41. Alvaro Revenga, Sipakapa No Se Vende, YOUTUBE (Guat.) (May 10, 2012),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-qfHDgWnBC5s.
42. International Labour Organization [ILO], Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples in Independent Countries No. 169 art. 1, June 27, 1989, 1650 U.N.T.S. 383; CONSTITUCI6N
POLITICA DE REPUBLICA DE GUATEMALA [C.P.] arts. 66-67.
43. Valerie Croft, Goldcorp Drilled by Shareholders, DOMINION (June 8, 2010),
http://www.dominionpaper.ca/articles/3486.
44. ON COMMON GROUND CONSULTANTS, HUMAN RIGHTS ASSESSMENT OF GOLDCORP'S
MARLIN MINE: APPENDIX F-OvERvIEw OF LEGAL CASES INVOLVING THE MARLIN MINE (2010),
available
at
http://hriaguatemala.com/en/docs/Human%20Rights/HRA Appendix F Legal Cases.pdf; see also Dawn Paley,
Goldcorp: Occupation and Resistance in Guatemala (and Beyond), DOMINION (June 21, 2008),
http://upsidedownworld.org/main/guatemala-archives-33/1346-goldcorp-occupation-and-resistance-inguatemala-and-beyond (commenting on how the operations of the mine continued during legal
proceedings); Brenda Norrell, Mayans in Guatemala: No Compromise, Halt Mining, NARCOSPHERE
(Sept.
30,
2007,
12:20
PM),
http://narcosphere.narconews.com/notebook/brendanorrell/2007/09/mayans-guatemala-no-compromise-halt-mining (demonstrating that metals from the
mine are draining into the river); Nathan Einbinder, Guatemala: The Hopefor an Endless Mine, UPSIDE
DowN WORLD (Aug. 12, 2008), http://upsidedownworld.org/main/guatemala-archives-33/1421guatemala-the-hope-for-an-endless-mine (highlighting the use of cyanide in the mining operation).
45. Revenga, supranote 41.
46. See UNICEF, supranote 36.
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governance."47 The reasons for this situation include "the destruction of physical
infrastructure, strains on healthcare and education systems, workers and supplies,
and increasing personal insecurity caused by the conflict or its remnants-such as
landmines and unexploded ordnance." 48 At this time, it is important to consider
that the "destruction of infrastructure" and the strains to health care and education
also contribute to the insecurity and lack of physical safety of children in all cases
of development projects that affect their living conditions in developing countries
and weak, but resource-rich nations.
Communities, indigenous to an area, that live traditionally on the land that is
and has been historically theirs, but are confronted by any industry that is
particularly hazardous to "fragile states," whose weak institutions, "with high
levels of corruption, political instability and weak rule of law," 4 9 which thus cannot
resist the power of corporate expansion, as they succumb to further weakening of
their bureaucracies and institutions, the results are, most often, irreversible harms
to the most vulnerable, including the children.
These conclusions can be easily drawn by studying the general situations in
all cases where development is imposed on vulnerable communities. It can be
inferred that children will suffer the worst impacts of any of these toxic operations.
However, there is no mention of children or of any special protections for their
particular vulnerabilities, at least no such language may be found in the Right to
Development.5 0 Yet in the resolution adopted by the General Assembly entitled A
World Fitfor Children ("2002 Resolution") paragraph 7(4) reads: "Care for every
child. Children must get the best possible start in life. Their survival, protection,
growth and development in good health and with proper nutrition are the essential
foundation of human development."" Yet paragraph five says "[w]e stress our
commitment to create a world fit for children, in which sustainable human
development . . . tak[es] into account the best interests of the child . . . ." and

relates a number of principles needed to achieve the projected goal, culminating in
the "interrelatedness of all human rights, including the right to development." 52
It seems that the "essential foundation of human development" refers to
something other than the "right to development," which is simply not aimed at
securing safety and health, as the main actors are not the affected local
populations, but the MNCs, who plan, decide, and effect their industrial operations
based solely on economic advantage. Hence the double and self-contradictory
meaning of "development" needs to be discussed openly and defined with
sufficient specificity to clarify when it is meant as a favorable expression regarding
47. Id. at 14-15.
48. Id. at 14.
49. Id. at 15.
50. The Right to Development, G..A. Res. 41/128, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128, Annex (Dec. 4,
1986).
51. A World Fit for Children, G..A. Res. S-27/2, 17(4), U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-27/2, Annex (May
10, 2002) (a resolution adopted by the General Assembly, on the report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the
Whole, which was adopted following the World Summit for Children).
52. Id.15.

10

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 42.1

children's health, and when it is instead meant as-at best-the amoral economic
practices of corporate legal persons.
Another desirable goal of the 2002 Resolution is outlined in paragraph 7(10):
Protect the Earth for Children.

We must safeguard our natural

environment, with its diversity of life, its beauty and its resources, all of
which enhance the quality of life, for present and future generations.
We will give every assistance to protect children and minimize the
impact of natural disasters and environmental degradation on them.53
The Resolution acknowledges that both "additional resources," and "renewed
political will" are necessary to translate even laudable goals into practice.54 In
paragraph twenty, however, the 2002 Resolution acknowledges that
"[d]iscrimination gives rise to a self-perpetuating cycle of social and economic
exclusion and undermines children's ability to develop to the fullest,"5 5 yet it does
relate discrimination to "development," which is simply seen as an instrument of
globalization, intended to reduce chronic poverty: "We recognize that globalization
and interdependence are opening new opportunities through trade, investment and
capital flows and advances in technology, including information technology, for
the growth of the world economy, development and the improvement of living
standards around the world." 56 But there is no indication that the "growth of the
world's economy" simply replicates the already discredited theory of trickle down
economics, 5 7 to benefit either the general living standards of impoverished people,
or the health and safety of children. In fact, the conflict between economic growth
and the protection of children is seen most clearly in the conflicts arising in the
home countries of the MNCs, as even there, despite the stronger existing
infrastructures and-presumably-the legal protection of human rights consonant
with democracy. One recent example will suffice. As explained by Philippe
Grandjean in Only Once Chance:
In the summer of 2006, the New York Times and other major
American newspapers displayed full-page advertisements to convince
readers that mercury in fish was safe. . . .

The message was:

"Concerned about mercury? You shouldn't be. Unless you eat this."
Then there was a picture of canned whale meat.5 8
The ads were placed and funded by the Center for Consumer Freedom, an
industry-funded think tank that regularly downplayed "the dangers of obesity,
smoking, and drunk-driving"; although in this case "the campaign was apparently
paid for by the tuna industry" that had lost significantly since the worry about

53. Id. 7(10).
54. Id. 8.
55. Id. 20.
56. Id. 19 (emphasis added).
57. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY 6 (2012).
58. GRANDJEAN, supra note 1, at 119.
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mercury had surfaced.59 In that case, like in many others, "industry skillfully turns
what should be a debate over policy to a debate over science."60
"[B]ecause of the mercury scare, [producers of canned tuna organized] a $25
million campaign." 61 Grandjean adds: "In one year, they would spend an amount
much greater than the total support for mercury research that I had received during
20 years from the National Institute of Health." 62 Other industries employed
similar strategies for years, including the smoking and tobacco industry until the
A whole industry of
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control was enacted.
paid "researchers" ensure that doubt is raised, when none exists, on any specific
scientific issue that affects public health regarding some industrial activity or
product. Some of the best known of these organizations are the Center for Science
and Public Policy, the Center for Indoor Air Research, and the Citizens for Fire
Safety Institute; these are the "'front groups' for financial interests," despite their
benign-sounding names.64
A parallel "disinformation campaign" has been staged by climate change
deniers, and the multiple oil and energy corporations whose economic interests are
threatened by the reality of global warming, already acknowledged by science
worldwide. 65 Thus, under a barrage of well-paid hired guns, the worst and most
harmful activities and the science that indicts them, are doubted, critiqued without
any scientific basis, and generally downplayed by the very corporations that gain
from the ongoing production and use that those activities generated.
Neither truth, nor science, nor yet human rights prevail in this ongoing
situation in the affluent North. Thus those in the global South, suffering from
chronic poverty and weakened institutions, have no hope to affirm and fight for
their rights and those of their children, no matter the seriousness of the imposed
harms. In fact, there is no effort on the part of corporate moguls to even mount
disinformation campaigns, as they can proceed at will towards their goals with no
resistance even from governments who are signatories to the Convention on the

59. Id. at 119-20.
60. Id. at 120 (citing DAVID MICHAELS, DOUBT Is THEIR PRODUCT: How INDUSTRY'S ASSAULT
ON SCIENCE THREATENS YOUR HEALTH 60-78 (2008); UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, HEADS
THEY WIN, TAILS WE LOSE: How CORPORATIONS CORRUPT SCIENCE AT THE PUBLIC'S EXPENSE 13-30
(2012)).

61. Id. at 120; see also Terry Rodgers, As Canned Tuna Sales Dive, Companies Plan Ad Blitz to
Reel
Buyers
Back
In,
SAN
DIEGO
UNION-TRIBUNE,
July
27,
2005,
http://www.utsandiego.com/uniontrib/20050727/newslb27tuna.html.
62. GRANDJEAN, supra note 1, at 120.
63. WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, May 21, 2003, 2302 U.N.T.S. 166
[hereinafter WHO Framework]; see John Tierney, 'Misleading' Research from Industry?, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 30, 2008, 11:02 AM), http://tierneylab.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/30/misleading-research-fromindustry/?_r-0.
64. GRANDJEAN, supra note 1, at 121.
65. Donald A. Brown, Ethical Analysis of the Climate Change Disinformation Campaign,
PM),
2:13
2012,
10,
(Jan.
PROGRESS
CLIMATE
http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/01/10/399724/ethical-analysis-of-the-climate-changedisinformation-campaign.
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Rights of the Child and other instruments intended to protect children's rights.66
There is no corresponding legal regime to restrain the harms perpetrated by
"development," while there is an instrument benignly titled the Right to
Development instead.
IV.

THE RIGHT TO HEALTH, THE CHILD, AND AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON
DEVELOPMENT

While public health scholars and activists have attempted to
employ the right to health as part of this right-based approach to
development, the promise of the right to health has largely proven
illusory in development discourse. Founded upon the non-derogable
right to life, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR)
affirms in Article 25(1) that "[e]veryone has a right to a standard of
living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his
family, including .. .medical care and necessary social services."67
Professor Meier acknowledges that development, which is understood as
"purely economic (measured in terms of aggregate GDP)," does not include "broad
social, political, and cultural change"68 and he proposes incorporating these notions
in an improved "ecological model of public health."69
However, he also
acknowledges that the present economic models of neoliberal globalized
development are "insalubrious" as they stand because, 70 according to that model,
public goods are viewed as a "market" failures: "Yet despite the recognized
importance of these public health systems, the neoliberal development paradigm's
pursuit of national economic growth at the expense of human development,
undermines the supply of public goods affecting entire societies."
This reality
leads Professor Meier to conclude, correctly I believe, that "neoliberal
development programs" harm public health.72 The major accepted understanding
of development in economic terms prospered in the "normative vacuum" provided
by globalization and neoliberalism, 73 as previous government-supported social and
public health services were privatized instead, and left "to the whims of
international markets," 74 thus further inflicting "additional suffering on
66. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC]; see
also InternationalNorms and Standards Relating to Disability,Part V. Persons with Disabilities and
Multiple
Discrimination-Rights of Special
Groups,
UNITED
NATIONS
ENABLE,
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/comp501.11tm#1.1
(last visited Nov. 4. 2013) (listing other
intemational instruments that govern children's rights).
67. Meier & Fox, supra note 2, at 296; UDHR, supra note 19, art. 25(1).
68. Meier & Fox, supra note 2, at 269.
69. Id. at 271.
70. Benjamin Mason Meier, Employing Health Rightsfor Global Justice: The Promise of Public
Health in Response to the InsalubriousRamifications of Globalization,39 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 711, 713
(2006).
71. Meier & Fox, supranote 2, at 273.
72. Id. at 274.
73. Id. at 276.
74. Id. at 277.
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disenfranchised and vulnerable populations." The deterioration of public health
systems, in the context of the present understanding of development is based
primarily on three ongoing problems:
First, through [structural adjustment programs] and subsequent
neoliberal programs, the IMF has eviscerated the developing state public
health systems ....
Second, mandated health sector efficiency controls have resulted
in cost recovery schemes that have had a dramatic impact on countries'
health services ....
Finally, these intellectual property regimes of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) often prevent States from reasonably providing
affordable medications and treatment for their people.
Thus far Professor Meier's analysis enriches rather than contradicts the
argument of this work; particularly in regard to the discriminatory presence of the
worst of these harmful effect of development, on the poor of the third world and
indigenous populations, as Professor Meier explicitly decries elevating "corporate
cupidity over the imperatives of public health."7 7 Neoliberal imperatives might
permit the research required to find cures for rich men's diseases, but they do not
allow research for medicines to treat "tropical" or "orphan" diseases, which remain
neglected because of market imperatives.7 8
Professor Meier points out that, because of neoliberalism, over the last fifty
years, previous gains in health care brought by the role of governmental
institutions have been reversed. 79 But, in the last fifty years or so, there has been
an ongoing but novel attack on public health, which is as likely (often more likely)
to attack those in wealthy countries than those who are poor. A clear exception to
this conclusion is the multiple attacks on indigenous peoples that we have noted.
The source of these attacks is the introduction of multiple untested industrial
chemicals that have grown apace with the withdrawal of state-based health
protection in general. 80
In 2006, I argued that future generations' rights, in fact the very existence of
future generations themselves, depended on a new understanding of the concept of
"development," rather than the simple acceptance of the currently accepted
meaning.81 The "development" of the child, that is, of those who comprise the first
75. Id. at 282; see also Joyce V. Millen et al., Introduction: What is Growing? Who is Dying?, in
DYING FOR GROWTH: GLOBAL INEQUITY AND THE HEALTH OF THE POOR 3, 6-7 (Jim Yong Kim et al.

eds., 2000).
76. Meier & Fox, supra note 2, at 285-87.
77. Id. at 288.
78. Id.; see also PAUL HUNT ET AL., WORLD HEALTH ORG., NEGLECTED DISEASES: A HUMAN
RIGHTS
ANALYSIS
38
(2007),
available
at
http://www.essex.ac.uk/hrc/research/projects/rth/docs/Neglected Diseases.pdf.
79. Meier & Fox, supra note 2, at 289.
80. See generally GRANDJEAN, supra note 1.
81. LAURA WESTRA, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND THE RIGHTS OF UNBORN AND FUTURE
GENERATIONS: LAW, ENVIRONMENTAL HARM AND THE RIGHT TO HEALTH 198-99 (2006).
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generation, is or should be the most important form of development. Without a
legal framework that gives primacy to prebom development, that acknowledges
the nefarious impact of most of those unchecked chemicals on the first generation,
normal development will not be possible either for the first or other future
generations beyond it, and environmental justice will not be achieved.82
The research that has been emerging over the last few decades demonstrates
that there is even more at stake than the poor general health that Professor Meier
documents, as we note in Dr. Grandjean's recent work.8 3 We now confront various
sorts of abnormal development, which would also have effects not only on the
exposed child or prebom, but on others across generations, as these substances
affect the DNA, as well as the future health of adults.84
However, the next question that needs to be asked, is whether the right to
health includes, or at least should be understood to include, the right to normal
development for the protection of the most vulnerable: the child. Professor Meier,
as we shall see, would like to combine a program of public health to the "right to
development."85 I would counter that unless the right to development is first
understood as "right to normal development," even that desirable goal will be
insufficient.
V.

THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD IN THE CONTEXT OF PRESENTLY DAMAGED PUBLIC
HEALTH INSTITUTIONS
A rights-based approach to development is a conceptual
framework for the process of human development that is normatively
based on international human rights standards and operationally directed

to promoting and protecting human rights. Essentially, a rights-based
approach integrates the norms, standards, and principles of the
international human rights system into the plans, policies and processes
of development.8 6

Coupled with the "lofty language" of "the highest attainable standard of
health" in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
("ICESCR"), these official words support, at best, individual medical needs, but do
little or nothing to advance the cause of public health, despite the acknowledged
progress from the earlier "medical model" of public health to the more recent

82. Id. at 147-48.
83. See generally GRANDJEAN, supra note 1.
84. See KEiTH L. MOORE ET AL., BEFORE WE ARE BORN: ESSENTIALS OF EMBRYOLOGY AND
BIRTH DEFECTS 306-09 (8th ed. 2013); Christopher M. Somers et al., Air Pollution Induces Heritable
DNA Mutations, 99 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SC. 15904 (2002); Ker Than, Pollution Can Change Your
DNA
in 3 Days, Study Suggests, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC NEWS (May 17, 2009),
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2009/05/090517-pollution-changes-dna.html.
85. Meier, supra note 70, at 765-66.

86. Third United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries, May 14-20, 2001,
Brussels, Beig., Human Rights, Poverty and Governance in Least Developed Countries: Rights-based
Approaches Towards a New Framework of Cooperation, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.191/BP/8 (May 13,

2001).
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"social/ecological model."8
The latter is now accepted by doctors,
epidemiologists, and other representatives of public health institutions, but
international law has not developed and progressed equally.8 8
The ICESCR was adopted in 1966, but nothing has been added to keep pace
with the scientific advances of the last fifty years to eliminate or at least minimize
new threats. The case law involving collective public health damages to
indigenous and other vulnerable communities reflects the lacunae present in legal
regimes, despite the strong language present in the Human Rights Council
Resolution on "Human Rights and the Environment"; the World Health
Organization (WHO) Report on the Social Determinants of Health; and the
UNCHR Resolution addressing "[t]he right of everyone to the enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health." 89
Nevertheless, despite the presence of these international legal instruments,
additional to the "right to development" that Professor Meier cites as the most
hopeful venue for progress, the proofof their ability to sustain public health and to
curb abuses promoted by neo-liberal-inspired "development," demonstrates their
impotence instead. 90 There are two basic reasons for this impotence. The first is
the power of industry, trade, and ultimately corporations, who are not bound by
any of the legal instruments we have cited, and have no interest in accepting
restraints on their operations. A number of examples could be adduced where
corporate interests explicitly run counter to public health requirements. For
instance, tobacco companies are fighting hard under trade agreement laws to
restrain countries with whom they want to deal from enacting stringent antismoking laws:
Facing vehement protest from tobacco state lawmakers and
business groups, the Obama administration appears to have retreated
from efforts to keep cigarette makers from using trade treaties to attack
countries that adopt strong anti-smoking rules.
At issue is whether a pending free trade deal should include
language protecting the authority of nations to adopt tough regulations
to reduce smoking. 9 1

87. See ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 12; Christopher Masi, When Less is More in PublicHealth,
51 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED., 479, 479-80 (2008) (discussing the "medical model" of public health and
highlighting that under this model there has been a "slowdown in life expectancy gains"); Meier & Fox,
supra note 2, at 265 (discussing the "social/ecological model" of public health).
88. Meier & Fox, supra note 2, at 292.
89. Human Rights Council Res. 16/11, Rep. of the Human Right Council, 16th Sess., Feb. 28Mar. 25, 2011, at 24, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/16/2 (Mar. 25, 2011); WORLD HEALTH ORG., CLOSING THE
GAP IN A GENERATION: HEALTH EQUITY THROUGH ACTION ON THE SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF
HEALTH (2008); Comm'n on Human Rights Res. 2002/31, Rep. of the Commission on Human Rights,
58th Sess., Mar 18-Apr. 16, 2002, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 3, E/2002/23, at 144 (Apr. 22, 2002).
90. Meier, supra note 70, at 763.
91. Myron Levin, Tobacco State Protest Could Hurt Obama Trade Deal, SALON (Aug. 13, 2013,
6:42 AM), http://www.salon.com/2013/08/13/tobacco-state protest-could hurt-obama-trade-deal.
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Examples could be multiplied. Corporations like Monsanto are so aware of
the dangers of their products that their lobbies have succeeded in having President
Obama sign the Monsanto Protection Act in March 2012.92 Much has been written
on corporate crimes. But the second issue, which is the topic of this work, is the
fact that the interface and the linkages between the environment and, in general,
ecological conditions and public health, are neither understood nor acknowledged.
These "missing linkages" can be summed up under four headings:
a. explicit denial of the interface in jurisprudence, from U.S. cases under
the Alien Torts Claims Act (ATCA), to the European Court of Human
Rights and the International Court of Justice;
b. lack of explicit prohibitions on the part of the WHO regarding
industrial chemical and agricultural processes, despite the abundant
evidence amassed by that U.N. body and available in medical journals
regarding the human health consequences of those industrial activities,
which today can be compared to the evidence gathered by the WHO
before drafting their Framework Convention on Tobacco Control;
c. ongoing denial of the egregious human rights violations that follow
upon climate change, including glacial melts in the Arctic through
drought and famine in sub-Saharan Africa, while the same Western
practices continue to contribute to global warming, including the over-use
of water and grains in industrial meat production with its resulting
methane releases; and,
d. insistence on the "right" to "sustainable development," without the
right of indigenous and other land-based communities to say "no" when
the development in question is unwanted, as it continues to gravely
impact these peoples' very subsistence, as well as their health and
survival, both as individuals and as peoples.
As well, the numerous cases, especially in North, Central, and South America,
involving indigenous peoples, and the grave harms they suffer because of
industrial exposures due to the development agenda of MNCs, unfortunately, make
the belief in progress based on the right to development doubtful at best. In that I
concur with Professor Meier's 2006 work, 93 as well as his more recent assertion
that "[i]ndividual [r]ights [a]re [p]owerless to [p]rotect [p]ublic [h]ealth
[s]ystems." 94
In contrast, "[p]ublic health and safety are community or group interests." 95
What needs to be addressed is that the rights that must be supported are the rights

92. See LAURA WESTRA, THE SUPRANATIONAL CORPORATION: BEYOND THE MULTINATIONALS
87-88 (2013) [hereinafter WESTRA, SUPRANATIONAL]; Michelle McGuinness, 'Monsanto Protection
Act' Called 'Outrageous,'Dangerous, MSN NEWS (Mar. 28, 2013), http://news.msn.com/us/monsantoprotection-act-called-outrageous-dangerous.
93. See Meier,supra note 70, at 727-732.
94. Meier & Fox, supra note 2, at 293.
95. Id. at 337 (quoting Dan E. Beauchamp, Community: The Neglected Tradition of Public
Health, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1985, at 28, 29).
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of humankind, of the human collectivity, although, as we argued elsewhere, some
groups and communities are particularly valuable and need support in addition to
the humanity they share with the rest. 96 When the affected "community" is
primarily that of the preborn and thus that of the child, then the weakness of the
Professor Meier adds:
"development" argument becomes even clearer.
"Development through free markets is often justified by arguments for collective
good and aggregate benefit, with growth distributed without regard for individual
economic and social rights."9 But "development" is largely driven by corporate
interests,98 the same corporate interests that demand in-house testing for their
products and processes, 99 and who lobby for elastic language in domestic and
international legal instruments, even demanding a prior immunity from the
possible (and in fact anticipated) harms these same products will produce.'o One
of the largest and most dangerous, Monsanto, is even prepared to protect its
privileges by force, if money does not suffice to smooth their path. 101
In order for the future to be of the hopeful scenario Professor Meier envisions,
the first step is the revision of the testing protocols applied to all industrial
substances and processes, one that involves the presence of impartial public health
organizations, rather than the existing in-home procedures. The second step is
revising all the cited instruments in support of public health, including language
consonant with that of the 2012 WHO EDC Report as well as previous WHO
Reports regarding child health. Finally, the most important step would be to return
to state-supported health institutions and organizations, immune from both funding
and intrusion from corporate sources. That ideal situation, unlikely as it is to
materialize in the foreseeable future, would eliminate privatized services by the
same corporate actors who are united in the WTO and NAFTA to ensure that even
the health findings of democratic countries' health systems, could be reversed on
economic and trade grounds.1 02
Even if we simply consider the malnutrition and starvation that affect the
impoverished populations in the third world, in addition to the chemical exposures
that impose hazards upon the wealthier countries, especially on their children, we

96. LAURA WESTRA, HUMAN RIGHTS: THE COMMONS AND THE COLLECTIVE
97. Meier & Fox, supra note 2, at 337.

12, 221 (2011).

98. See UGO MATTEI AND LAURA NADER, PLUNDER: WHEN THE RULE OF LAW IS ILLEGAL 58-63
(2008).
99. See WESTRA, SUPRANATIONAL, supra note 92, at 93-98.

100. See Holly Yeager, Senate Funding Bill Strips Controversial Provision on Genetically
Modified Crops, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-funding-

bill-strips-controversial-provision-on-genetically-modified-crops/2013/09/26/353247ae-26c4-1 1e3b3e9-d97fb087acd6_story.htmI.
101. See Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater's Black Ops: Internal Documents Reveal the Firm's
2010),
Clandestine Work for Multinationals and Governments, NATION (Sept. 15,
http://www.thenation.com/article/l54739/blackwaters-black-ops#.

102. See DAVID R. BOYD, UNNATURAL LAW: RETHINKING CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
POLICY 258 (2003) (describing the Methanex case, where Health Canada was forced to retract its
findings, accept a carcinogenic additive in gasoline, and pay almost $20 million to the U.S. corporation
that manufactured the substance).
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find a scenario that reinforces the fear, rather than hope in development: "The
world's croplands could feed 4 billion more people than they do now just by
shifting from producing animal feed and biofuels to producing exclusively food for
human consumption, according to new research from the Institute on the
Environment at the University of Minnesota." 0 3
If you add to those figures the immense amounts of water wasted by so-called
"animal agriculture," the climate change effects arising from it, and the ongoing
danger arising from the overuse of antibiotics for the same unfortunate animals, the
costs for public health and human survival itself are extreme. 104 Of course the use
and overuse of meat by richer people is a public health danger in itself, to the
individual health of so many that obesity/diabetes endanger with all concomitant
diseases, is present in all developed countries, once again enriching a number of
corporate persons, from fast foods, to agribusiness, to the pharmaceutical industry
itself.'os
VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

It is disheartening to see that an instrument like the Right to Development,06
which should have been there to ensure respect for the economic and social rights
of human beings, is used instead to facilitate economic activities that result in the
"development" of multinational corporations, rather than the betterment of the
conditions of the poor.
This conflict emerges most clearly when we consider the issue of public
health, not only the provision of medical services, but, more importantly, the
concern for the healthy development of the most vulnerable: the children. As we
saw, UNICEF's report refers to the child as "invisible" in a world where there is
little in law or governance to protect the child, and where even the Convention on
the Rights of the Child has no specific reference to the problems presented by
industrial operations, and the related exposures affecting the child. "
Hence, unless some drastic change occurs along the lines proposed by
Professor Meier, it would seem that not only the right to health (including normal
development), but the right not to suffer discrimination on any grounds are not
presently ensured for the child.

103. Univ. of Minn., Existing CroplandCould Feed FourBillion More by Dropping Biofuels and
Animal Feed,SCI. DAILY (Aug. 1,2013), http://sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/08/130801125704.htm.
104. See Lisa Winebarger, Comment, Standing Behind Beastly Emissions: The U.S. Subsidization
ofAnimal Agriculture Violates the UnitedNations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 27 AM.
U. INT'L L. REV. 991, 1006-09 (2012); see Meat: Now It's Not Personal!,WORLD WATCH MAG., JulyAug. 2004, at 12, 12-19.
105. See Meat: Now It's Not Personal!,supranote 104, at 18-19.
106. The Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128, Annex (Dec. 4,
1986).
107. UNICEF, supra note 36, at 14-15; see generally CRC, supra note 66 (demonstrating no
specific reference to industrial operations' effects on children).

THE 1979 UNITED STATES-IRAN HOSTAGE CRISIS REVIEWED
FROM AN ISLAMIC INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE
MUHAMMAD-BASHEER .A. ISMAIL*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Almost all Muslim states' signed and ratified the two international diplomatic
and consular legal frameworks: the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations ("VCDR") 2 and the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
("VCCR").3 The Islamic Republic of Iran, a party to the VCDR and the VCCR, is
expected to uphold these conventional principles of diplomatic immunities and
international law in all its diplomatic interactions with other states. Three decades
ago, the Islamic Republic of Iran seized the United States of America's embassy
and its staff. The United States brought a case against Iran in the International
Court of Justice ("I.C.J") for violating diplomatic immunity and international
obligations. Although the Iranian government was not represented throughout the
proceedings before the I.C.J., it sent, through the Iranian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, two letters dated December 9, 1979, and March 16, 1980, to the I.C.J.4
These letters summarized the reasons why the Iranian government felt that the case
brought by the United States should not be recognized and considered by the

*Muhammad-Basheer A. Ismail has a PhD in Law from the University of Hull, England, and a
Barrister and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Nigeria. This article is an excerpt from his doctoral
thesis completed under the supervisions of Dr. Niaz A. Shah and Dr. Richard Burchill of the School of
Law, University of Hull, England. The author is greatly indebted to them for their constructive and
helpful observations. The author is also grateful to Dr. Lateef Adetona for his invaluable comments and
Mr. Feisal Fara, a PhD candidate at the University of Hull, for his useful remarks. I am equally thankful
to Laura Wood for her editorial comments and observations.
1. "Muslim state" in this article refers to country that has a majority Muslim population. It also
includes states that specifically declare themselves as "Islamic Republics" and those states that declare
Islam, in their Constitutions, as the state's religion. It must be noted, however, that the meaning of
"Muslim states" does not necessarily cover all the 57 states that are members of the Organisation of
Islamic Cooperation ("OIC"), because there are some member states such as Togo, Uganda, Republic of
Benin, Gabon, Mozambique, and Suriname that cannot be said to have majority Muslim population. See
MASHOOD A. BADERIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND ISLAMIC LAW 8 (2003); see also HASAN
MOINUDDIN, THE CHARTER OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE AND THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AMONG ITS MEMBER STATES 10-12 (1987).

2. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95
(entered into force Apr. 24, 1964) [hereinafter VCDR].
3. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261
(entered into force Mar. 19, 1967) [hereinafter VCCR].
4. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980
I.C.J. 3, $ 10 (May 24).
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I.C.J.5 After considering the facts of the case and all the evidence adduced, the
I.C.J. found the Iranian government guilty. 6 The judgment of the I.C.J. would have
been more convincing to the Islamic Republic of Iran had the United States further
predicated its arguments on Islamic law.
Considering this background, it may be necessary to reappraise the 1979
seizure of the American embassy in Tehran by examining Islamic law's
implication on the entire incidence. The purpose is to ascertain whether the Iranian
authorities made adequate provisions for the protection of the American diplomatic
personnel within the territory of Iran in accordance with Islamic siyar, otherwise
known as Islamic international law.7 It is crucial to mention here, that not much
has been mentioned concerning the position of Islamic siyar on the 1979 Iranian
invasion of the United States embassy. The only major work that was written in
respect of the position of Islamic law concerning the Iranian invasion of the United
States embassy in 1979 was by Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni in 1980 while the
invasion of the embassy was still ongoing.8 This article will, therefore, be
evaluating facts surrounding i) the seizure of the embassy and the hostage taking
crisis; ii) the applicable international conventions between Iran and the United
States and their legal implications under Islamic siyar; iii) the justification for
detaining the United States diplomats, if any, under Islamic siyar; iv) the violation
of diplomatic immunity under Islamic siyar; and, v) the implication of Iran's
violation of the United States diplomatic immunity under Islamic international law.
This article then concludes that the general finding of Islamic siyar with regards to
the Iranian hostage case may not be different from that of the findings of the I.C.J.
II.

SEIZURE OF THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY

On November 4, 1979, a group of Iranian Muslim students, known as the
Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy,9 invaded the American embassy
in Tehran and held fifty-two of its personnel hostage for 444 days. The action of
the students was said to be in protest against the decision of the United States in
October 1979 to admit the former Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, into the
United States under the pretext of a life-saving medical treatment.10 The hostage
takers threatened that unless the Shah was extradited along with his wealth, they
5. See id.; United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Request for the
Indication of Provisional Measures, 1979 I.C.J. 7, 1 8 (Dec. 15).
6. United States Diplomaticand ConsularStaff in Tehran, Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 195.
7. The word 'siyar' has been used as a rough equivalent of Islamic international law. THE
OxFORD DICTIONARY OF ISLAM 297 (John L. Esposito ed., 2003). It is generally used by jurists to mean
the conduct of state relationship with other communities and nations. Id. Islamic international law and
Islamic siyarwill be used interchangeably in this article.
8. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Protection of Diplomats Under Islamic Law, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 609,
609, 618-20 (1980).
9. B. SEN, A DIPLOMAT'S HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 119 (3rd rev. ed.

1988).
10. Amir Rafat, The Iran Hostage Crisis and the International Court of Justice: Aspects of the
Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staffin Tehran, 10 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
425,426 (1981).

2013

IRAN HOSTAGE CRISIS FROM ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE

21

would not hesitate to put the hostages on trial for the offense of espionage." But
the fact remained that under Section 3181(a) of the United States Code, the United
States would not have extradited the Shah due to the absence of any extradition
treaty with the Islamic Republic of Iran.12 That being the case, the United States
was legally incapable of extraditing the Shah of Iran. Aside from the thirteen
female and African-American hostages that were released within the first month,' 3
and later another hostage that was released due to illness,14 the rest of the members
of the diplomatic and consular staff of the United States were not released until
January 20, 1981.'s
The United States made "innumerable pleas, resolutions, declarations, special
missions, and even sanctions" towards securing the release of the hostages without
success.16 The United States then instituted a legal action against the Islamic
Republic of Iran at the I.C.J., the judicial arm of the United Nations, on November
29, 1979.'1 The I.C.J., in its unanimous decision on December 15, 1979, gave an
interim order directing Iran to restore the diplomatic mission to the United States
government and to release the hostages by giving them full diplomatic protection
with freedom to leave Iran.' On May 24, 1980, the I.C.J. issued its final judgment
on the merits and found Iran to be in contravention to its obligations under
international conventions and long-established rules of general international law.19
The Islamic Republic of Iran was also ordered to make reparation to the United
States. 20 Both the interim order and the final judgment of the I.C.J. were defied by
Iran.2 1
It is important to mention that throughout the entire proceedings at the I.C.J.,
the United States hinged their legal arguments mainly on well-acknowledged

11. Id. at 427-28.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (2012); see Richard Falk, Editorial, The Iran Hostage Crisis: Easy Answers
and HardQuestions, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 411, 411-12 (1980).
13. It was reported that a woman and two African-American men were released on November 18,
1979. Jonathan C. Randal, Iran Releases 10 More U.S. Hostages, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 1979, at Al.
Another four white females and six African-American male hostages were released on November 19,
1979. Id.
14. Paul Lewis, RichardI. Queen, 51, Hostage Freed Early by Iraniansin '80, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug.
21, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/21/us/richard-i-queen-51-hostage-freed-early-by-iraniansin-80.html.
15. William Branigin, Ordeal Ends on 444th Day, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1981, at Al.
16. L.H. Legault, Hostage-Takingand DiplomaticImmunity, 11 MAN. L.J. 359, 359 (1981).
17. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 3,
1 (May 24). See also Don Oberdorfer, U.S. Takes Case to World Court, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 1979,
at Al.
18. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Request for the
Indication of Provisional Measures, 1979 I.C.J. 7,147 (Dec. 15) (granting provisional measures).
19. UnitedStates Diplomatic and ConsularStaff in Tehran, Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 90.
20. Id. 95.
21. Id.
75. See also JOHN F. MURPHY, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE CONTROL OF
INTERNATIONAL VIOLENCE: A LEGAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 120 (1983).
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principles of diplomatic immunity, 22 which are viewed and understood from the
Western legal perspective. The United States could have further argued from the
viewpoint of Islamic law by relying on the Qur'anic, prophetic, and various
Muslim juristic pronouncements on the principles of diplomatic immunity. Such
arguments would have strengthened the United States case against the Islamic
Republic of Iran. Judge Weeramantry rightly argues that Islamic international law,
which is equally "rich in principles relating to the treatment of foreign embassies
and personnel," would possibly have had a three-fold effect on Iran if the United
States had availed itself the opportunity of canvassing it before the Justices of the
I.C.J.23 The three-fold effect, according to Weeramantry, is that "[1] its persuasive
value would have been immensely greater; [2] it would have shown an
appreciation and an understanding of Islamic culture; and [3] it would have
induced a greater readiness on the Iranian side to negotiate from a base of common
understanding." 24
We must also not forget the general references made by two of the Judges of
the I.C.J. (Judge Waldock and Judge Tarazi) to the contribution of Islamic
jurisprudence to the body of diplomatic immunity and inviolability. In his view,
Judge Waldock, in the lead judgment, maintains "the principle of the inviolability
of the persons of diplomatic agents and the premises of diplomatic missions is one
of the very foundations of this long-established regime, to the evolution of which
the traditions of Islam made a substantial contribution." 25 Similarly, Judge Tarazi,
while delivering a dissenting opinion, cited with approval a 1937 lecture delivered
by Professor Ahmed Rechid of the Istanbul law faculty, confirming the respect
conferred on diplomatic personnel under Islamic law, when Professor Rechid says
that "[i]n Arabia, the person of the Ambassador has always been regarded as
sacred. Muhammad consecrated this inviolability. Never were ambassadors to
Muhammad or to his successors molested." 26
The Iranian authority, particularly, Imam Ayatollah Khomeini 27 has been
generally accused of backing and directly endorsing the entire actions of the
students regarding the seizure of the United States embassy. 28 Not only did the
Iranian government cooperate with the student demonstrators by not preventing
them from invading the United States embassy, it also gave a mark of approval to
and showered an unconditional encomium on the hostage takers.29
A
representative of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, for example, was recalled as saying
22. Memorial of United States, United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v.
Iran), 1980 I.C.J. Pleadings 121, at 124 (Jan. 12, 1980).
23. C. G. WEERAMANTRY, ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 166
(1988).
24. Id.
25. UnitedStates Diplomaticand ConsularStaff in Tehran, Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 186.
26. Id. at 59 (dissenting opinion of Judge Tarazi).
27. Ayatollah Khomeini was the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, a position he
held until his death on June 3, 1989. Patrick E. Tyler, Iran'sAyatollah Khomeini is Dead,WASH. POST,
June 4, 1989, at Al.
28. Rafat, supranote 10, at 427.
29. United States Diplomatic and ConsularStaff in Tehran, Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 71.

2013

IRAN HOSTAGE CRISIS FROM ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE

23

that "[t]oday's move by a group of our compatriots is a natural reaction to the
United States government's indifference to the hurt feelings of the Iranian people
about the presence of the deposed Shah, who is in the United States under the
pretext of illness."30 He further said that "[i]f the U.S. authorities respected the
feelings of the Iranian people and understood the depth of the Iranian revolution,
they should have at least not allowed the deposed Shah into the country and should
have returned his property."31 A pronouncement attributed to the then Iranian
Foreign Minister, Mr. Ibrahim Yazdi, that the students' action "enjoys the
endorsement and support of the government, because America herself is
responsible for this incident," was also regarded as a general ratification of the
entire hostage crisis.32
The then-President of the United States, Jimmy Carter, decided to explore the
possibility of resolving the imbroglio through diplomatic process by instructing his
Attorney-General, Ramsey Clark, accompanied by the chief counsel for the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, William Miller, to go and deliver a message to
Imam Ayatollah Khomeini requesting the release of the hostages. 33 Imam
Khomeini and members of the Revolutionary Council refused to meet with the
envoys sent by the United States. While Clark was en route, Tehran Radio
broadcasted the speech made by Ayatollah Khomeini on November 7, 1979,
forbidding any member of the Revolutionary Council from holding any discussion
with the two emissaries from the United States, while also maintaining that:
the U.S. embassy in Iran is our enemies' centre of espionage against our
sacred Islamic movement ... Should the United States hand over to Iran
the deposed shah . . . and give up espionage against our movement, the

way to talks would be opened on the issue of certain relations which are
in the interest of the nation. 34
The major position of the Iranian government, which explains the approval of
the students' seizure of the United States embassy was Imam Khomeini's vital
remark that "those people who hatched plots against our Islamic movement in that
place do not enjoy international diplomatic respect."35
Imam Khomeini's
declaration that "[tihe noble Iranian nation will not give permission for the release
30. Tehran Students Seize U.S Embassy andHold Hostages,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1979, at Al.
3 1. Id.
32. UnitedStates Diplomatic and ConsularStaff in Tehran, Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 170.
33. LUCIEN S. VANDENBROUCKE, PERILOUS OPTIONS: SPECIAL OPERATIONS AS AN INSTRUMENT
OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 116-17 (1993). The choice of Clark may not be unconnected to the fact that he
happened to be a relentless critic of the former Shah of Iran and more so, he was known to have
indicated his support for the Islamic revolution during his meeting with Ayatollah Khomeini while he
(Khomeini) was in exile. Id.; see also JAMES A. PHILLIPS, IRAN, THE UNITED STATES AND THE
HOSTAGES:
AFTER
300
DAYS
13
(1980),
available
at
http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf media/1980/pdf/bgl26.pdf. According to James A. Phillips, a policy
analyst, the U.S. rested their trust on the "anti-Shah credentials of these two liberals [Clark and Miller]"
whom they thought could give them credibility by having the crisis resolved through diplomatic means.
PHILLIPS, supra note 33, at 13.
34. UnitedStates Diplomatic and ConsularStaff in Tehran, Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 1 26.
35. Id. 73.
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of the rest of [the hostages]. Therefore, the rest of [the hostages] will be under
arrest until the American government acts according to the wish of the nation,"36
depicted, in an obvious fashion, the lucid intent of the Iranian government in
ratifying the acts perpetrated by the Iranian demonstrators.
The likely legal implication of the Iranian official statements in this scenario
is that hostage takers are agents of Iranian authority. It would seem difficult for
the Iranian government to claim lack of responsibility just because it did not
officially carry out or direct the seizure of the United States embassy and the
detention of its personnel. The Iranian authorities can, at best, be described
according to the remark of Professor Rafat as "wholehearted participants in the
violation of international law that had occurred."37 According to a principle laid
down in Islamic law, an act may be deemed validly constituted by an unauthorized
38
This
agent, provided that such an act is eventually ratified by the principal.
follows the legal maxim that says "[s]ubsequent ratification has the same effect as
a previous authorization to act as an agent."39 Therefore, it would not be out of
place for the Iranian government to take responsibility for the acts perpetrated by
the Iranian demonstrators based on the various pronouncements made by the
Iranian spiritual leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, and other government officials.
III. THE IRANIAN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES
The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States mutually agreed to abide
by international obligations to respect and protect diplomatic missions. These
41
international obligations are variously contained in the VCDR; 40 VCCR; the
1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents; 42 and the 1955

36. Id.
37. Rafat, supranote 10, at 427.
38. See MUHAMMAD AYUB, UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC FINANCE 348 (2007).
39. LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST: ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC LAW 187 (Majid
Khadduri & Herbert J. Liebesny eds., The Lawbook Exchange, LTD. 2008) (1955) (footnote omitted).
40. VCDR, supra note 2. The VCDR was ratified by the Islamic Republic of Iran on February 3,
1965, and also ratified by the United States of America on November 13, 1972. United Nations,
Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
1961),
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno=III(Apr.
18,
3&chapter-=3&lang-en (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
41. VCCR, supra note 3. The VCCR was ratified by the Islamic Republic of Iran on June 5, 1975,
and also ratified by the United States of America on November 24, 1969. United Nations, Multilateral
Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Apr. 24,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLiNE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=iii1963),
6&chapter-3&lang=en (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
42. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected
Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167. This
Convention was ratified by the Islamic Republic of Iran on July 12, 1978, and also ratified by the
United States of America on October 26, 1976. United Nations, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the
Secretary-General, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally
1973),
14,
(Dec.
Agents
Diplomatic
including
Persons,
Protected
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Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United
States and Iran.43 Sovereign nations have been able to interact peacefully and
maintain regular connection among themselves due to the age-long international
legal method in the form of treaties and covenants. The United States alleged that
the Islamic Republic of Iran was in gross violation of international obligations
stipulated in these treaties by failing to safeguard and protect the safety and
inviolability of the United States diplomatic mission and personnel in Iran." In
other words, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States have unanimously
agreed to respect and discharge the following obligations:
a. Protect the inviolability of the diplomatic premises and the
correspondence and archives; 45
b. Safeguard the inviolability of diplomats and protect them from arrest
and detention; 46
c. Guarantee diplomatic and consular immunity from criminal
prosecution;47
d. Ensure immunity from criminal prosecution of the administrative and
technical personnel of the mission;48
e. Guarantee the freedom of movement of the diplomatic and consular
staff;49
f. Co-operate in the prevention of crimes against internationally protected
persons;50 and,
g. Give the most constant protection and security to the nationals of the
United States and their consular representatives within the territory of the
Islamic Republic of Iran.
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno-XVIII7&chapter-I8&lang-en (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
43. Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, U.S.-Iran, Aug. 15, 1955, 8
U.S.T. 900, 284 U.N.T.S. 93 (entered into force June 16, 1957) [hereinafter 1955 Treaty of Amity].
44. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 3,
18 (May 24). See also Rafat, supra note 10, at 425-426.
45. VCDR, supra note 2, arts. 22, 24, 27; VCCR, supra note 3, arts. 31, 33.
46. VCDR, supra note 2, art. 29; VCCR, supra note 3, art. 40.
47. VCDR, supra note 2, art. 31; VCCR, supra note 3, art. 43; 1955 Treaty of Amity, supra note
43, art. XVIII.
48. VCDR, supra note 2, art. 37.
49. VCDR, supra note 2, art. 26; Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes art. 34, April 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325,
596 U.N.T.S. 487 (entered into force Mar. 19, 1967). This Optional Protocol has been ratified by
Islamic Republic of Iran on June 5, 1975, and initially ratified by the United States of America on
November 24, 1969, however, it withdrew its ratification on March 7, 2005. United Nations,
Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Optional Protocol to the Vienna
Convention on ConsularRelations concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes (Apr. 24, 1963),
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno=III-8&chapter=3&lang-en
(last visited Mar. 1, 2014) (while the United States has withdrawn from the treaty, it was in force during
the relevant time of the conflict of which this article is focused).
50. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected
Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, supra note 42, arts. 2, 4, 7.
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In addition to its obligations under international law, the Islamic Republic of
Iran cannot pretend to be oblivious to the significance of covenants in Islamic
jurisprudence. Even though Iran is known to have an overwhelming majority
following the Shi'a Imamiyyah sect of Islam,52 the fact remains true that in the
Sunni 53 and Shi'a schools of law, the religious importance and the legal binding
nature of international treaties (known within Islamic legal parlance as mu 'ahadat)
are well pronounced.54 Islamic jurisprudence attaches great value to the concept of
agreements. Contracts, in Islamic law, are not only considered legally binding,
they are equally held with great sense of religiosity. The maxim "Al Muslimun
'inda shurfitihim (Muslims are bound by their stipulations)" is generally accepted
as traditional rule of Islamic jurisprudence by all the madhahib-Muslim schools
of law.ss In Islamic law, a binding contract could be in the form of an individual's
obligation to Allah; a contract of marriage between two parties of opposite sexes; a
political arrangement which encompasses treaty obligations between two or more
states; or a commercial contract. 56 They are generally considered agreements, or
pacts, which must be fulfilled once entered into either individually or
collectively.57
An agreement, be it between an individual Muslim and the Muslim state or
between a Muslim state and a non-Muslim state, remains sacrosanct. The Imam of
a Muslim state is particularly under a duty to discharge his covenants to the
Muslims and non-Muslims alike.5 8
According to the tradition of Prophet
Muhammad (pbuh) quoted by the Hanbali jurist, Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328), that:
For everyone who has committed a breach of faith there shall be a flag
[of disgrace]. On the day of judgment it will be hoisted. Its height will

51. 1955 Treaty of Amity, supra note 43, art. 1(4).
52. The Shi'a Imamiyyah otherwise known as al-Ithna-Ashariyyah, the Twelvers, is the
predominant sect in the Islamic Republic of Iran, although there are numerous denominations within the
Shi 'a sect. See Shahrough Akhavi, Shiite Theories ofSocial Contract, in SHARI'A: ISLAMIC LAW INTHE
CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT 137, 139-40,143-46 (Abbas Amanat & Frank Griffel eds., 2007).
53. The Sunni, otherwise known as ahlu-sunnah wal-jama'ah, which means the people of the
tradition of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) and the consensus of the ummah, forms the largest group in
Islam. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ISLAM 306 (John L. Esposito ed., 2003).
54. See LABEEB AHMED BSOUL, INTERNATIONAL TREATIES (MU'.iHADA T) IN ISLAM: THEORY
AND PRACTICE IN THE LIGHT OF ISLAMIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (SIYAR) ACCORDING TO ORTHODOX

SCHOOLS 107-112 (2008). See also Saba Habachy, Property,Right, and Contract in Muslim Law, 62
COLUM. L. REv. 450, 452 (1962); Muhammad-Basheer Adisa Ismail, Islamic Diplomatic Law and
International Diplomatic Law: A Quest for Compatibility, at 263 (Nov. 2012) (unpublished Ph.D.
thesis, University of Hull), available at https://hydra.hull.ac.uk/assets/hull:7135a/content [hereinafter
Ismail, Islamic Diplomatic Law and International Diplomatic Law].
55. Habachy, supranote 54, at 459.
56. Noor Mohammed, Principles of Islamic Contract Law, in UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC LAW:
FROM CLASSICAL TO CONTEMPORARY 95, 96 (Hisham M. Ramadan ed., 2006).
57. See id.
58. Habachy, supra note 54, at 451. "The duty of loyalty and respect for contract weighs more
heavily on the Imam and on everyone who wields authority in the Muslim community than it does on an
ordinary individual." Id. at 463.
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be in proportion to the enormity of his breach of faith. No breacher of
faith is more unjust than an amir [prince] who breaks his covenant.s9
In fact, a Muslim state is expected to be a model for its citizens in discharging
all contractual obligations it has granted to any foreign country.60
Generally, in Islamic law, a covenant has its authority rooted in the two prime
sources of Islamic jurisprudence, the Qur'an and Sunnah.6 1 When the Qur'an says:
"0 you who have believed, fulfill [all] contracts,"62 it is generally understood that
it incorporates all forms of obligations, contracts, and covenants that are made
between man and man and "spiritual covenants between man and God."6 1
Particularly relevant to this discussion is the verse of the Qur'an that categorically
forbids any violation of treaties between Muslims and non-Muslims. "Exempted
are those with whom you made a treaty among the polytheists and then they have
not been deficient toward you in anything or supported anyone against you; so
complete for them their treaty until their term [has ended]. Indeed, Allah loves the
righteous [who fear Him]."6 This means that if non-Muslims remain faithful and
do not breach their covenants, then, Muslims are duty bound to respect the terms of
the agreements until their expiration. Allah is very clear in describing those who
violate covenants as those who are faithless. 65
Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) was recorded to have entered into a treaty with
the non-Muslims of Makkah, which was known as the Treaty ofHudaybiyyah (AD
628), and he tenaciously observed the terms of the treaty to the letter.66 That
treaty, according to Muslim jurists, later became a paradigm that authenticates the
validity of all forms of legal instruments between the Muslim and non-Muslim
states.67 In the same vein, there are numerous statements by Prophet Muhammad
(pbuh) giving authority to the validity of covenants and treaties in Islamic law,
especially if such treaties do not jeopardize the interest of the Muslims or contain

59. Id. at 463 (footnote omitted) (quoting the Muslim jurist Ibn Taymiyyah).
60. See id. at 451.
61. The Sunnah, being the second source of Islamic law, is the Prophetic traditions and constitutes
the sayings, actions, and tacit approval of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF
ISLAM 305 (John L. Esposito ed., 2003).
62. Qur'an 5:1.
63. J. N. D. Anderson & N. J. Coulson, The Moslem Ruler and Contractual Obligations, 33
N.Y.U. L. REV. 917, 923 (1958). See also P. Nicholas Kourides, Comment, The Influence of Islamic
Law on ContemporaryMiddle Eastern Legal Systems: The Formationand Binding Force of Contracts,
9 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 384, 394 (1970).
64. Qur'an 9:4.
65. See Qur'an 2:100 ("Is it not [true] that every time they took a covenant a party of them threw
it away? But, [in fact], most of them do not believe.").
66. This treaty, otherwise known as 'Sulh al-Hudaybiyyah,' was signed in March AD 628 at a
place called al-Hudaybiyyah, which was on the edge of the sacred territory of Makkah. See W.
MONTGOMERY WATT, MUHAMMAD AT MEDINA 46-52 (1956).
67. See GENE W. HECK, WHEN WORLDS COLLIDE: EXPLORING THE IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS 170 (2007).
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any stipulations that run contrary to the Islamic teachings. 68 In fact, Islamic law
will encourage a Muslim ruler or any of his representatives not to hesitate in
concluding an agreement once such an agreement neither negates Islamic teachings
nor is inimical to the general interests of the Muslims.69 Prophet Muhammad
(pbuh) is reported to have said that "The Muslims are bound by their obligations,
except an obligation that renders the lawful unlawful, and the unlawful lawful."70
It is considered sacrilegious for a Muslim to violate a treaty or a term in a treaty
once it has been agreed upon, regardless of whether the other party is a nonMuslimi' 1 Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) was very blunt in informing Abu Jandal
that "[w]e have entered with the Quraysh into a treaty of peace and we have
exchanged with them a solemn pledge that none will cheat the other" 72 when he
requested to join the Muslims in Madinah immediately after signing the famous
Treaty ofHudaybiyyah in AD 628.73
In a similar vein, the third Caliph in Islam, Uthman Ibn 'Affan (d. AD 656),
was said to have entered into a treaty with the people of Nubia promising not to
wage war against them or attack them on basis of the treaty that binds the two of
them.74 The Caliph was reported to stand firmly by the terms of the treaty.
It is not in doubt that the Islamic Republic of Iran, being a signatory to all
these treaties, is legally committed and intended to observe the terms of the
treaties. It will also be right to assume that the objects and terms of these treaties
are not in any way contradictory to the core objectives of the Shari'ah(maqasidalshari'ah).n In other words, these treaties, both under conventional international
law and Islamic international law, must be observed to the letter since they have

68. See Wilson B. Bishai, Negotiations and Peace Agreements Between Muslims and NonMuslims in Islamic History, in MEDIEVAL AND MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 50, 51-54 (Sami A. Hanna
ed., 1972).
69. Labeeb Ahmed Bsoul, Islamic Diplomacy: Views of the Classical Jurists, in ISLAM AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ENGAGING SELF-CENTRISM FROM A PLURALITY OF PERSPECTIVES 127, 134
(Marie-Luisa Frick & Andreas Th. Muller eds., 2013).
70. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE SHARI'A AND ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE INTIME OF WAR AND
PEACE 153-54 (2014) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI, SHARI'A AND ISLAMIC CRIMINAL
JUSTICE].

71. Habachy, supra note 54, at 460.
72. MUHAMMAD HUSAYN HAYKAL, THE LIFE OF MUHAMMAD 354 (Isma'TI Rdj! A. al Fariqi
trans., 8th ed. 1976).
73. It is the treaty that was signed between the state of Madinah as represented by Prophet
Muhammad on the one hand and the Quraysh tribe of Makkah as represented by Suhayl bin 'Amr on
the other hand. See WATT, supra note 66, at 46-52 (it is also known as 'Sulh al-Hudaybiyyah').
74. M. H. HAMIDULLAH, MUSLIM CONDUCT OF STATE 291-92 (2d ed. 1945).
75. See 13 THE HISTORY OF AL-TABART: THE CONQUEST OF IRAQ, SOUTHERN PERSIA AND EGYPT
175-76 (Gautier H.A. Juynboll trans., 1989).
76. See generally supranotes 40-43.
77. The primary purposes and objectives of Islamic law, which must remain preserved, according
to the Muslim jurists, are: religion (ad-din), life (an-nafs), progeny (an-nasl), intellect (al-'aql), and
wealth (al-mal). M. UMER CHAPRA, THE FUTURE OF ECONOMICS: AN ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE 118
(2000). These objectives are meant to "promote the well-being of all mankind" and "[w]hatever ensures
the safeguard of these five serves public interest and is desirable." Id.
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The failure of the Iranian government to
become applicable in themselves.
provide adequate security to the United States embassy and its personnel,
especially on November 4, 1979, when the latter desperately needed it from the
incursion of the demonstrators, definitely constituted a breach of these
international obligations both under Islamic international law and conventional
international law.
It is worthwhile to mention that assuming the Iranian government was right in
its allegation of espionage against the United States, it could have justifiably
refused to observe the terms of the diplomatic treaties it had with the United States.
The Iranian government's refusal to fulfill the terms of such treaties would have
been well supported by the Qur'anic verse that says: "If you [have reason to] fear
from a people betrayal, throw [their treaty] back to them, [putting you] on equal
terms. Indeed, Allah does not like traitors."79
In addition, such refusal would have also received legal justification from
Article 60(2)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ("VCLT") which
provides that:
A material breach of a multilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles: .
. . a party specially affected by the breach to invoke it as a ground for
suspending the operation of the treaty in whole or in part in the relations
between itself and the defaulting State.8 0
The Islamic Republic of Iran can only be justified in its action following the
provisions of the foregoing verse of the Qur'an and the VCLT if it had formally
informed the United States government of its intention to withdraw all diplomatic
commitments it had with United States due to the espionage activities of the
United States within the Islamic Republic of Iran. This position has received
approval from the pronouncement of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) when he said that
"[h]e who has entered a treaty must not alter it until the period has expired, or he
should let the other side know of the annulment so that he and they would be on
equal footing."81 The Prophet also added that "[b]ehave not treacherously, even
towards those who are treacherous to you." 82 Hilmi Zawati rightly concluded
when he said that "[i]n committing any prohibited acts, which might disturb the
peace and security of dar al-Islam, like engaging in espionage ... an envoy will be
declared personanon grataand expatriated safely to his state of origin."8 3
It thus appears that the Iranian government did not expressly declare its
intention to sever diplomatic ties with the United States due to the espionage
activities of the United States, which it found to be a gross violation of Article 41
78. Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 615.
79. Qur'an 8:58.
80. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 60(2), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S 331.
(2008),
available
at
THY
PROPHET
33
81. ISLAM
HOUSE,
KNOW
http://dl.islamhouse.com/data/en/ih-books/single/en-know_prophet.pdf.
82. ISLAM
HOUSE,
THE
PROPHET'S
BIOGRAPHY
186
(2006),
available at
http://dl.islamhouse.com/data/en/ih-books/single/en The Biographyof the Prophet.pdf.
83. HILMI M. ZAWATI, IS JIHAD A JUST WAR? WAR, PEACE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER
ISLAMIC AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 80 (2001).
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of the VCDR.84 There is no evidence that such step was taken by the Islamic
Republic of Iran since it did not "employ the remedies placed at its disposal by
diplomatic law specifically for dealing with activities of the kind of which it now
complains."85 Having said this, the Iranian government cannot be justified in their
action towards the United States and, as such, would be held liable to the United
States under Islamic law and international law for invading the United States
embassy and detaining its diplomatic personnel.
IV. VIOLATION OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

The protection of diplomatic envoys has been known and practiced since the
ancient times through the present era of modern states.86 We cannot also doubt the
fact that there have been series of cases involving the violation of diplomatic
inviolability ranging from kidnap, arrest and detention, to even killing of
diplomatic personnel. It is, however, doubtful if there is any violation of
diplomatic immunity that can be likened to the taking of the United States embassy
and detaining its diplomatic personnel by Iran as occurred on November 4, 1979.
It is not surprising when Professor Barker makes an unequivocal submission that
"[u]ndoubtedly, the most significant failure to protect diplomats in history
concerned the seizure and subsequent occupation of the US Embassy in Tehran,
Iran, in 1979.,87 The occupation of the United States embassy by the Iranian
demonstrators was described by Adib-Moghaddam as "the most explicit rejection
of international 'norms of appropriate behaviour', and here specifically the
institutions of international law."88 Richard Falk has also alluded to this
submission in 1980 when he said that "Ayatollah Khomeini's refusal to honor the
rules of international law relating to diplomatic immunity is among the most
serious charges brought against its leadership. Even Hitler, it is alleged, never
violated the diplomatic immunity of his enemies." 89
It seems clear that the seizure of the United States embassy in Iran could not
have been permissible under the Islamic legal system. If one is to place the Iranian
acts of forceful entry into the United States embassy; the acts of detaining
personnel of the United States embassy; the acts of seizing and searching the
documents and archives of the United States embassy; and the acts of restriction
imposed on the freedom of movement of the United States diplomatic personnel on
the platform of Islamic law, a legal system officially proclaimed to be adopted by

84. Article 41 of the VCDR provides that: "Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities,
it is the duty of all persons enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations
of the receiving State. They also have a duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State."
VCDR, supranote 2, art. 41.
85. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 3,
87 (May 24).
86. Legault, supranote 16, at 359.
87. J. CRAIG BARKER, THE PROTECTION OF DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL 8 (2006).
88. ARSHIN ADIB-MOGHADDAM, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE PERSIAN GULF: A
CULTURAL GENEALOGY 25 (2006).
89. Falk, supra note 12, at 411.
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the Islamic Republic of Iran, it will not be a surprise that Iran would have been
held liable were it to be prosecuted under the Islamic legal system. The reason, of
course, is obvious following the view of Professor Bsoul that "Muslim jurists
agreed that the envoys and ambassadors enjoyed the right of immunity, regardless
of their views and the nature of the message they were delivering. Their immunity
continued for as long as they were in the Islamic empire." 90 It is apparent that
under Islamic siyar, diplomatic envoys must not only be respected, but must
actually be protected from all forms of molestation or maltreatment. This principle
of Islamic siyar was further buttressed by Dr. Muhammad Hamidullah that
"[diplomatic] [e]nvoys, along with those who are in their company, enjoy full
personal immunity: they must never be killed, nor be in any way molested or
maltreated."91 Coincidentally, this represents the general position of how the
diplomatic personnel should be treated according to the Shiite school of Islamic
jurisprudence.92 Before discussing the implication of the Iranian acts under
Islamic law, it may be necessary to consider the legal authority of the principles of
diplomatic immunity in Islamic jurisprudence.
A.

Legal Authority oflslamic DiplomaticImmunities

The Islamic concept of diplomatic immunity derives its legal authority first
from the Qur'an, which is the primary source of Islamic jurisprudence. The
Prophetic traditions also establish the validity of diplomatic immunities in Islamic
law as indicated by several statements of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). "Likewise,
the practices of the Muslim Caliphs, starting from the period of the first four
caliphs, up to the present Muslim [states] confirm the legitimacy of diplomatic
For the purpose of clarity, each of these legal sources will be
[immunity]."9
briefly considered.
1.

Text from the Qur'an

The incident that validates the exchange of emissaries and further confirms
diplomatic immunity is, according to Professor Bassiouni, cited in Qur'an 27:234494 It occurred when Bilqees bint Sharahil, the Queen of Saba', 95 in response to
the letter of Prophet Sulayman (992-952 BC), sent emissaries with gifts to be
presented to Prophet Sulayman. 96 Qur'an 27:35 recounts the incident when
Bilqees said: "But indeed, I will send to them a gift and see with what [reply] the

90. Bsoul, supra note 69, at 134.
91. HAMIDULLAH, supra note 74, at 139 (footnote omitted).
92. Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 618.
93. M.B.A. Ismail, JustificationsandPrinciplesof Diplomatic Immunity: A Comparison between
Islamic InternationalLaw and InternationalLaw, J. ISLAMIC PRAC. INT'L L., Issue 1 2013, at 60, 75
[hereinafter Ismail, Justificationsand PrinciplesofDiplomatic Immunity].
94. Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 610.
95. Saba' is also known as Himyar and according to Ibn Katheer, it was a dynasty in Yemen. See
ABu AL-FIDA ISMAIL IBN KATHIR, 7 TAFsIR IBN KHATIR 314 (Shaykh Safiur-Rahman Al-Mubarakpuri
ed., 2d ed. 2003).
96. See Qur'an 27:22-35.
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messengers will return."9 "While declining the gifts which were considered as a
sort of bribery, Prophet Sulayman restrained himself from visiting his annoyance .
. . on the envoys, because he understood the importance of their personal
inviolability."98 Prophet Sulayman then sent the emissaries of Bilqees back with
their gifts saying: "Do you provide me with wealth? But what Allah has given me
is better than what He has given you.

. .

. Return to them . . . ."9

There is no

doubt that Prophet Sulayman had the power of detaining and punishing the
emissaries of Bilqees for their offense, but rather he chose to let them go, believing
that it is sacrilegious to harm or detain the envoys of another sovereign.
2.

The Sunnah

The Sunnah has established the fundamental principles of privileges and
immunities that are granted to diplomatic envoys under Islamic styar in numerous
places.'oo This is as a result of the exchange of diplomatic envoys between Prophet
Muhammad (pbuh) and other nations. History has it that Prophet Muhammad
(pbuh) sent different emissaries to various places including Makkah, Byzantium,
Egypt, Persia, and Ethiopia either for religious or political reasons. 101 He equally
warmly received delegations and embassies in his mosque at a place designated as
ustuwanat al-wuffid (the pillar of embassies).102 He so much held the respect and
inviolability accorded foreign ambassadors in high esteem to the extent that while
he was on his deathbed he was reported to have instructed his successor to award
gifts to envoys as he himself used to do during his lifetime.103 Prophet Muhammad
(pbuh) was known to be very kind towards his guests to the extent that he attached
the string of belief in Allah and the Last Day to the kind treatment of guests by
saying that: "Who[ever] believes in Allah and the Last Day, should serve his guest
generously."'0 Meaning that, as a Muslim, you are required to be hospitable to
your guest, be that person a Muslim or non-Muslim.
3.

Consistent Practice of Muslim Heads of State

Flowing from the two divine sources, the generality of the Muslim heads of
states (the Caliphs, Sultans, and the current heads of the Muslim countries) also
establish diplomatic immunity through their international transactions. ' Just like
in the time of Prophet Muhammad, the era of his foremost successors, generally
referred to as the rightly guided caliphs, also recorded some diplomatic relations

97. Qur'an 27:35.
98. Ismail, Justificationsand Principlesof DiplomaticImmunity, supra note 93, at 75.
99. Qur'an 27:36-37.
100. See Bassiouni, supranote 8, at 613.
101. See MAJD KHADDURI, WAR AND PEACE INTHE LAW OF ISLAM 241 (1955). See also Bsoul,
supra note 69, at 130.
102. ZAWATI, supra note 83, at 77.
103. HAMIDULLAH, supranote 74, at 138.
104. ISLAMIC HADITH: ENGLISH TRANSLATION 18.156 (Kaitlyn Chick trans., 2013).
105. Bsoul, supranote 69, at 134-36.
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with foreign potentates.106 In strict adherence to the teachings of Prophet
Muhammad (pbuh), Abu-Bakr (d. AD 634), the first Caliph after Prophet
Muhammad (pbuh), was reported to have instructed Yazid Ibn Abu Sufyan (d. AD
640), when the later was leading an expedition to Syria, in the following words: "in
case envoys of the adversary come to you, treat them with hospitality."10 7 This era
witnessed tremendous exchange of envoys between the Muslims and non-Muslim
states. For instance, in AD 651 a diplomatic mission headed by Sa'd bin Abi
Waqqas was sent to the Chinese Emperor, Gaozong of Tang, under the overall
leadership of Uthman Ibn 'Affan, the third Caliph.os
The diplomatic intercourse of the then Islamic empire with neighboring
kingdoms, according to Hilmi Zawati, attained the height of sophistication during
the period of the Umayyad and especially during the era of the Abbasid dynasty. 109
The large amount of peace treaties conclusively negotiated with other kingdoms at
that time attest to the diplomatic successes achieved by these early Muslim
states.' 10 The period of the Abbasid has been acknowledged to have expanded, in
no small magnitude, the ambit of the international connections the Islamic State
had with other nations, especially in the area of commerce."' No wonder the
foreign relations of the Abbasid Caliphate have been identified and greatly
applauded for being a monumental factor upon which rest the enormous power,
glory, and progress recorded by the caliphate.112
It is no surprise, therefore, that the generality of the Muslim states under the
auspices of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation came together to recognize the
inviolability and immunities of the diplomatic personnel of individual state
members." 3 They did this in addition to becoming parties to the 1961 Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations and 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations.114 Thus, Islamic law recognizes and observes certain immunities and
privileges when dealing with diplomatic envoys.
B.

Implication ofIran's Contravention ofDiplomatic Immunity Under
Islamic Siyar

The historical narration of the incidence between Prophet Sulayman and
Bilqees (the Queen of Saba') contained in the Qur'an is quite instructive in this
regard." 5 The decision of Prophet Sulayman to send the emissaries of Bilqees
106. ZAWATI, supra note 83, at 78.
107. Ismail, Islamic Diplomatic Law and International Diplomatic Law, supra note 54, at 88.
108. See JONATHAN N. LIPMAN, FAMILIAR STRANGERS: A HISTORY OF MUSLIMS IN NORTHWEST
CHINA 25, 29 (1997).
109. ZAWATI, supra note 83, at 78.
110. See id.
111. SEN, supra note 9, at 5.
112. See PHILIP K. HITri, MAKERS OF ARAB HISTORY 82 (1968).
113. Convention of the Immunities and Privileges of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference,
May
15,
1976,
O.I.C.
Doc.
IS/CM/D.20/FINAL,
available
at
http://www.oicun.org/uploads/files/convenion/AGREEMENT%/200N%20IMMUNITIES%2En.pdf.
114. Bassiouni, supranote 8, at 613.
115. Id. at 610.
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back along with their gifts, which were considered as bribery and an insult to his
personality, exhibited the kind of respect he had for foreign messengers. 1 16 He
declared them as persona non grata. Hence, the Qur'anic narration, according to
Professor Bassiouni, signifies that "the emissaries were immune from the wrath of
the host state and were not held responsible for the acts or messages sent by their
head of state." 1 7 He further concludes that "expulsion is the only sanction to be
taken against them."'" Therefore, the Islamic Republic of Iran would have acted
within the confines of Islamic international law by expelling the diplomatic
personnel of the United States or closing down the entire diplomatic mission of the
United States on the ground of espionage following the example of Prophet
Sulayman in the Qur'an.
The Prophetic traditions further elaborated the Qur'anic injunctions regarding
the way diplomatic envoys should be treated. One incidence was the case of the
two emissaries sent to Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) by Musaylimah, who also
claimed to be a prophet of God.11 9 In spite of the annoying message the envoys of
Musaylimah brought to Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), which could have led to their
incarceration or even execution, Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) said to them: "By
[Allah], were it not that messengers are not to be [slain], I would behead the both
of you!" 20 He uttered those words in recognition of the fact that the two envoys of
Musaylimah were considered ordinary means of diplomatic communication, and as
such possessed diplomatic immunity. Also relevant in this context is the case of
Wahshi, the one who murdered Hamzah, the uncle of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh),
in the battle of Uhud. 121 He was accorded diplomatic immunity when he visited
Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) as an ambassador of the people of Taif.122 The
generous reception that Wahshi received from Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) led to
his acceptance of Islam.123 In the words of Saif, "[t]he Prophet, stressing the
diplomatic immunity of ambassadors, did not hold their earlier antagonism against
them," but instead he cheerfully received and welcomed them into the newly found
faith of Islam.124

116. See Qur'an 27:35-37.
117. Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 610.
118. Id. at 610-11.
119. BASSIOUNI, SHARI'A AND ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 70, at 187-88. His full name
was Musaylimah ibn Habib. Id. He was one of those who laid false claim to prophethood almost around
the same time with Prophet Muhammad. Id. He was given the nickname "al-kadhdhab" (the liar) by
Prophet Muhammad. See id.
120. Id.
121. The Battle of Uhud, AL-ISLAM, http://www.al-islam.org/restatement-history-islam-andmuslims-sayyid-ali-ashgar-razwy/battle-uhud (last visited Nov. 7, 2013). This is the second major battle
Prophet Muhammad and the Muslims fought against the Makkans in AD 625. Id.
122. See Sahih Bukhari Volume 005, Book 059, Hadith Number 399, HADITH COLLECTION,
http://hadithcollection.com/sahihbukhari/92/5656-sahih-bukhari-volume-005-book-059-hadith-number399.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2014).
123. See id.
124. Ahmed Abdelkareem Saif, Taif, in CITIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA: A
HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 342, 343 (Michael R. T. Dumper & Bruce E. Stanley eds., 2007).
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The Federal Shariat Court of Pakistan was correct when it held that Prophet
Muhammad never permitted any [diplomatic] representatives to be maltreated,
"rather he showed them greatest honour and respect and granted immunities to
them inter alia from imprisonment and death, however, hostile was their behaviour
and threatening their language."l25
The detention of foreign envoys was specifically discouraged by Prophet
Muhammad (pbuh).126 It was narrated by Abu Rafi' who was designated as the
Makkans' envoy to Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) in Madinah immediately after the
battle of Badr, and upon seeing Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), Islam was cast into
his heart straight away to the extent that he requested never to return to Makkah.1 27
The Prophet blatantly rejected his request by saying: "I do not break a covenant or
imprison messengers, but return, and if you feel the same as you do just now, come
back." 28 The request of Abu Rafi' was rejected by Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) on
the basis of diplomatic inviolability as he was, then, an ambassador of the
Makkans, he deserved not to be detained in Madinah. Perhaps, if Prophet
Muhammad had acceded to the request of Abu Rafi' by allowing him to remain in
Madinah, it would have amounted to him detaining a Makkan envoy. It was
further reported that Abu Rafi' later came back, not as diplomatic envoy, but as a
Muslim emigrant.129
It is precisely clear from the foregoing authorities in the Qur'an and the
Prophetic traditions that diplomatic envoys must be respected and particularly
protected throughout the duration of their stay within any Muslim state. Moreover,
since the Islamic Republic of Iran has the duty of "framing the foreign policy of
the country on the basis of Islamic criteria," as specified in its Constitution, 130 it is
also expected that Iran will be totally committed to the principles of diplomatic
immunity as contained under Islamic international law. Islamic international law
imposes a duty on the Islamic Republic of Iran to provide adequate protection
against the invasion and seizure of the United States embassy.
V.

COMPARING THE RECENT ATTACK ON THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN TEHRAN WITH
THE 1979 INVASION OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY

The November 29, 2011, attack on the British embassy by some angry
demonstrators can be distinguished from the 1979 United States embassy

125. In re Islamisation of Laws Public Notice No. 3 1983, (1985) 37 PLD (FSC) 344, 354 (Pak.);
see also Ismail, Justificationsand PrinciplesofDiplomatic Immunity, supranote 93, at 81.
126. HAMIDULLAH, supra note 74, at 147-48.
127. See
Abu
Dawud
Book
0008,
Hadith
2752,
HADITH
COLLECTION,
http://www.hadithcollection.com/abudawud/240-Abu%2ODawud%20Book%2008.%20Jihad/16836abu-dawud-book-008-hadith-number-2752.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2014).
128. Id.
129. See id.
130. QANUNI AsSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF
IRAN] 1358 [1980], art. 3(16).
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invasion.' 3 ' The protestors, mostly students, went into the British embassy,
shattering windows, ransacking offices, setting ablaze the embassy vehicle, looting
and damaging embassy properties, and removing and replacing the British flag
with the Iranian flag.132 The demonstration was initially meant to commemorate
the first anniversary of the assassination of a senior Iranian nuclear scientist, Majid
Shahriari.13 3 They eventually stormed the British embassy, mainly to protest the
United Kingdom's decision to cut off all dealings with the Iranian Central Bank in
response to the Iranian nuclear program.' 34
In this particular incidence, the Iranian government quickly condemned the
attack by saying that: "The foreign ministry regrets the protests that led to some
unacceptable behaviours[.] We respect and we are committed to international
regulations on the immunity and safety of diplomats and diplomatic places." 3 5
But then, one would have expected the Iranian government to provide adequate
and special measures to protect the embassy and its personnel before the attacks
took place. Had they done that, Iran would have been vindicated and seen by the
international community to have complied with the terms embedded in the 1961
and 1963 Vienna Conventions as well as upholding the principles of diplomatic
immunity entrenched in Islamic international law. Moreover, it is a fundamental
precept in Islamic law that individuals and states are strictly bound by the terms of
the treaties they made to other individuals and states, be they Muslims or nonMuslims. 3 6 Allowing the demonstrators to gain access to the premises of the
embassy, in the words of the British Foreign Secretary, William Hague, would
amount "to a grave breach of the Vienna Convention which requires the protection
of diplomats and diplomatic premises under all circumstances." 3 7
VI. DOES IRAN HAVE ANY LEGAL JUSTIFICATION FOR INVADING THE AMERICAN
EMBASSY UNDER ISLAMIC INTERNATIONAL LAW?

The Iranian government claimed the invasion of the United States embassy by
the demonstrating students on November 4, 1979, was justified. But then, there is

131. See Robert F. Worth & Rick Gladstone, Iranian Protesters Attack British Embassy, N.Y.
Nov. 29, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/30/world/middleeast/tehran-protesters-stormbritish-embassy.html? r=0.
132. See id.
133. Julian Borger & Saeed Kamali Dehghan, Storming of British Embassy in Tehran Worsens
Bilateral
Relations,
GuARDIAN,
Nov.
29,
2011,
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/201 1/nov/29/british-embassy-attack-iran-uk-relations.
134. See Worth & Gladstone, supra note 131 ("Britain's new economic sanctions require all
contacts to be severed with the Iranian Central Bank, a step that the United States had already taken.").
135. 5:20 PM GMT/12:20 PM EST-Iran ProtestersAttack UK Embassy in Tehran-Tuesday 29
November, GUARDLAN, http://www.theguardian.com/world/blog/2011/nov/29/iran-protesters-attack-ukembassy-tehran-live#block-19 (last visited Feb. 26, 2014).
136. See Habachy, supra note 54, at 451-52; see also Saudi Arabia v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.
(Aramco), 27 I.L.R. 117, 195 (1963).
137. 6:10 PM GMT/1:10 PM EST-Iran ProtestersAttack UK Embassy in Tehran-Tuesday 29
November, GUARDLAN, http://www.theguardian.com/world/blog/2011/nov/29/iran-protesters-attack-ukembassy-tehran-live#block-24 (last visited Feb. 27, 2014).
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a need to critically evaluate the Iranian government's justification under Islamic
law. It is also noteworthy that the Iranian government neither put up appearance
nor filed any Counter-Memorial before the I.C.J. Iran never participated in the
entire judicial proceedings, but rather, sent two letters, dated December 9, 1979,
and March 16, 1980, from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran to the I.C.J. 13 8
These letters, which were similar in contents, contained the reasons why the
Iranian government felt that "the Court cannot and should not take cognizance of
the case" brought by the United States.139
The December 9, 1979 letter, drew the attention of the Court to the "deeprootedness and the essential character of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, a
revolution of a whole oppressed nation against its oppressors and their masters;
any examination of the numerous repercussions thereof is a matter essentially and
directly within the national sovereignty of Iran." 1 4 0 As far as the Islamic Republic
of Iran is concerned, the entire question before the I.C.J.
only represents a marginal and secondary aspect of an overall problem,
one such that it cannot be studied separately, and which involves, inter
alia, more than 25 years of continual interference by the United States
in the affairs of Iran, the shameless exploitation of our country, and
numerous crimes perpetrated against the Iranian people, contrary to and
in conflict with all international and humanitarian norms.141
The letter further mentioned that the dispute between the governments of Iran
and the United States is not predicated on "the interpretation and the application of
the treaties upon which the American Application is based, but results from an
overall situation containing much more fundamental and more complex
elements."1 4 2 Therefore, according to Iran, it will be improper for the I.C.J. to
"examine the American Application divorced from its proper context, namely the
whole political dossier of the relations between Iran and the United States over the
last 25 years."l 43
In addition, the then spiritual leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Imam
Ayatollah Khomeini, issued a decree on November 17, 1979, which may be
considered as an approval and justification for taking over the United States
embassy by saying that: "the American Embassy was 'a centre of espionage and
conspiracy' and that 'those people who hatched plots against our Islamic
movement in that place do not enjoy international diplomatic respects.""4

138. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 3,
10 (May 24).
139. Id. See also United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Request for
the Indication of Provisional Measures, 1979 I.C.J. 7, 18 (Dec. 15).
140. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Request for the Indication of
Provisional Measures, 1979 I.C.J. T 8.
141. United States Diplomatic and ConsularStaff in Tehran, Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 135.
142. Id. 110.
143. Id.
144. Id. T73.
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It can be inferred from the above statement that since the United States
embassy had been used as a place to spy on and conspire against the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Iran was then justified to detain its diplomatic and consular staff
and therefore, seize the entire embassy. In a nutshell, one could say that the
Iranian government relied on the following justifications as the basis for its action:
first, a continual interference by the United States in the affairs of Iran and the
numerous crimes committed against the Iranian people for more than 25 years; 145
and second, the use of the United States embassy as a 'centre of espionage and
conspiracy' against the Islamic Republic of Iran.146
Regarding the first justification, there are impressive examples in the Qur'an
and the Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), which made it abundantly clear
that it will amount to violating the immunity of diplomatic envoys if the diplomats
should be subjected to punishment or detention by the host country for any offense
they might have allegedly committed.147 Moreover, the Iranian government never
brought any criminal charges alleging the commission of espionage or any other
offenses against any of the United States diplomats. Rather, the diplomats should
be seen as ordinary means of facilitating diplomatic interactions between the
Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States.148
The second justification by the Iranian government is that the United States
government was using its embassy in Iran as a spy nest, which, according to the
Iranian overnment, automatically took away the United States enjoyment of
international diplomatic respects.1 49 Truly, according to Islamic law of crime,
espionage is an offense, but it does not go to the extent of stripping diplomatic and
consular staff of their immunity. One has to understand that espionage as an
offense belongs to the ta'azir (discretionary) category15 0 of crimes as it is not
categorically considered haram (prohibited) under Islamic criminal law.'' It does
not fall under the hudi~d (determined) 5 2 and qisas (retaliation) offenses.153 As for
145. Id. 10.
146. Id. 73.
147. See JAVAID REHMAN, ISLAMIC STATE PRACTICES, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE THREAT
FROM TERRORISM: A CRITIQUE OF THE 'CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS' IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER 119

(2005).
148. See Bassiouni,supra note 8, at 610.
149. UnitedStates Diplomaticand ConsularStaffin Tehran, Judgment 1980 I.C.J. 73.
150. These are offenses that are not specifically mentioned in the Qur'an and the Sunnah, but the
Islamic penal system empowers the state and the judges to impose punishments on these forbidden acts
which are accordingly designated as ta'azir. See RUDOLPH PETERS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
ISLAMIC LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE FROM THE SIXTEENTH TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 65-66
(2005). By reason of its flexibility, offenses that are most likely to fall under ta'azir have been
considered to be much wider in scope than those of hudad or qisas. See id.
151. Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 623-24.
152. These are crimes whose punishment are specified and decreed by the Qur'an and the Sunnah
of the Prophet otherwise known as "uquubaat muqaddarah." See Saeed Hasan Ibrahim, Basic
Principles of CriminalProcedure Under Islamic Sharf'a, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE INISLAM: JUDICIAL
PROCEDURE INTHE SHARI'A 17, 18 (Muhammad Abdel Haleem et al. eds., 2003).
153. Unlike hudfid offenses, which are considered to involve the rights of God (huquq-llaah),qisas
offenses also referred to as retaliation concern the rights of man. See Mehran Tamadonfar, Islam, Law,
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the hudiid and qisis offenses, there are fixed penalties for them in the Qur'an and
the Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh).15 4
It is clear in Islamic law that ta'azir offenses, being discretionary in nature,
could generally be waived, particularly, by diplomatic immunity.'ss In other
words, since espionage is classified as one of the ta'azir offenses, it therefore,
follows that any detention or arrest of internationally protected person for the
commission of espionage will be rendered nugatory. The Iranian government
would have contravened Islamic international law by detaining the United States
diplomats for allegedly committing the offense of espionage. Even if the United
States diplomats were involved in the act of spying in Iran, the most appropriate
action to be taken by the Iranian regime, according to Islamic international law,
would have been to expel them from Iran. This action is also compatible with the
provisions of Article 9(1) of the VCDR which provides that:
The receiving State may at any time and without having to explain its
decision, notify the sending State that the head of the mission or any
member of the diplomatic staff of the mission is persona non grata or
that any other member of the staff of the mission is not acceptable. In
any such case, the sending State shall, as appropriate, either recall the
person concerned or terminate his functions with the mission. A person
may be declared non grata or not acceptable before arriving in the
territory of the receiving State. 56
The purported justifications put forward by the Islamic Republic of Iran can,
at best, be described, according to Professor Rehman, as "national, political and
economic grievances," which may not constitute an arguable legal defense under
Islamic siyar and conventional international law.'5 7 For instance, Imam Ayatollah
Khomeini lamented: "What kind of law is this? It permits the U.S. government to
exploit and colonize peoples all over the world for decades. But it does not allow
the extradition of an individual who has staged great massacres in Iran. Can you
call it law?"158 However, this in itself does not provide legal justification for
invading the United States embassy. Professor Rehman further stresses that
although "there was a sense of unfairness, injustice and exploitation perpetuated by
successive United States governments," the relevance of the Iranian claims to
Islamic international law remains very much doubtful.1'
Meanwhile, the

and Political Control in Contemporary Iran, 40 J. FOR SCI. STUDY RELIGION 205, 212 (2001). The
offenses that fall under the qisas are five, namely: (a) murder, (b) voluntary killing, (c) involuntary
killing, (d) intentional physical injury or maiming, and (e) unintentional physical injury or maiming. Id.
See also Bassiouni,supra note 8, at 623-24.
154. Ghaouti Benmelha, Ta'azir Crimes, in THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 211, 212 (M.
Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1982).
155. Id. at 212, 222. See also Bassiouni, supranote 8, at 623-24.
156. VCDR, supra note 2, art. 9(1).
157. REHMAN, supra note 147, at 123.
158. An Interview with Khomeini: Harsh Words, in a Soft Voice, About the Shah, Carter and
America, TIME, Jan. 7, 1980, at 26, 27.
159. REHMAN, supra note 147, at 123.
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justifications canvassed by the Iranian government, though not legally viable,
surely indict the international law of its "arbitrariness and one-sidedness," which
call for a critical attention.' 60
VII. CONCLUSION

It can be gleaned from this article that Islamic diplomatic law, in the same
spirit with international diplomatic law, condemns the 1979 seizure of the United
States embassy in Tehran. One may submit therefore, that if Iran were to be
brought before a court that dispenses Islamic law, the judgment would not have
been different from that of the I.C.J., regardless of the fact that Iran officially
follows the Shi'a Imamiyyah sect of Islam. The Islamic Republic of Iran has a
duty, under Islamic law, to fulfill all contractual obligations it has entered into with
the United States, provided they are not contradictory to the core objectives of the
shari'ah (maqaasidal-shari'ah). The fact that the United States was accused of
committing the offense of espionage by the Iranians may not hold as justification
for the seizure of the United States embassy. The Islamic Republic of Iran within
the purview of this article is therefore found liable under Islamic law for failing to
discharge its diplomatic commitments to the diplomatic mission and staff of the
United States embassy.

160. Id. at 124.

SAILING ON TROUBLED WATERS-ANTIQUATED U.S. MARITIME
LIABILITY LIMITS FOR DEATH AND INJURIES OF SHIP PASSENGERS:
OPTIONS FOR REFORM
RIAZ ZAMAN*

On April 15, 1912, the British luxury liner Titanic sank in the North Atlantic
off Newfoundland, less than three hours after striking an iceberg. About 1,500
people died. Far from the glamour of films now associated with the tragedy, the
lives of family members of those who died were shattered, in part due to maritime
liability limits offering lean compensation at best. Under the U.S. Limitation of
Liability Act of 1851, Titanic's shipowner could limit liability to the value of the
ship, passenger tickets, and cargo.1 Many survivors and families of those who died
received no compensation at all.2 Four years after the tragic sinking, Titanic's
owner, White Star, agreed to pay about $430 per each life lost, an exceedingly
modest amount even in 1912.3
The reason for such a low amount was due to legal thinking at the time that
shielded shipowners from liability, except where the shipowner had .'privity' or
'knowledge' that the accident could occur.4 Even in 1912, this approach to
compensation was an outdated throwback to 1851, when shipowners were shielded
from liability in order to promote development of a strong maritime industry.
Oddly, more than 150 years later, shipowners' liability is still limited by equally
arcane laws codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501-30512, Limitation of Shipowners'
Liability Act and Fire Statute-the descendent statute of the Limitation of Liability
Act of 1851.6 Under the modem version, total compensation for all claims of
personal injury or death arising out of one incident is limited to "$420 times the
tonnage of the vessel" where the owner had no "privity or knowledge" of
circumstances resulting in the accident.
Although increasingly high shipping standards have substantially reduced the
risk of fatal accidents, the limitation laws have not been updated to reflect current
* The author is an LL.M. candidate at the Georgetown University Law Center.

1. Cynthia Crossen, Titanic's Sinking PlungedSurvivors into Poverty, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2003,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 1044398577689669693-search.html.
2. See id.
3. Id. See also James E. Mercante, In the Wake of 'The TITANIC': An Unsinkable Law, N.Y. L.J.
(Apr. 12, 2012), http://www.rubinfiorella.com/pdf/TITANIC.pdf (providing a brief procedural history
of the court cases that followed the tragedy).
4. Mercante, supra note 3.
5. See id.
6. An Act to limit the Liability of Ship-Owners, and for other Purposes of Mar. 3, 1851, ch. 43, 9
Stat. 635 (current version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501-30512 (2006)).
7. Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30506 (2006).
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realities. This article explores the potential impact of outdated U.S. liability limits
and options to reform the law. The author considers the London Convention on
Limitation of Liability of Maritime Claims ('76 and '96) and the Athens
Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea,
2002 as alternatives to the current U.S. law, but ultimately concludes that liability
for death and personal injury claims is best left to private insurers without
statutorily defined limits. This article also considers forum non conveniens as a
method of reducing litigation by foreign plaintiffs in U.S. courts-in order to
address concerns that repeal of U.S. liability limits will result in even more suits in
U.S. courts filed by foreign plaintiffs.
The article concludes that compensation is best left to private insurance due to
the flaws of international regimes of liability and the capacity of maritime
insurance clubs to competently compensate claims. More importantly, the need for
limits that existed in prior centuries no longer exists. In effect, the limits of
liability serve as little more than a subsidy to foreign flagged vessels, since only
one major passenger vessel today is flagged as a U.S. passenger ship. This subsidy
could be at the expense of U.S. claimants and others who file lawsuits in U.S.
courts.
Critics of the 1984 Limitation of Shipowners' Liability Act (hereinafter
"Liability Act" or "LOLA," where 1984 is the most current revised version) point
to many reasons why the act should be repealed. First and foremost, policy
considerations that motivated the passage of the original act in 1851 as a means of
protecting an infant shipping industry no longer exist. Critics have also noted that
modem legal avenues exist that carefully protect both the corporate entity (i.e.
shipowners) and claimants-primarily through insurance policies.8 In this modem
context, the subsidy provided to shipowners has no justification, and unjustly
weighs against a claimant, inhibiting a claimant's ability to obtain just
compensation.
I.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN LIMITATION OF LIABILITY ACT

The foundation of the current Limited Liability Act was created in the mid
19th century to ensure that the United States' shipping industry could compete
with its European counterparts. This limited liability has been reformed over the
years, usually in response to tragedies; however, the attempts to completely repeal
this limited liability have yet to be successful.
A.

Shipowners'Limitation ofLiability Act of 1851

Passage of the Shipowners' Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 (hereinafter
"the 1851 Act" or "1851 LOLA") is related to the early development of the ocean
cargo industry of the 1840s. The California Gold Rush that started in 1850
provided an additional stimulant to an already growing shipping industry.
8. See Mark A. White, The 1851 Shipowners' Limitation of Liability Act: Should the Courts
Deliver the Final Blow?, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 821, 822-23 (2004). In addition, environmental statutes
pre-empt the Liability Act for damage related to certain cargo. Id. at 838-39.
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Congress' passage of the 1851 Act was also motivated in part by the Supreme
Courts' decision in New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants Bank of
Boston.9 The Supreme Court held that a contract shielding the shipowner from
liability was invalid.'o The case arose out of an incident occurring on the night of
January 13, 1840, involving consignment of goods through a business owner, Mr.
Hernden."
Mr. Hemden ran a business transporting consigned goods.12 He
neither owned nor operated ships, but would contract for carriage of one wooden
crate carrying goods under his custody aboard the steamship Lexington, travelling
between New York and Boston.' 3 Owners of the Lexington, N.J. Steam, negotiated
a contract with Mr. Hernden absolving N.J. Steam from liability for loss or damage
to Mr. Hemden's crate.14
On the night of January 13, 1840, the Lexington and its cargo caught fire in
the Long Island Sound. Merchants Bank had consigned cargo with Mr. Herndon
that was destroyed in the fire, and sued N.J. Steam for damages.' 5 The Supreme
Court determined that N.J. Steam's contract with Mr. Hemden did not shield it
from liability and awarded a sum of $22,224, a windfall at the time.16 The decision
would eventually motivate Congress to set statutory liability limits.
In 1848, the same year as the Supreme Court's decision in Merchant's Bank,
gold was discovered in California, stimulating commerce and transport. As a
result, California became a state in 1850, and transport by land and sea continued
to grow. United States transatlantic shipping also saw a boost, with shipping lines
travelling from New York to Liverpool. The U.S. Collins Line was in direct
competition with the British CunardLine, but the British vessels had the advantage
of protection from liability.' 7
With the rallying cry of "Remember the Lexington," Senator Hannibal
Hamlin of Maine introduced the bill that became the 1851 Limitation Act.' The
key provision of the act limits liability as follows: "That the liability of the owner
or owners of any ship or vessel . . . shall in no case exceed the amount or value of

9. Walter W. Eyer, Note, Shipowners' Limitation of Liability-New Directions for an Old
Doctrine, 16 STAN. L. REV. 370, 372-73 (1964). In fact, the original statute directly references this case
in its text. 9 THE STATUTES AT LARGE AND TREATIES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 635 n.b
(George Minot ed., 1853).
10. N.J. Steam Navigation Co. v. Merch.'s Bank of Bos., 47 U.S. (1. How.) 344, 385 (1848).
11. Id. at 347.
12. Id. at 345-46.
13. Id. at 379.
14. Id. at 345.
15. Id. at 378-79.
16. Id. at 354, 385.
17. See White, supra note 8, at 828-3 1.
18. Donald C. Greenman, Limitation of Liability Unlimited, 32 J. MAR. L. & COM. 279, 280
(2001). See also CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 2d Sess. 713-20 (1851) (recording the Senate debate of this
law); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: DEMOCRATS AND WHIGS 1829-1861, at 125
n.13 (2005).
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the interest of such owner or owners respectively, in such ship or vessel, and her
freight then pending" unless a loss is occasioned with his privity or knowledge.19
Interpreting the statute, the concept of limitation was further defined in
Supreme Court cases from 1871: Norwich Co. v. Wright ("Norwich 1"),2o and
Place v. Norwich & New York Transport Co. ("Norwich Il").21 In Norwich I, the
Court determined that limitation is derived from the value of the vessel after the
collision. 22 Hence, where a ship sinks or is completely destroyed, injured
passengers receive no compensation at all. In Norwich II, the Court not only
confirmed that claimants would receive no compensation when a ship sinks, but
more importantly, that insurance proceeds paid to the shipowner are not part of the
compensation fund because insurance proceeds are not part of the shipowners'
"value of his interest in the vessel" as required under LOLA. 23 The result of the
Court's logic produced a strange paradox-where the most serious and damaging
accidents result in the lowest compensation fund.24
In holding that an owner is limited to the value of the vessel and cargo after
the accident the Supreme Court explained: "The great object of the law was to
encourage ship-building and to induce capitalists to invest money in this branch of
industry. Unless they can be induced to do so, the shipping interests of the country
must flag and decline." 25 This concept of protecting shipowners as described by
19. An Act to limit the Liability of Ship-Owners, and for other Purposes of Mar. 3, 1851, ch. 43, 9
Stat. 635 (current version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501-30512 (2006)).
20. Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. 104 (1. Wall.) (1871) [hereinafter Norwich 1].
21. Place v. Norwich & N.Y. Transp. Co., 118 U.S. 468 (1886) [hereinafter Norwich l1].
22. Norwich I, supra note 20, at 119-25. In Norwich I, the Court referenced a variety of
intemational maritime sources to frame Congressional intent in passing Section 3 of 1851 Liability Act.
Id. at 116-120. The Liability Act is a compilation of clauses from English law and liability statutes of
Massachusetts and Maine, referencing international maritime law. Id. at 119. The Supreme Court
recognizes a divergence between English law and maritime sources on the issue of the point in time on
a ship's voyage that its value determines compensation. Id. at 120-22. Maritime sources determine that
a shipowner may surrender a ship and any remaining cargo after the accident to satisfy any liability. Id.
at 116-20. English law, by passage of acts that carve out an exception from the maritime rule, require a
shipowner to establish a compensation fund based on the value of freight and cargo prior to the
accident. Id. at 118-19. The Supreme Court determined that Section 3 of the Liability Act did not mirror
the language of English law providing an exception to the otherwise established maritime rule. Id. at
119-20. Moreover, Section 3 was derived from the laws of Massachusetts and Maine both of which
uphold the maritime rule. Id. at 119. Although the state statutes address the issue of damage to cargo
only, the language of the 1851 Liability Act extended also to personal injury. Id. at 120-22. As a result
of the Supreme Court's interpretation, a compensation fund of zero is entirely possible when a ship
sinks and cannot be recovered; that is, when the post-accident value of the ship is zero. Id. at 120-25.
23. Norwich II, supra note 21, at 536-41. In Norwich II, the Supreme Court held that insurance
proceeds recovered by the shipowner cannot be included in the vessel's value for the purpose of
allowing compensation. Id. at 536-37. Maritime insurance is indemnity insurance. Id. at 536. As such,
insurance proceeds paid to a shipowner are not an "interest in property" that determines compensation
under Section 3 of the 1851 Liability Act. Id. at 536-41. Significantly, maritime insurance today still
functions as indemnity insurance and, as a result, injured parties cannot collect against insurance
proceeds paid to a shipowner that has filed for bankruptcy. John D. Kimball, The Central Role ofP&I
Insurance in MaritimeLaw, 87 Tul. L. Rev. 1147, 1153 (2013).
24. Greenman, supra note 18, at 283.
25. Norwich I, supra note 20, at 121.
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the Supreme Court in 1871 continues to drive modem maritime limits. Indeed the
Maritime Law Association ("MLA")26 used the same arguments as recently as
2010 to justify its recommendations for continuing maritime limits. 27 The MLA is
a non-governmental organization that states as its purpose to promote uniformity
of U.S. maritime law.28 On the issue of liability, the MLA promotes policies that
have been advocated by shipowners for more than a century. Like shipowners, the
MLA stands steadfast against repeal of the limit. 29
B.

Amendments to the 1851 Limitation ofLiability Act of 1936 and 1984

Following its tendency to reform maritime laws only in response to tragic
events, rather than proactive reform, Congress first amended the 1851 Liability Act
in 1936 in response to the burning of the passenger line, Morrow Castle, on
September 8, 1934, which caused 135 deaths off the shore of New Jersey.
Invoking the 1851 Liability Act, owners of the Morrow Castle were limited in their
liability to the meager sum of $20,000 for all claims for loss of cargo and death.30
As a result of public outrage, Congress amended the Act's provisions relating to
personal injury and death by requiring shipowners to establish a compensation
fund amounting to $60 per gross ton of the vessel. 3 ' The law retained an
exemption from the limit in cases where the master, superintendent, or managing
agent had "privity or knowledge" of conditions leading to the accident. 32
Congress amended the Limitation Act again in 1984 to raise the liability limit
to $420 per gross ton of the vessel,33 again where the incident occurs without
"privity or knowledge" of the owner. 34 The MLA points out that modem courts

26. The MLA was incorporated in 1993, but traces its inception back to 1899 as the U.S.
counterpart to the Belgian-based organization, Comit6 Maritime International, an international body
meeting for the first time in the 1880's with the purpose of compiling and codifying maritime law.
About the MLA, MAR. L. Ass'N U.S., http://www.mlaus.org (last visited Jan. 10, 2014). The U.S. MLA
today states its purpose in its Articles of Incorporation as, "to facilitate justice in its administration, to
promote uniformity in its enactment and interpretation." Id.
27. See MAR. LAw Ass'N OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY ACT 7 (2010) [hereinafter MLA, REPORT], available at
http://www.mlaus.org/archives/library/2094.pdf (describing the MLA's position against repeal of
liability limits).
28. About the MLA, supranote 26.
29. MLA, REPORT, supra note 27, at 7.
30. Greenman, supra note 18, at 284.
31. See id. at 284-85.
32. Id. at 285.
33. Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30506 (2006) ("Minimum Liability. If the amount of
the vessel owner's liability determined under Section 30505 of this title is insufficient to pay all losses
in full, and the portion available to pay claims for personal injury or death is less than $420 times the
tonnage of the vessel, that portion shall be increased to $420 times the tonnage of the vessel. That
portion may be used only to pay claims for personal injury or death.").
34. Id. § 30505(b). This Section reads:
Claims subject to limitation. Unless otherwise excluded by law, claims, debts, and liabilities
subject to limitation under subsection (a) are those arising from any embezzlement, loss, or
destruction of any property, goods, or merchandise shipped or put on board the vessel, any
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generally do not apply the 1984 Limitation Act based on one or more of the
following findings that are deemed to constitute "privity or knowledge":
1. Failure to provide or insure adequate operations, equipment, or crew;
2. Failure to detect and/or correct defects;
3. Orders by owner to vessel that proved improper;
4. Improper operation of vessel by owner or knowledge of;
5. Personal contract;
6. Improper stowage or other operational act by sufficiently high person; and,
7. Failure of evidence to prove no privity and knowledge. 35
Although this list provides significant potential exemptions from arcane
liability limits, the MLA's position certainly does not render the issue moot. In his
study, Statistical Analysis of Limitation of Liability Cases, Donald Greenman
found that between 1993 and 1996, out of ten cases, courts applied the liability
limit to six. 36 However, in periods surveyed since 1953, courts did have a
tendency to break the limitation more than apply it.37 Overall, Greenman's data
shows that from 1953 to 1996, courts applied the limitation in sixty-three cases
while breaking the limit in 103 cases. 38 Congressional action is essential in order
to promote uniformity of law for the victims of maritime accidents. Today we
have a situation where courts may break the limits for some, while denying it for
others.39
More recently, in December 2011, a U.S. District Court in Wilmington, North
Carolina, limited liability to $100,000 for the deaths of two plaintiffs on a vessel
operated by defendant Marine Specialty Management. 40 The two plaintiffs,
Cynthia Woodcock and Lorrie Shoup, were killed during a parasailing accident.41
The court held that the vessel liability limits apply. Accordingly, the families were
awarded $100,000 plus interest and costs. 42 Over the past several years, courts are

loss, damage, or injury by collision, or any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture,
done, occasioned, or incurred, without the privity or knowledge of the owner.
Id.
35. Greenman, supra note 18, at 287.
36. Donald C. Greenman, StatisticalAnalysis of Limitation of Liability Cases 1953-1996, in MAR.
LAW Ass'N OF THE U.S., DOCUMENT NO. 729 THE MLA REPORT 10527, 10530 tbl.I (Gordon W.
Paulsen et al. eds., 1997).
37. See id.
38. Id.
39. See Greenman, supra note 18, at 287-89.
40. See Jason Gonzales, Insurance Company Orderedto Pay in ParasailingDeaths, STAR NEWS
(Sept. 20, 2012, 1:31 PM), http://www.stamewsonline.com/article/20120920/ARTICLES/120929957.
In a related state-court action, the decedents' estates were awarded 9 million dollars. Id. The court had
not determined the effect of the federal Limitation of Liability Act. Id. In this case, plaintiffs are
fortunate that they had another remedy not subject to the limit. However, this commonly is not the case
for many maritime death claims.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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increasingly applying the limit to incidents involving owners of pleasure yachts,
motorboats, and jet skis.43
Greenman's data about the number of courts applying the limit between 1953
and 1996 raises an interesting issue: Does diminished application of the limit really
justify ignoring it? Should Congress and society not have a duty to ensure a legal
system that provides just compensation for losses and a uniform standard of
determining liability? Although Greenman's data demonstrates a general tendency
to deny the limitation more than to apply it, the cases to which the limit applies
represent real losses to individuals and families. These losses must be of concern
to Congress and to the American public. To aggravate matters, compensation,
even when the limitation may not apply, can be further reduced by court created
interpretations that limit the types of damages available to plaintiffs.44 Although
all of these issues have been presented to Congress from time to time, it remains a
mystery why Congress has so far failed to substantially reform or altogether repeal
limits on shipowner liability.
C.

ProposedLegislationBefore Congress to Repeal Liability Limitsfrom
1966-2010

Congress considers reform of maritime liability limits only in response to a
disaster. This was the case in 1851 when the Lexington Steamboat disaster led to
the passage of the 1851 Liability Act, 45 and similarly in 1936 when the burning of
the Morrow Castle caused the deaths of 135 passengers and led to the 1936
amendments.46 In 1966, Congress considered totally repealing the liability limits
after the Yarmouth Castle sank en route to the Bahamas.47 Again in 1983 and
1985 Congress considered total repeal. 4 8 But the 1983-1985 amendments resulted
in raising the liability limit only to $420 per the vessel's tonnage. 49 Most recently,
Congress considered reform in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon failure, where
an explosion on the Deepwater Horizon oil-drilling platform resulted in the deaths
43. Dennis J. Stone, The Limitation of Liability Act: Time to Abandon Ship?, 32 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 317, 332 (2001).
44. See Dooley v. Korean Airlines Co., 524 U.S. 116, 124 (1998) (holding that survivors are
entitled to pecuniary losses, but not damages for loss of society or pre-death pain and suffering, when
an action was brought under the Death on the High Seas Act ("DOHSA")). Nonetheless, pecuniary
losses can be significant, as this would entitle survivors to lost income of decedent over their lifetime.
See FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR. & OSCAR S. GRAY, 4 HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON
TORTS 756-58 (3d ed. 2007). Damages for pain and suffering can also be a significant portion of overall
recovery. Pain and suffering damages may be especially important where a decedent did not earn a high
wage. See id. at 763-65. Hence, exclusion of such damages can be a significant loss for survivors.
45. White, supranote 8, at 827.
46. Greenman, supranote 18, at 284-85.
47. S. 3251, 89th Cong. (1966); see also Allan I. Mendelsohn, The Public Interest and Private
InternationalMaritime Law, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 783, 805-06 (1969) (discussing proposals to
revise the Limitation of Liability Act in response to the Yarmouth Castle incident).
48. H.R. 277, 99th Cong. § 5 (1985); H.R. 3156, 99th Cong. (1985); REP. WALTER BEAMAN
JONES SR., MARITIME SAFETY ACT OF 1983, H.R. REP. NO. 98-525, at 10-11 (1983).
49. H.R. REP. No. 99-767, at 22 (1986) (discussing the current law that legislates levels of
maritime liability).
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of eleven individuals and injury of 126 people.50 Under maritime law, an oil-rig is
considered a "vessel," allowing application of the Limitation Act.5 1 An overview
of this history provides some insight into Congress' failure to act as stemming
from effective and continuing MLA lobbying success.
1.

Proposed Reform in Response to the Yarmouth Castle Incident of
1965

In 1966, the 90th Congress considered a bill that would repeal the limitation
entirely, in response to the sinking of the Yarmouth Castle on November 13,
1965.52 The Yarmouth Castle caught fire on a journey from Miami to Nassau,
Bahamas, while the source of the fire could not be determined, one possibility was
a mattress near an electrical connection.5 3 Due to inadequate fire protection and
safety measures, the fire spread, eventually sinking the vessel with eighty-eight
panicking passengers and two crew members going down with the vessel.54 Others
managed to escape via inflatable rafts (despite an undersupply of emergency
equipment) and varying levels of assistance from crewmembers, some heroic,
while other crewmembers attempted to save themselves in panic.s Following this
tragedy, Congress considered Administration sponsored bills that would repeal the
limit entirely and require both mandatory insurance and compliance with
intemational safety standards mandated under the Convention on Safety of Life at
Sea.56
Despite a strong endorsement of repeal from the Executive Branch, Congress
inexplicably deleted the section relating to repeal of the liability limits in its final
version of the law, while passing all the other sections.5 7 Committee reports do not
offer any explanation as to why Congress failed to repeal the limits in its final
enactment. Executive departments and agencies that endorsed the repeal included:
Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration, State Department, Treasury
Department, Coast Guard, and the Federal Maritime Commission.58 The Federal
Maritime Commission, an independent agency responsible for regulating U.S.
50. REP. JOHN CONYERS JR., CHAIRMAN, SECURING PROTECTIONS FOR THE INJURED FROM
LIMITATIONS ON LIABILITY ACT, H.R. REP. 111-521, at 4 (2010). The Deepwater Horizon failure

occurred on April 20, 2010, when an explosion on the Deepwater Horizon oil drilling platform
enflamed the platform, causing a massive oil spill. Id.
51. See 46 U.S.C. § 115 (2006); 33 U.S.C.A. § 2701(37) (West 2013) (showing that for the
purpose of maritime law, the platform is considered a "vessel," allowing application of liability limits).
52. S. 3251.
53. U.S. COAST GUARD, COMMANDANT'S ACTION ON THE MARINE BOARD OF INVESTIGATION
CONVENED TO INVESTIGATE THE FIRE ON BOARD THE PANAMANIAN SS YARMOUTH CASTLE ON 13
NOVEMBER 1965 AND SUBSEQUENT SINKING WITH Loss OF LIFE 2, 22 (1966), available at
htttp://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg545/docs/boards/yarmouthcastle.pdf
54. Id. at 1, 22-24.
55. Id. at 16-18.
56. S. 3251; H.R. 10327, 89th Cong. (1966); WARREN GRANT MAGNUSON, SAFETY OF LIFE AT
SEA, S. REP. No. 89-1483, at 4-6 (1966) (report of the Committee on Commerce about the bills at issue,
stating endorsement of agencies).
57. See generally S. 3251; H.R. 10327; S. REP. No. 89-1483.
58. S. REP. No. 89-1483, at 11.
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international maritime transport, worked closely with the other agencies and
departments in drafting the legislation, including the repeal.59 Indeed, speaking on
behalf of these agencies, Rear Admiral John Harllee, Chairman of the Federal
Maritime Commission, explained:
We take the position that limitation of liability should be
eliminated, unless insurance companies or passenger ship
representatives offer compelling proof that (1) a complete absence of
limitations on liability is not needed to provide proper safeguards to the
public, and (2) elimination of limitations on liability would not be
feasible from a cost or insurance placement viewpoint. Even if this
should be the case, we would strongly urge that liability limits be
substantiallyraised.60

Perhaps, having mandated amounts of insurance coverage and requiring
compliance with international safety standards in its legislation, Congress saw no
need also to repeal the limitation.
Georgetown University Law Center Professor Allan Mendelsohn, who
worked on the repeal proposal for the State Department, stated that industry
witnesses defeated the proposed repeal with arguments ancillary to the issue of the
insurance industry's capacity to insure against unlimited liability. 61 Arguments
from industry witnesses in 1966 have now been appropriated by today's MLA,
keeping them alive as recently as 2010, when Congress considered amending
LOLA after the Deepwater Horizon spill. In 2010, the MLA doubted the insurance
industry's capability to handle claims beyond liability limit, making the limits
necessary. 62 Industry argues that historically most countries have maritime
liability limits and that repeal of liability limits would place the United States at a
distinct disadvantage.6 3 These limits, however, are a historical anomaly, enacted at
a time when a shipowner did not exercise any degree of control over the operation
of its vessel. Instead, vessels were operated by a captain and crew beyond contact,
and at sea thousands of miles from the shipowner. In past times, limits may well
have had the equitable and economic justification of protecting maritime transport
Today, shipowners, aided by modern technology, are
vital to commerce.
responsible for vessel operations, no matter how distant. Moreover, and perhaps
most important, all other modes of transport have no liability limits of any type in
the United States. Carriers by road, rail, and air that operate throughout the United
States do so without any liability limits.M Nor would unlimited liability be unduly
prejudicial against U.S. carriers simply because unlimited liability would apply to
all suits brought in U.S. courts regardless of a vessel's flag.6 5

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 11-16.
Id. at 13-14 (emphasis added).
Mendelsohn, supranote 47, at 803-07.
MLA, REPORT, supra note 27, at 2-4.
Mendelsohn, supra note 47, at 803-04.
Id. at 803.
Id.
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Professor Mendelsohn also discusses other industry arguments during the
1966 Congressional hearings related to the Yarmouth Castle, that have now again
been adopted by the MLA.66 Industry has long argued that the marine insurance
industry is incapable of providing sufficient insurance coverage to cover unlimited
liability and that unlimited liability would thus become the financial ruin of the
maritime shipping industry.67 But the capacity of the insurance industry to handle
unlimited liability in road, rail, and air transport indicates that this argument is
simply not true. Industry experts also argue that the procedure of concursus is best
68
Through the procedure of concursus, a
preserved in limited liability systems.
shipowner can bring multiple claims from one incident into one court. However,
with a few minor procedural amendments, concursus can be equally preserved in a
system of unlimited liability. 6 Alternatively, the same multidistrict litigation
statute that allows all victims of air disasters to sue in one court could be equally
applicable to victims of a maritime disaster.7 0
2.

Proposed Reforms in 1983 and 1985

Congress again considered repealing liability limits in its 98th Session in
1983 and in its 99th Session in 1985. In its 98th Session, Congress resolved to
raise the limit of liability to $420 per ton as an interim measure, despite expert
testimony detailing many flaws of this approach.' Professor Allan Mendelsohn,
testifying as an expert in maritime law, noted that the concept of maritime liability
limits is currently unnecessary and outdated:
We may have reached the point in this 20th century, in the development
of our domestic and international law, where limits of liability have
become outmoded. They do not exist in domestic bus transportation.
They do not exist in railroad transportation, and they do not even exist
in domestic air transportation.72
Even more poignant is Professor Mendelsohn's belief that raising the limit to
$420 per ton would be more harmful to injured passengers than the $60 per ton
limit at that time. Professor Mendelsohn stated two reasons. First, he explained
that courts view the $60 limit as having no real legal meaning and will readily
break it to prevent the injustice of its application. 74 Second, raising the amount to
66. Compare Mendelsohn, supra note 47, at 802-05, with MLA, REPORT, supra note 27, at 2-4.
67. Mendelsohn, supra note 47, at 804.
68. See id.
69. Id. at 804. Concursus could be available to plaintiffs through an amendment to Rule F of the
Federal Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, especially when read in
conjunction with 28 U.S.C. § 1407, allowing consolidation of claims in multidistrict litigation. Id.

70. Id.
71. REP. WALTER BEAMAN JONES SR., MARITIME SAFETY ACT OF 1983, H.R. REP. No. 98-525, at
10-11 (1983).

72. Limitation of Shipowner's Liability Oversight: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Merch.
Marine of the H. Committee on Merch. Marine and Fisheries, 98th Cong. 100 (1983) (statement of
Professor Allan Mendelsohn, Adjunct Professor Georgetown Law School).
73. Id. at 109-10.
74. Id. at 110.
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$420 implies that Congress had considered the issue and passed the $420 per ton
limit intending that courts actually apply it.75 This could lead to inadequate
compensation.7 6
Professor Mendelsohn explained:
Were there another Yarmouth Castle disaster aboard a vessel like the
Constitution, for example, a $420 figure would yield a fund of about

$7,560,000. Divided among the survivors of 90 fatal victims, however,
each would receive only about $84,000; and this would leave nothing
for the injured, no matter how serious the injury. If more than 90 people
died-as was the case with the Morro Castle and the Titanic disasters-

the recoveries would be even more inadequate. I would not wish to be
responsible for adopting legislation that produces such wholly unfair
results, and I am sure each of you shares my sentiments fully.7 7
Despite Professor Mendelsohn's warning, Congress adopted the $420 per ton
limit justifying it as an interim measure to adjust for the cost of living increase
from the 1936 limit, when the limit was $60 per ton.78 The increase was supposed
to be interim or temporary-until Congress could pass a more comprehensive
reform.7 9 Twenty-eight years later, Congress has not yet passed that reform.
A year after it raised the limit, the same committee considered a bill in 1985
to modify the $420 liability limit by adopting the 1976 Convention on Limitation
of Liability for Maritime Claims, ('76 London Convention "LLMC") an
international agreement that aimed to consolidate and modernize prior
international maritime liability agreements.so In testimony before the committee,
then Assistant Secretary for the Department of Transportation and current
Georgetown University Law Center Professor Warren Dean brought to light
several deficiencies in the LLMC.si On the issue of repeal of the limits, Professor
Dean agrees that the matter is best left to private insurers without interference from
liability limits set by the government. 82 Professor Dean explained that any limit is
inadequate because inflation can render the limit an outdated anachronism within a
short time frame from its passage:

75. Id.
76. See id.
77. Id.
78. REP. WALTER BEAMAN JONEs SR., MARITIME SAFETY ACT OF 1983, H.R. REP. No. 98-525, at
10-11 (1983).
79. Id.
80. H.R. 277,99th Cong. (1985), andH.R. 3156,99th Cong. (1985).
81. Department of Transportation:Hearing on H.R. 277 and H.R. 3156 Before the Subcomm. on
Merch. Marine of the H. Comm. on Merch. Marine and Fisheries,99th Cong. 4-7 (1985) (statement of
Warren L. Dean, Jr., then Assistant Gen. Counsel for International Law, Dep't of Transp.) [hereinafter
Dean's Statement].
82. Id. at 4 ("We believe that the Committee should examine the need for preserving the
application of limits for both personal and cargo claims to determine whether market forces could
resolve the problem of compensation through private contracts, thereby removing any need for
government intervention.").
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Finally an inherent weakness of the legislative approach to liability
limitation is its failure thus far to provide for adjustment of liability
limits to compensate for erosion by inflation. Indeed, there may be no
reliable indicator to which a liability limit could be indexed. That is
another reason these matters are best left to the insurance marketplace.
The current Limitation of Liability Act became obsolete due to erosion
by inflation over the years. 83
The Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries did propose a set of
reforms to liability and workers' compensation affecting commercial fishing
vessels, while failing to reform liability limits for vessels carrying passengers.84
The committee offered no persuasive explanation as to why it failed to repeal the
liability limit. Its report merely states:
There was general agreement among the witnesses that the laws
regarding liability for loss of life or bodily injury are out of date and
should be amended to reflect present conditions. There was also a
feeling that all types of vessels, particularly commercial vessels, should
be treated the same. Some stated that a wait-and-see policy should be
adopted. They felt that the recent change from a $60- to a $420-pergross-ton limitation of liability, as required by 46 App. U.S.C. 183(b),
might be adequate without further legislation. Many others said that
legislation should be enacted that closely parallels the present
Convention of Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976. They felt that this
would provide the most effective and equitable means of protecting the
rights of victims and vessel owners.85

3.

Proposed Reform After the Deepwater Horizon Spill in 2010

More recently, H.R. 5503 was introduced by Congressman John Conyers on
July 13, 2010.86 Amongst other changes, the bill sought to repeal the Limitation of
Liability Act." This proposal was a direct result of a petition filed by Transocean,
owner of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig, to limit its liability for injuries and deaths
to those aboard the rig, using the Limitation of Liability Act. The act would limit
83. Id. at 9.
84. H.R. 5013, 99th Cong. (1986).
85. H.R. REP. No. 99-767, at 22 (1986).
86. Securing Protections for the Injured from Limitations on Liability Act, H.R. 5503, 111th
Cong. (2010).
87. Id. § 4. The bill also proposes changes to DOHSA, which originally created a cause of action
for wrongful death under the Act, but limited remedies to pecuniary damages. Id. § 2. The amendment
would allow for non-pecuniary damages (e.g. pain and suffering, loss of care, comfort and
companionship, etc.). Id. § 2(2). However, under DOHSA liability limits contained in the Limit of
Liability Act apply. 46 U.S.C. § 30502 (2006). Congressmen Conyers also sought to amend the Jones
Act, an act that provides a right of action for seamen against their employer for wrongful death and
personal injury. H.R. 5503, Illth Cong. § 3 (2010). The amendment would have allowed for non-

pecuniary damages for wrongful death claims brought under the act. Id.
88. REP. JOHN CONYERS JR., CHAIRMAN, SECURING PROTECTIONS
LIMITATIONS ON LIABILITY ACT, H.R. REP. 111-521, at 4 (2010).
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Transocean's liability to $26,764,083, being the weight of the salvaged vessel and
its cargo multiplied by $420.8 The Deepwater Horizon failure occurred on April
20, 2010, when an explosion on the Deepwater Horizon oil-drilling platform
caused a massive oil spill. 90 The explosion resulted in the deaths of 11 workers
and several injuries to the 126 workers on the platform. 91 In a committee memo,
Congressman Conyers states, "Section 4 repeals this antiquated law, which has
little relevance in our age of instant global communication and makes little sense at
a time when there are precious few U.S. flagged ships who could even benefit from
the liability limitations." 92 As of September 2012, the Pride ofAmerica is the only
major U.S. flagged cruise ship-a one-ship company 93 operated by Norwegian
Cruise Lines. 94
The bill passed the House of Representatives on July 1, 2010.95 Its
companion bill in the Senate, S. 3600, died after being read twice in the Committee
of Commerce, Science, and Transportation.96
Senate reports provide no
explanation for not passing the bill. In the House of Representatives, a member
who was in the minority of the vote argued that the bill was rushed through in
response to the Deepwater Horizon spill without hearing expert testimony and
could result in unanticipated adverse effects.97 A member in the majority of the
89. Mark Long & Angel Gonzales, Transocean Seeks Limit on Liability, WALL ST. J., May 13,
2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704635204575241852606380696.html.
90. H.R. REP. 111-521, at 4.
91. Id.
92. Memorandum from John Conyers, Jr., Chairman of the H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, on Full
Committee
Markup
of
H.R.
5503,
at
7
(June
22,
2010),
available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/pdf/Memol00623.pdf.
93. The "one-ship" company is a legal device that shipowners use to limit recovery amounts for
claims. See Malcolm Wallis, Recovery of Maritime Debts and the Role of the Associated Ship, 28
BANKING & FIN. L. REv. 103, 109-10 (2012) (discussing the increased registry of one-ship companies
and difficulties in collecting debts against them). A shipowner can register a ship as its own corporate
entity, with little or no assets to the corporate name other than the value of the vessel. See id. Recovery
of debts against these one-ship companies is then limited to the meager assets available in the corporate
name. Id. at 110-12. One-ship companies could render unlimited liability ineffective. See id. at 112-14.
The limited recovery imposed by one-ship companies can, however, be overcome by requiring vessels
to carry insurance coverage that could adequately cover claims. See Mendelsohn, supranote 47, at 802.
94. Pride of America Set for Major Upgrades, MARINE LOG (Sept. 7, 2012),
http://www.marinelog.com/index.php?option=com-k2&view-item&id=2899:pride-of-america-set-formajor-upgrades&Itemid=230.
95. H.R. 5503, 111th Cong. (as passed by House, July 1, 2010).
96. S. 3600, 11Ith Cong. (2010). The bill was read twice in committee and no further action was
taken. Library of Congress, Bill Summary and Status, 111th Congress (2009-2010), S.3600, THOMAS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl 1ll:SN03600:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Sept. 28,
2013).
97. REP. JOHN CONYERS JR., CHAIRMAN, SECURING PROTECTIONS FOR THE INJURED FROM
LIMITATIONS ON LIABILITY ACT, H.R. REP. 111-521, at 31 (2010) ("Nonetheless, without the benefit of
even a single legislative hearing, H.R. 5503 virtually re-writes U.S. maritime law, making portions of it
out-of-step with the maritime-liability laws of nearly every other seagoing nation; eliminates important
provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act, a statute passed just 5 years ago, with strong bi-partisan
support, to ensure that class actions are decided in a neutral, fair forum-the Federal courts; and makes
significant amendments to provisions of the Bankruptcy Code for debtors with oil-spill liability. Given
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vote in the House of Representatives however, reported strong favor for repealing
the limit:
LOLA [Limitation of Liability Act] has clearly outlived any
legitimate purpose it may once have served. Its original purpose-to
promote American shipping interests-is now largely serving the
interests of carriers incorporated in Third World countries and using
foreign-flagged vessels in order to avoid having to pay U.S. taxes or
follow U.S. health and safety regulations. Moreover, Congress could
not possibly have envisioned in 1851 that movable industrial oil
exploration and development platforms would qualify as "vessels"
under LOLA and attempt to shield their liability in this type of disaster.
When LOLA was enacted, a shipowner could communicate with
the captain and crew of a vessel away from home port only through
documents transshipped on other vessels. LOLA was intended to
protect those owners in light of that difficulty in staying in
communication. Today's communication technology allows shipowners
to oversee their vessels as constantly as they wish, even when the vessel
is on the other side of the world. Owners today have direct
communication by radio, computers, and phone, and a ship can be
positioned and monitored constantly using satellite systems. Continued
use of LOLA simply removes healthy incentives for owners to properly
oversee their ships.
Finally, there are better, more sophisticated alternatives for
protecting shipowners than LOLA. Today, shipowners have a wide
variety of legal tools available that better protect their financial interests.
For example, insurance, contract, charter, mortgage, and the separate
incorporation of vessels are alternative methods that offer more
appropriate financial protection than LOLA.98
Despite excellent arguments put forth in the House of Representatives,
Congress once again failed to reach an agreement to repeal the limit in 2010 as it
failed after the Yarmouth Castle disaster in 1966.99 An increase in the limit to
$420 passed as an interim measure in 1984100 still exists as an anachronism in 2013
as the law of the land: a law that threatens and could well justify inadequate
compensation of victims or their survivors after a future maritime disaster.

the sweeping nature of the changes in this bill and the lack of committee process to create a record so
members could understand its full effects, we were unable to support this legislation.").
98. Id. at 11.
99. S. REP. No. 89-1483, at 8-9 (1966) (discussing the justifications for the limits that were
included).
100. REP. WALTER BEAMAN JONES SR., MARITIME SAFETY AcT OF 1983, H.R. REP. No. 98-525, at
10-11 (1983) (discussing Congress' decision to increase the limits instead of repealing them).
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INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS COMPARED TO THE U.S. LIMITATION OF
LIABILITY ACT

International law has developed standards for the liability of maritime vessels.
There are some aspects of these laws that are more favorable than the U.S. model,
but they would also not cure all of the deficiencies of the current system in the
United States.
A.

Liability Limits in the LLMC and 2002 Athens Convention Comparedto
U.S. LOLA

International maritime agreements present Congress with alternative systems
of compensation that could be adopted into U.S. law, thereby harmonizing U.S.
requirements with international standards. However, like the U.S. LOLA,
international systems also set liability limits that may not always offer adequate
compensation while adopting a stricter standard to break the liability limit than
required under U.S. LOLA. The MLA advocates for adoption of the Convention
on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims ('76 London Convention,
"LLMC").10
The International Maritime Organization ("IMO") drafted the
LLMC in 1976 to address liability limits for claims arising out of personal injury
and death.10 2 The LLMC mandates a higher limit than its predecessor, the '57
Brussels Convention,10 3 but provides shipowners with a limit that the MLA deems
101. MLA, REPORT, supra note 27, at 4. See also Convention on Limitation of Liability for
Maritime Claims, Nov. 19, 1976, 1456 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter LLMC].
102. See Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims (LLMC),
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/Convention-on-Limitation-ofLiability-for-Maritime-Claims-(LLMC).aspx (last visited Jan. 16, 2014) [hereinafter IMO, LLMC].
103. International Convention Relating to the Limitation of the Liability of Owners of Sea-Going
Ships arts. 1, 3, Oct. 10, 1957, [1982] A.T.S. 2 [hereinafter '57 Brussels Convention] (the convention
aimed to set international liability standards for death, injury, and damage to cargo). The convention
establishes a compensation fund based on a vessel's weight. Id. art. 2. An accident resulting in
passenger injuries (or deaths) and property damage will have a total compensation fund limited to 3,100
francs per ton of the vessel. Id. art. 3. The compensation fund is apportioned so that 2,100 francs per ton
is for claims arising out of injury or death with the remainder allocated to property claims. Id. art.
3(1)(c). Compare id art. 3, with Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30506 (2006) (each basing
limits on the tonnage of the ship in question). The international community would do away with this
approach in the LLMC and subsequent maritime liability conventions, instead establishing a liability
limit based on the number of passengers a vessel is certified to carry. See LLMC, supra note 101, art.
7(1). Another notable difference between the '57 Brussels Convention and the LLMC and its progeny is
the standard to break the liability limit. See LLMC, supra note 101, art. 4. Under the '57 Brussels
Convention, an owner would not be entitled to the limit where he could have reasonably foreseen
circumstances that caused the accident. See DUYGU DAMAR, WILFUL MISCONDUCT IN INTERNATIONAL

TRANSPORT LAW 162-166 (Hamburg Studies on Mar. Affairs Vol. 22, 2011) (providing an analysis of
the standards to break the limit in the '57 Brussels Convention and the LLMC). The LLMC has a higher
standard to break the limit. See id at 167-70. The limit should only be broken where the owner intended
the harm that occurred. See id. at 170-72. The approach taken in the LLMC is discussed further below
in this article. See infra Part II.B. See also Limitation of Shipowners' Liability-The Brussels
Convention of 1957, 68 YALE L.J. 1676 (1959) (discussing the standards contained in the '57 Brussels
convention, their development, and a comparison to U.S. law).
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almost unbreakable.'0 Of equal importance to the issue of liability limits is the
standard of negligence that defines when an owner or operator is entitled to the
limit and when it can be broken. 05 According to the MLA, adoption of the LLMC
in the United States would resolve potential inequities of the 1851/1984 U.S.
106
Limitation Act without subjecting the maritime industry to claims with no limits.
07
Unlimited claims, according to the MLA, are uninsurable.
The Protocol of 2002 to the Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of
Passengers and their Luggage by Sea ("the 2002 Athens Convention" or simply
"Athens") provides still another liability system that the United States could adopt
to replace LOLA.108 This convention establishes higher liability limits than both
the LLMC and LOLA.'0 9 The Athens Convention was originally adopted in 1974
to establish a homogenous liability system by consolidating the 1961 and 1967
Brussels Conventions.1 0 The international community considered the convention
a significant advancement. Prior to its adoption, liability was determined by
contracts of carriage that often excluded a carrier from any liability."' In 2002,
the original Athens Convention was amended to raise liability limits.112
The international conventions at issue require a shipowner to pay a set fund in
the amount of the liability limit. All claimants can then file for compensation from
the set fund, but the amount of actual recovery varies by the amount of
claimants." 3 These liability amounts are greater than the liability amount provided
in the U.S. LOLA. The LLMC, Athens, and U.S. LOLA provide for limitation of
liability to the shipowner for death or injury of passengers, as follows:

104. See IMO, LLMC, supra note 102.
105. Standards of negligence as defined in the conventions and breakability of the limit is discussed
in more detail below. See infra Part II.B.
106. MLA, REPORT, supranote 27, at 7.
107. Id. at 3-4.
108. The Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea,
2002, entry intoforce Apr. 23, 2014, 2008 O.J. C74-E/567 [hereinafter Athens Convention]. This treaty
incorporates the updated language that was approved in a 2002 Protocol with the original 1974 treaty.
Compare Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea, Dec. 13,
1974, 1463 U.NT.S. 19, with Protocol of 2002 to the Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of
Passengers and their Luggage by Sea, Nov. 1, 2002, [hereinafter Protocol to the Athens Convention]
at
available
https://www.gov.uk/govemment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment data/file/261628/Misc.6.2013_Pro
t_2002_Athens_8760.pdf (which updates the levels of liability utilizing the International Monetary
Fund's Special Drawing Right).
109. See Athens Convention Relating to the Carriageof Passengers and their Luggage by Sea
(PAL), INT'L MAR. ORG., http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/Athens[hereinafter
Convention-relating-to-the-Carriage-of-Passengers-and-their-Luggage-by-Sea-(PAL).aspx
IMO, Athens Convention].
110. NORMAN A. MARTINEZ GUTIRREZ, LIMITATION OF LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL MARITIME
CONVENTIONS 116-17 (2011).
111. Id.
112. IMO, Athens Convention, supra note 109.
113. LLMC, supra note 101, arts. 9, 11; Athens Convention, supra note 108, art. 12.
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Athens: 400,000 SDR (about USD $614,290) multiplied by the number of
passengers the ship is authorized to carry in the ship's certificate;114
LLMC: 175,000 SDR (about USD $268,752) multiplied by the number of
passengers the ship is authorized to carry in the ship's certificate;" 5 and,
US. LOLA: USD $420 multiplied by the tonnage of the vessel." 6
Although Athens and the LLMC establish higher liability limits then LOLA,
the amount paid to each individual (or to the estate of a decedent) varies based on
the number of passengers filing a claim against a set compensation fund, in the
amount of the liability limit."17 In effect, these conventions value life based on the
number of passengers on board a vessel at the time of an accident."18 In contrast,
the U.S. system of tort liability values life based on a complex set of factors related
to conditions during the life of a decedent or injured individual. Compensation can
be based on loss of economic support to a decedent's family, loss of services, loss
of companionship, and pain and suffering, among other factors. Despite the novel
approach to compensation international conventions pose, in some cases
compensation may be adequate. But international systems cannot guarantee that
compensation will always be adequate.

114. Article 7(1) of the 2002 Athens Convention provides a maximum limit of liability fund of
"400,000 units of account per passenger on each distinct occasion." Athens Convention, supra note
108, art. 7(1). Article 9 dictates that conversions are based on International Monetary Fund's Special
Drawing Rights; when converted, this equals USD $614,290 times the number of passengers the ship is
authorized to carry. Id. art. 9; see also Currency Units per SDR for January 2012, INT'L MONETARY
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/data/rms mth.aspx?SelectDate=2012-01FUND,
31&reportType=CVSDR (last visited January 20, 2014) [hereinafter IMF, Currency Units] (based on
conversion rates in effect on Jan. 13, 2012, for conversion from SDR to U.S. dollars, and are used for
the following conversions).
115. Protocol of 1996 to Amend the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims art.
4, May 2, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1433 (1996) [hereinafter Protocol to LLMC]. Article 4 of the 1996 Protocol
specifies the limit:
In respect of claims arising on any distinct occasion for loss of life or personal injury to
passengers of a ship, the limit of liability of the shipowner thereof shall be an amount of
175,000 Units of Account multiplied by the number of passengers which the ship is
authorized to carry according to the ship's certificate.
Id. (replacing the language of article 7, paragraph I of the original). LLMC establishes a fund based on
weight of the vessels for claims other than passenger claims. LLMC, supra note 101, arts. 6, 11 (these
are updated in article 3 of the Protocol to LLMC). See also IMO, LLMC, supra note 102 (explaining
that the LLMC also uses the International Monetary Fund's Special Drawing Rights).
116. Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30506 (2006).
117. See LLMC, supra note 101, arts. 9, 11; Athens Convention, supra note 108, art. 12.
118. See Athens Convention, supra note 108, art. 7(1); Protocol to the LLMC, supra note 115, art.
4 (updating the language of article 7 of the 1976 LLMC).
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Take for example, a "Voyager" class vessel of the Royal Caribbean Cruise
Line, certified for 3,114 passengers, weighing about 138,000 tons."' 9 In a disaster
resulting in the deaths of half the passengers, 1,557 people, maximum liability
under Athens, LLMC, and U.S. LOLA would be as follows:
Athens: USD $1,228,580 per person;1 20
LLMC: USD $537,504 per person;121 and,
U.S. LOLA: USD $37,225 per person. 122
Courts may be also required to reduce these figures in order to provide
compensation to those who survived but filed claims for injuries.123 These
amounts would also be less if more passengers die or are injured in the accident.124
In some situations, limits set in Athens and LLMC may be comparable to damages
for loss of life under U.S. tort law, but this may not always be the case.
In aviation law, the international community recognized the very real
potential for injustice with any liability limits. With passage of the 1999 Montreal
The 1999 Montreal
Convention, aviation now has unlimited liability. 12
Convention unified and replaced various systems of liability for air carriers
provided in the 1929 Warsaw Convention and related agreements.1 26 The Warsaw
Convention liability system set a maximum recovery for personal injury and death
at 125,000 gold francs (approximately US $8,300 at the time).127 The 1999
Montreal Convention entered into force on November 4, 2003, with 97 parties,
including the United States, thereby becoming the law of the land in the United
States.128 The 1999 Montreal Convention demonstrates that unlimited liability is
very clearly a viable and desirable option. Unlimited liability in the air context
allows for compensation based on usual tort approaches instead of the approach
119. Royal
Caribbean
Voyager
of
the
Seas,
RCC
RESERVATIONS,
http://www.rccreservations.com/royal-caribbean-ships/voyager-of-the-seas (last visited Jan. 20, 2014).
120. See Athens Convention, supra note 108, art. 7. Using the liability limit prescribed in Article 7
of the Athens Convention: (USD $ 614,290 x 3,114 certified passengers) / 1,557 actual passengers =
S 1,228,580 per person.
121. See Protocol to LLMC, supra note 115, art. 4. Using the liability limit prescribed in Article 4
of the Protocol to LLMC: (USD $ 268,752 x 3,114 certified passengers) / 1,557 actual passengers $537,504 per person.
122. See Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30506. Using the liability limit prescribed in
LOLA: (USD $420 x 138,000 tons) / 1557 actual passengers = $37,225 per person.
123. See LLMC, supranote 101, arts. 9, 11; Athens Convention, supranote 108, art. 12.
124. See LLMC, supranote 101, arts. 9, 11; Athens Convention, supranote 108, art. 12.
125. Montreal Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air art.
21, May 28, 1999, T.I.A.S. No. 13,038, 2242 U.N.T.S. 309 [hereinafter Montreal Convention].
126. Warsaw Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by
Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 4 U.S.T. 5250, 137 L.N.T.S. 11. See also Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I.
Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARv. L. REV. 497 (1967) (discussing
the development of accident compensation in international air law and the United States' initial
rejection and eventual adherence to the Warsaw Convention).
127. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 126, at 499.
128. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for InternationalCarriage by Air Done at
Montreal on 28 May 1999, INT'L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., http://legacy.icao.int/icao/en/leb/mtl99.pdf
(last visited Jan. 20, 2014) (containing a list of signatories to Montreal Convention).
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taken in maritime conventions, valuing life based on the number of passengers or
weight of a vessel. Like airlines, vessels subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts
should be subject to a similar liability system without limits. 129
Although adopting unlimited liability in the maritime context would be the
ideal solution, adopting the liability system in the Athens Convention is a viable
second alternative. Athens provides higher liability limits and contains an option
for unlimited liability. 130 However, as will be discussed further below, Athens
could impose a stricter standard to break liability limits-imposing its liability
limit in most cases-like the LLMC would.
Before getting to the standard to break the limit, it is worth taking a closer
look at liability limits under Athens. Article 3 of Athens establishes the burden of
proof for liability claims, by establishing a two-tiered system of liability.131 In the
first tier, the carrier may be held strictly liable up to 250,000 SDR (USD
$383,931), unless the carrier can prove that the incident was the result of an act of
war, natural phenomenon, or the act of a third party intending to cause damage.' 32
Regarding the second tier of liability, Article 3 provides that: "If and to the extent
that the loss exceeds the above limit, the carrier shall be further liable unless the
carrier proves that the incident which caused the loss occurred without the fault or
neglect of the carrier."13 3 This second tier of liability is subject to the overall
(USD $614,290)134 times the number of passengers
liability limit of 400,000 SDR
35
the ship is certified to carry.'
Article 3 (the second tier of liability) is the result of a compromise. Japan
proposed the same two-tiered liability system used in air transport, with unlimited
liability in the second tier.' 3 6 The Japanese delegation were also the authors of this
two-tiered system as it exists today for air transport liability in the 1999 Montreal

129. Montreal Convention, supra note 125. Article 21 stipulates the strict liability clause: "For
damages arising under paragraph I of Article 17 not exceeding 100,000 Special Drawing Rights for
each passenger, the carrier shall not be able to exclude or limit its liability." Id. art. 21(1). In cases of
damages above 100,000 SDR (USD $153,572), Article 21(2) provides no limit. Id. art. 21(2). However,
strict liability does not apply to this clause. A carrier may escape liability where it can prove: "(a) such
damage was not due to the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of the carrier or its servant or
agents; or (b) such damage was solely due to the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of a third
party." Id.
130. Athens Convention, supranote 108, art. 7.
131. Id. art. 3. See also MARTINEZ GUTIERREZ, supra note 110, at 130-33 (detailing the two-tiered
system of liability throughout the drafting process).
132. Athens Convention, supranote 108, art. 3(1). See also IMF, Currency Units, supranote 114.
133. Athens Convention, supranote 108, art. 3(1).
134. See IMF, Currency Units, supranote 114.
135. Protocol to the Athens Convention, supra note 108, art. 7(1). The revised article reads:
The liability of the carrier for the death of or personal injury to a passenger under Article 3
shall in no case exceed 400,000 units of account per passenger on each distinct occasion.
where, in accordance with the law of the court seized of the case, damages are awarded in
the form of periodical income payments, the equivalent capital value of those payments shall
not exceed the said limit.

Id.
13 6. MARTiNEZ GUTItRREZ, supra note

110, at 130-31.
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Convention, with unlimited liability in the second tier.' 3 7 During negotiations for
Athens, Japan's second tier alternative ultimately resulted in a compromise to
create the two-tiered approach to liability under Article 3, but with a limit in the
second tier. But the original Japanese proposal with unlimited liability under the
second tier should have been adopted-as it was and remains today, in
international air law-in the 1999 Montreal Convention,13 8 adopted by the U.S. in
2003. 139
As an alternative to the limits imposed in Article 3, however, Athens provides
states with the option to set their own liability limits, provided the limit is not less
than those in Article 3 and Article 7(1).140 More importantly, the convention
allows states to declare no limit of liability. This "opt-out" clause is in Article
7(2).141 State actors must inform the Secretary General when choosing to use the
opt-out clause. 142 Adoption of the Athens Convention would thereby allow the
United States considerably more flexibility in determining whether any liability
limits should apply to U.S. citizens and parties subject to U.S. jurisdiction, while
still being part of an international regime.
B.

The Almost UnbreakableLimit in the LLMC and Athens Convention

In addition to potentially inadequate limits, Athens and LLMC could establish
a higher standard to break the limit than the current approach in the United States.
The LLMC is appealing to shipowners because this limit is considered
unbreakable, except in cases of defined "willful misconduct" on the part of the
shipowner, 1 43 whereas the United States requires only an owner's "privity or
knowledge" to break the limit-a vaguely defined term allowing flexible
application. 1" Under the Athens Convention, the standard to break the limit is

137. Id. at 130-33. See also Jennifer McKay, Note, The Refinement of the Warsaw System: Why the
1999 Montreal Convention Represents the Best Hope for Uniformity, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 73,
83-84 (2002).
138. MARTiNEZ GUTIERREZ, supra note 110, at 131. Japan's proposal regarding Article 3 liability
limits was not adopted, but did receive additional consideration later in negotiations. Id. at 130-31.
Norway included Japan's proposal as an alternative text in a draft submitted to the 81st Session of the
Legal Committee. Id. at 131. Japan also resubmitted its proposal at the 81st Session. Id. Although the
proposal was not adopted at that time, it is worth noting that there is some recognition amongst the
international community that current maritime liability systems can be unjust. See id. at 130-33.
139. Richard Boucher, Ratification of the 1999 Montreal Convention, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (Sept.
5, 2003), http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/2385 1.htm.
140. Athens Convention, supranote 108, art. 7(2).
141. Article 7(2) of the 2002 Athens Convention mandates:
A State Party may regulate by specific provisions of national law the limit of liability
prescribed in paragraph 1, provided that the national limit of liability, if any, is not lower
than that prescribed in paragraph 1. A State Party, which makes use of the option provided
for in this paragraph, shall inform the Secretary-General of the limit of liability adopted or of
the fact that there is none.
Id.
142. Id.
143. LLMC, supra note 101, art. 4.
144. Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30505 (2006). See also infra note 167.
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harmonized with the LLMC.145 Article 4 of the LLMC provides the relevant
provision defining the willful misconduct standard by which the limit can be
broken: "A person liable shall not be entitled to limit his liability if it is proved that
the loss resulted from his personal act or omission, committed with the intent to
cause such loss, or recklessly and with knowledge that such loss would probably
result."l 46
Article 13 of Athens contains similar language as the LLMC, providing that a
carrier may lose its right to the limit if "the damage resulted from an act or
omission of the carrier done with the intent to cause such damage, or recklessly
and with knowledge that such damage would probably result." 47 This is the same
as the defined "willful misconduct" standard required to break the limit under the
LLMC.148
Under the U.S. Limitation Act, a shipowner is not entitled to limitation where
causative fault occurred with the owner's "privity or knowledge." The MLA
considers the LLMC's defined "willful misconduct" standard as stricter than the
"privity or knowledge" standard required to break the limit in the United States.149
The LLMC therefore offers greater protection to shipowners with a higher standard
to break the limit, according to the MLA.iso The standard in the LLMC is
145. See Athens Convention, supra note 108, art. 13(1).
146. LLMC, supra note 101, art. 4 (emphasis added). The Comit6 Maritime International ("CMr'
or "Committee"), an international body responsible for drafting this provision, later explained that the
prior draft had to be changed since it could give rise to unlimited liability and varying court
interpretations. See COMITE MAR. INT'L, THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES OF THE LLMC CONVENTION,
1976 AND THE PROTOCOL OF 1996, at 121-22 (1997) [hereinafter TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES OF THE
LLMC CONVENTION]; DAMAR, supra note 103, at 166-67. The Committee then submitted its final
amended version to the IMO. DAMAR, supra note 103, at 166-67. The phrase included at the end, "or
recklessly and with knowledge that such loss would probably result" is meant to establish a "wilful
misconduct" standard. See TRAVAUX PRI PARATOIRES OF THE LLMC CONVENTION, supra note 146, at
122-24. CMI is an international non-governmental organization with the purpose of unifying all aspects
of maritime law. F. L. Wiswall, Jr., A Brief History, COMITE MAR. INT'L,
http://www.comitemaritime.org/A-Brief-History/0,27139,113932,00.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2014).
The CMI was established in 1897 with the purpose of compiling and codifying maritime law. Id.
During conference negotiations, the IMO sought to broaden the 1976 LLMC's strict willful
misconduct standard by adding the phrase "or from his own gross negligence" at the end of Article 4.
DAMAR, supra note 103, at 166-67 (regarding the CMI Committee's intent to define a "willful
misconduct" standard in Article 4 of the LLMC and the IMO's position during negotiations). The
French delegation also sought to add language ensuring that shipowners could not benefit from the limit
where an accident is caused by actions of servants acting within their scope of duties. Id. at 167. Neither
proposal had support in conference. Id. As a result, Article 4 was passed as proposed with the intent of
maintaining a limit that is almost unbreakable, except in the most rare, or even absurd, circumstances,
where the damage or injury was a direct result of an individual's "willful misconduct." See id. at 16670.
147. Athens Convention, supra note 108, art. 13(1).
148. MARTINEz GUTItRREZ, supra note 110, at 126.
149. MLA, REPORT, supranote 27, at 5.
150. Id.
Since the Convention has been adopted by most of the rest of the world's shipping nations,
the Committee majority questioned if it is economically viable and advisable to remove such
major claim components from limitation in the U.S., and to expose U.S. shipping to
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generally considered to allow breakability of limits only where the shipowner in
fact knew and intended the damage to occur.is5
The LLMC introduces a mens rea element into the standard to break liability
limits. Depending on implementation by national law and interpretation of courts,
the LLMC may protect owners whose operators indulge in negligent behavior
where the shipowner was not aware of such behavior. 152 For example, the limit
will not be broken in an action against a shipowner for damage caused by a
collision resulting from an operator's error in navigation.' 53 The limit can only be
broken in an action against the shipowner where the shipowner is directly culpable
for damage. 15 4 In a suit against vessel crew as agents of the shipowner, the limit
will more than likely be upheld where the shipowner is only vicariously liable for
actions of his agents.' 55 The liability limit may extend to a suit against an operator
also, where damage is a result of the operator's conduct. 56
A court must consider an inquiry into a shipowner's or any defendant's mens
rea on a case-by-case basis, under Article 4 of the LLMC.s 7 In addition, courts
would need to interpret the application of limits in actions against operators in
relation to the doctrine of respondeatsuperior,whereby an employer is liable for
the actions of its employees performed in furtherance of the employer's
business.15 On this issue, the LLMC appears to conflict with the doctrine of
respondeat superior, by attempting to shield a shipowner from unlimited liability
for damages caused by the willful misconduct of an operator. In contrast, U.S.
courts do break the limit against an owner for operator misconduct. 159
unlimited liabilities, putting U.S. shipping at a disadvantage in the international shipping
world. Excluding personal injury and death claims from the Limitation Act might also have
impacts in insurance markets, again with a competitive disadvantage in the potential for
added costs to U.S. vessel owners.
Id. at 4.
151. BARNABAS W.B. REYNOLDS & MICHAEL N. TsIMPLIS, SHIPOWNERS' LIMITATION OF
LIABILITY 75 (2012).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 27.
157. See id. at 83.
158. See DAMAR, supra note 103, at 196-97 (explaining that international maritime conventions
hold a servant or agent responsible for his own willful misconduct instead of placing liability on the
owner; hence, "there is no need to prove that the act or omission of the servant or agent was within the
scope of his employment").
159. U.S. Courts have broken liability limits for operator misconduct, where operators failed to
follow procedures established by shipowners. See XIA CHEN, LIMITATION OF LIABILITY FOR MARITIME
CLAIMS: A STUDY OF U.S. LAW, CHINESE LAW AND INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS 60-62 (2001). An
example, can be found in the Barberi incident of October 15, 2003. In re City of New York, 522 F.3d
279 (2d Cir. 2008). Here the court found that a collision occurred due to operator misconduct and that
the shipowner failed to adequately enforce operating procedures. Id. at 288.
On that afternoon, the Barberi collided with a maintenance pier during a routine run from New
York City to Staten Island, killing eleven and injuring seventy five from amongst 1,500 passengers. Id.
at 280-81. Standard operating procedure ("SOP") required the captain and assistant captain to be in the
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On the issue of mens rea, if unable to prove intent of an individual, the party
seeking to break the limit must prove recklessness, where recklessness is proof of
reckless conduct "with knowledge" that the loss "would probably result.""'o This
too is considered a much stricter standard than the U.S. "privity and knowledge"
standard. Under the LLMC, a claimant cannot break the limit by proving damage
was a possible outcome of conduct. 161 A claimant must prove a person had
knowledge that the damage was a probable outcome of conduct.162 "Knowledge"
as used in Article 4 of the LLMC means that the liable person had actual
knowledge, meaning the person actually knew damage would occur.1 63
"Knowledge" does not mean constructive knowledge, meaning that the person
should have known the damage would occur.' 6 In contrast, the U.S. approach

pilothouse for the duration of the voyage. Id. at 281. In the moments prior to the collision, the captain
was not in the pilothouse. Id. at 281. The Barberi was being steered by the assistant captain. See id. at
280-81. Unknown to the shipowner, the assistant was on a regimen of prescription medications
contributing to fatigue, compounded by babysitting his grandchildren the previous day. Id. at 281. The
ship collided with a maintenance pier at approximately 15 knots. See id. at 280-81.
In evaluating negligence, the court applied a common law "reasonable care" standard of
negligence (so interpreting the U.S. Limitation of Liability Act). See In re City of New York, 475 F.
Supp. 2d 235, 241 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). In breaking the liability limit, the court took note that the
shipowner neither disseminated nor enforced the SOP. Id. at 247-49. Thus, the shipowner's failure
constituted the type of "privity or knowledge" that warrants breaking the limit. Id. at 249-50. It
reasoned that "[t]his rule could have easily been complied with on the Barberi,because there were two
pilots on the vessel at all times. Instead, Captain Gansas spent the entire voyage in the aft, or
Manhattan-facing, pilothouse. Had he been present, the disaster would have been avoided." Id. at 238.
If the Limitation of Liability Act applied, the shipowner would have been able to limit claims to about
$14.4 million. Id. at 239. Instead, in 2008, New York City agreed to pay victims and their families
$54.3 million. Andy Newman, Judge Gives Man Paralyzed in Ferry Crash Highest Award So Far,N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 17, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/18/nyregion/I8ferry.html.
Applying the "willful misconduct" standard of the LLMC to the event causing the Barberi
collision may well produce a different outcome. Failure to enforce an SOP does not constitute the mens
rea or actual knowledge element of willful misconduct that demonstrates the shipowner intended or
could know the outcome, in this case, a collision with a maintenance pier. U.S. courts commonly break
Limitation of Liability Act limits for violations of IMO ship standards, failure to detect defects,
improper stowage, etc. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text. These factors may well not be
available to break limits when applying the "willful misconduct" standard that would govern if the
LLMC were to be adopted into U.S. law.
160. LLMC, supra note 101, art. 4.
161. MARTiNEZ GUTItRREZ, supra note 110, at 65.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. The Leerort case provides an example of how unbreakable the limitation can be, at least in
the interpretation of the British Court of Appeal. DAMAR, supra note 103, at 168. The case involved the
collision of the vessel Zim Pireaus into the Leerort. Id. The Leerort was standing still in water at the
time of collision. Id. The Zim Pireaus on the other hand was racing towards the Leerort at excessive
speed. Id. The vessel was simply out of control. Id. The crew experienced an engine failure. Id. The
engine would shut off in the astern mode but function intermittently in an emergency mode. Id. The
court characterized the engine failure at a critical moment as "almost incredible" but found that it did
not justify breaking the limit. Id. The court asserted that the engine failure could not be attributed to a
"personal act or omission of the owners done with the intent to cause a collision or recklessly and with
knowledge that such a collision would probably occur." Id.
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allows a court to break the limit where the owner had privity or knowledge-as
earlier indicated, a vaguely defined phrase that allows flexible, albeit inconsistent
application, resulting in a lower threshold to break the limit than under the LLMC
or Athens.165 Although the MLA has indicated judicial economy is a benefit of
adopting the LLMC,' 66 this may not be the case. Requiring analysis of mens rea,
the LLMC may lead to complex and prolonged court proceedings.
Testifying before Congress in 1985, when Congress considered adopting the
LLMC's liability system through H.R. 277, Georgetown University Law Center
Professor Warren Dean explained that the standard to break the limit presents
claimants with an almost insurmountable hurdle to overcome in order to obtain
adequate compensation. 167 Moreover, unbreakable and low limits in the LLMC
may well provide a disincentive for owners to maintain safe and seaworthy vessels:
Even though this provision shifts the burden of proof from claimant to
the party wishing to limit liability, it will result in a nearly unbreakable
limit to liability. It is very difficult for claimants to establish that an
owner acted recklessly, knowing that loss would probably occur or
intending to cause the loss of the ship. This new, nearly unbreakable
limit is the trade-off for the bill's higher-but in our view inadequateliability limits.
Section 5 (of the bill adopting the LLMC) would replace the
current legal duty of the owner to provide a seaworthy ship before being
entitled to limit liability. The courts have been liberal in voiding
owners' attempts to limit liability by finding that an owner provided an
unseaworthy ship and the insurance market has been able to provide
insurance and to meet those costs. We are concerned that that
elimination of the owner's duty to provide a seaworthy ship could result
in unsafe shipping.68

With modem corporations, many layers of command and organizational
intricacies further complicate the relationship between a shipowner and his
employee. Inquiries into mens rea are complicated when analyzing "willful
misconduct" as defined in the LLMC. With the LLMC extending the limit to
persons other than the shipowner, the inquiry into mens rea is even further
complicated. The LLMC extends the limit to apply to actors other than the
shipowner, including charterers, managers, operators, salvors, and generally any

165. Donald C. Greenman, Limitation of Liability: A CriticalAnalysis of United States Law in an
InternationalSetting, 57 TUL. L. REv. 1139, 1145-46 (1983) (noting that flexible interpretation leads
U.S. courts to refer to common law concepts in applying the standard and quoting Professors Gilmore
and Black describing U.S. statutory "privity or knowledge" and "design or neglect" as "empty
containers into which the courts are free to pour whatever content they will") (referencing GRANT
GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, Jr., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 695-97 (1957)). For a discussion about
U.S. courts' attempts to define the standard and difficulties in its application, see CHEN, supra note 159,
at 60-65.
166. MLA, REPORT, supra note 27, at 5.

167. Dean's Statement, supra note 81, at 9.
168. Id. at 8-9.
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person for whom an owner or salvor is responsible-a salvor being a person
providing salvage operations.169
Professor Dean cautioned Congress against extending application of the limit
by amending U.S. LOLA to adopt the LLMC:
We believe that, before such an expansion is made, there should be a
full evaluation of the question of liability limitation respecting modem
maritime activities-a process advanced by this hearing today. For
example, factors pertaining to the question of whether charterers or
managing operators should be allowed to limit their liability are
different from those pertaining to salvors, i.e., consideration should be
given to whether a salvor should not be entitled to limit liability, while
the owner of the vessel being salved is so entitled, as in the case of an
incident involving a response to an oil spill or release of hazardous
materials.170
Besides a clear and almost unbreakable limit, the MLA points to several other
advantages of adopting the LLMC into U.S. law.17 ' The LLMC would provide a
limitation fund even in cases where the vessel has no post-accident value,
preventing a zero compensation outcome.172 MLA further argues that the defined
"willful misconduct" standard focuses litigation away from establishing "privity or
knowledge" of the owner as required under LOLA. Instead, litigants can focus on
ordinary fault and valuation of damages.1 73 This also provides, so they say, for
better and more accessible insurance. MLA argues that without legal adjudication
for privity and fault in causality, vessel owners will be able to insure at least
against limit amounts.174 Moreover, this fund has a higher likelihood of actually
being paid to litigants. MLA also posits that the fund discourages formation of a
one-ship company to avoid liability.'
LLMC also provides distinct funds for
personal injury and cargo liability, providing a clearer path to compensation.' 7 ' In
addition, LLMC preserves the procedure of concursus that can be used to prevent a
rush to individual litigation and inequitable outcomes amongst multiple litigants.
MLA also sees benefits in adopting LLMC's reference to SDRs as opposed to
dollars, whose value fluctuates, based on international markets. 7 8
Although the LLMC would be an improvement over the arcane liability limits
established in LOLA, the benefits stated by MLA would appear to be inflated and
not to work to benefit the U.S. shipping industry much less passengers-simply
because the beneficiary of these limits would be foreign flagged cruise ships. This
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

LLMC, supra note 101, art. 1.
Dean's Statement, supra note 81, at 7.
See MLA, REPORT, supra note 27, at 5-7.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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is because cruise ships, designed to carry passengers, do not operate as U.S.
flagged vessels. As of September 2012, only one major cruise ship operated as a
U.S. flagged vessel, the Pride of America, a one-ship company operated by
Norwegian Cruise Lines.' 7 9 Cruise vessels register abroad (the Bahamas is one
favorite registry) mostly to avoid labor laws and standards required of U.S. flagged
vessels.o8 0 Contrary to the MLA's list of benefits of adopting the LLMC,"' the
convention would only serve to protect and subsidize foreign flagged cruise
vessels by limiting their liability, at the expense of U.S. citizens or other
passengers able to file suit in the United States.
Other benefits stated by the MLA are also questionable. MLA's arguments,
such as that the LLMC would prevent litigation over "privity or knowledge" while
providing clear compensation funds,182 would seem to advance judicial economy,
but at the expense of fair compensation. MLA's position is ironic. It undermines a
fundamental purpose of courts, namely, to provide a fair resolution of disputes, and
instead promotes a policy that allegedly favors judicial economy and protection of
foreign flagged vessels. As noted above, the LLMC may not even provide
efficient resolution of disputes with complex inquiries into mens rea while
extending the limit to parties other than the shipowner. Such litigation is contrary
to MLA's position that the LLMC promotes "timely resolution of claims."
The basic purpose behind the LLMC and U.S. LOLA is the same. Both seek
to protect shipping lines.184 In discussing the United States' adoption of the LLMC
in 2010, the MLA stated, "[t]he majority of the Committee feels that this purpose
of providing the global economic competitiveness of America's maritime industry
remains a valid policy supporting the Limitation Act."' 8 5 Yet, the need to
encourage growth of a nascent industry that existed in 1851 no longer exists.
Moreover, there is hardly a U.S. flagged passenger line industry to protect. In
addition, the LLMC would introduce into U.S. law a far more stringent standard
for breaking liability limits.
Regarding unbreakability of limits, the issue caused enough concern in the
European Community to inspire a proposed directive in 2005 that would have
amended the standard to provide greater breakability.' 8 6 Although the final
amendments did not include modification of the defined "willful misconduct"
standard under the LLMC, the European Community has committed to negotiate
179. MARINE LOG, supra note 94.
180. James Walker, What Cruise Lines Don't Want You to Know, CNN (Feb. 14, 2013, 3:21 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/13/opinion/walker-cruise-ships (reporting on the recent incidents of cruise
ship mishaps).
181. MLA, REPORT, supra note 27, at 5-7.
182. Id. at 5.
183. Id. at 3.
184. See DAMAR, supra note 103, at 11-14 (discussing the historical development of maritime
liability limits as a way protecting the shipping industry).
185. MLA, REPORT, supra note 27, at 2.
186. Proposalfor a Directive of the European Parliamentand the Council on the Civil Liability
and Financial Guarantees of Shipowners, COM (2005) 593 final (Nov. 23, 2005), available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0593:FIN:EN:PDF.
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with the IMO to revise the "level at which shipowners lose their right to their
liability.""' When the international community shows concern about the defined
"willful misconduct" standard, this must be a signal to the U.S. Congress to
proceed with caution, if it all, towards adopting the LLMC, despite the MLA's
recommendation.
III.

FORUM NON CONVENIENS

Any change to maritime death and injury liability limits is likely to have some
impact on the number of foreign plaintiffs bringing suit in the United States. Since
the adoption of the 1999 Montreal Convention by the United States in 2003, the
United States has seen a large increase in foreign plaintiffs suing in the United
States to take advantage of many features of U.S. law and a judicial system that
may result in far more generous recoveries for plaintiffs than what they would get
in their home courts.'8 On the one hand, this can lead to congestion in U.S.
courts. On the other, it provides international plaintiffs with access to remedies
and a judicial system that may not be available in their homes or elsewhere.
U.S. courts have found a method of dealing with the influx of foreign
plaintiffs by dismissing suit on the basis of forum non conveniens, forcing foreign
plaintiffs to re-file in their countries of domicile or permanent places of residence.
To demonstrate that dismissal for forum non conveniens is warranted, a defendant
must establish "that (1) an adequate alternative forum is available, (2) the public
and private factors weigh in favor of dismissal, and (3) the plaintiff can reinstate
his suit in the alternative forum without undue inconvenience or prejudice."l89
In Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert, the U.S. Supreme Court described the
public and private interest factors that a court must consider when evaluating
potential dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds.' 90 In Gilbert, a warehouse
owner in Virginia filed suit in the Southern District of New York in diversity
against a corporation incorporated in Pennsylvania, but doing business in both
Virginia and New York.' 9' The plaintiff brought action in tort against the
defendant for negligence in handling gasoline delivered to plaintiff's warehouse in
Virginia, causing an explosion which damaged the warehouse and goods stored
On
therein.192 Plaintiff sought damages in the amount of $365,529.77.193
defendant's forum non conveniens motion, the Court decided in favor of dismissal

187. Id. at 4.
188. See Allan I. Mendelsohn, Foreign Plaintiffs, Forum Non Conveniens, and the 1999 Montreal
Convention, 36 AiR & SPACE L. 293, 293 (2011) (discussing the influence of the U.S. contingency fee
system in attracting foreign plaintiffs after an international air incident and the increased use of forum
non conveniens by U.S. courts).
189. Leon v. Million Air, Inc., 251 F.3d 1305, 1311 (11th Cir. 2001).
190. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507-09 (1947).
191. Id. at 502-03.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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out of New York, concluding that Virginia was the appropriate alternative
forum.194
The Court also emphasized, however, that "unless the balance is strongly in
favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be
disturbed."l 95 Factors considered relating to the litigants' interests, termed private
interests, included: ease of access to sources of proof, ease of access to witnesses,
possibility of viewing premises, enforceability of the judgment once obtained, and
any other considerations "that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and
inexpensive."' 96 The Court also weighed factors it called public interest factors
such as congestion from existing case load and the burden on citizens of jury duty
especially where the litigation has no relation to the community.' 9 7 The Court
explained, "[t]here is a local interest in having localized controversies decided at
home."' 9 8 Further, where state law applies to a diversity action, there is an interest
in maintaining a forum located in the state of the applicable law. 199 When a court
is satisfied that an alternative forum is available and the balance of public and
200
private factors is in favor of the defendant, a court may dismiss the case.
Although Gilbert dealt with domestic litigants, the test outlined in Gilbert has
regularly been used also to dismiss foreign plaintiffs from U.S. courts on the
grounds offorum non conveniens. In applyingforum non conveniens, the Supreme
Court has also held that a plaintiffs choice of forum deserves less deference when
the plaintiff is foreign. 201 Forum non conveniens dismissals in the domestic U.S.
context are today handled under federal law, enacted in 1948.202
A recent example of the applicability of forum non conveniens is a ruling by
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida in Giglio Sub S.N. C. v.
Carnival Corporation, deciding a matter related to the wreck of the Costa
Concordiathat occurred on January 13, 2012.203 The Costa Concordia,with 4,200
people aboard, hit a reef and sank off Italy's Tuscan coast on January 13, 2012,
204
The
causing the deaths of thirty-two passengers and over a hundred injuries.
Southern District of Florida dismissed an action, on forum non conveniens
grounds, brought by Italian business owners and residents of the island of Giglio,

194. Id. at 511-12.
195. Id. at 508.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 508-09.
198. Id. at 509.
199. Id.
200. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981).
201. Id. at 256.
202. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2012).
203. Giglio Sub S.N.C. v. Carnival Corp., No. 12-21680-CIV, 2012 WL 4477504, at *1-2 (S.D.
Fla. Sept. 26, 2012).
204. Barbie Latza Nadeau & Laura Smith-Spark, S Convicted Over Deadly Costa Concordia
21,
2013,
9:16
PM),
Wreck
in
Italy,
CNN
(July
Cruise
Liner
http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/20/world/europe/italy-costa-concordia-triallindex.html.
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Italy, alleging damage to tourism, property values, and the environment. 205 Other
actions are still pending in U.S. courts for personal injury and wrongful death.206
Applicability of forum non conveniens may occasionally be complicated by
blocking statutes, which are statutes passed in foreign jurisdictions to prevent
plaintiffs from re-filing in their home country after first filing in the United States
and being dismissed underforum non conveniens.207 Blocking statutes thus would
seem to prevent the availability of an alternative forum, thereby frustrating an
essential element of a U.S. court's forum non conveniens analysis. Blocking
statutes have been used in Latin American countries, with the Latin American
Parliament, Parlatino, issuing a model blocking statute for adoption by member
countries. 208 For many Latin American and other civil law countries, blocking
statutes do not create new law; rather they clarify existing jurisdictional
requirements as applied to a tort action first filed in the United States, to bar such
actions from being re-filed in the plaintiff s home country. Under the laws of these
countries, courts permanently lose jurisdiction once the case has been filed in an
alternative forum, in this case the United States. 209
This unique jurisdictional concept is rooted in the idea of deference to the
plaintiffs choice of forum. Once the plaintiff has chosen his forum amongst
viable alternatives, dismissal on the grounds offorum non conveniens is viewed by
Latin American countries as an illegal violation of the plaintiffs right to select an
appropriate forum.210 Moreover, the holding in Piper v. Reyno, that foreign

205. Giglio Sub S.N.C., 2012 WL 4477504, at *21.
206. See New York Law Firm Ronai & Ronai, LLP Files Wrongful Death Lawsuit Seeking 400
Million Dollarson Behalfof The Family of Violinist Sandor Feher Killed in the ConcordiaDisaster,PR
NEWSWIRE (Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.pmewswire.com/news-releases/new-york-law-firm-ronai-ronai-llp-files-wrongful-death-lawsuit-seeking-400-million-dollars-on-behalf-of-the-family-of-violinistsandor-feher-killed-in-the-concordia-disaster-165267716.html (this particular suit has been filed in the
Southern District of New York (12CV-5814) on behalf of the family of Hungarian Violinist, Sandor
Feher, who died in the tragedy, seeking $400 million in damages).
207. See Allan 1. Mendelsohn & Carlos J. Ruiz, The United States vs. France: Article 33 of the
Montreal Convention and the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 77 J. AIR L. & COM. 467, 480-84
(2012) (discussing a recent and still current blocking problem in aviation under the 1999 Montreal
Convention).
208. MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND APPLICABLE LAW TO TORT LIABILITY
(Latin Am. Parliament (Parlatino) 1998), reprinted in HENRY SAINT DAHL, DAHL's LAW
DICTIONARY/DICCIONARIO JuRiDIcO DAHL: SPANISH-ENGLISHIINGLtS-ESPAROL 260-261 (5th ed.
2010).
209. See Henry Saint Dahl, Forum Non Conveniens, Latin America and Blocking Statutes, 35 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 21, 25-29 (2004) (discussing national laws of Ecuador, Guatemala,
Dominica, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica that divest jurisdiction when a national of these countries first
files suit in a foreign court, usually in the United States). See also Jena A. Sold, Comment,
InappropriateForum or InappropriateLaw? A Choice of Law Solution to the JurisdictionalStandoff
Between the United States and Latin America, 60 EMORY L.J. 1437, 1454-1457 (2011) (discussing
common law jurisdictional concepts in Latin American countries that bar jurisdiction once a case is
filed in a foreign court while also discussing Parlatino's model blocking statute and blocking statutes of
Ecuador and Guatemala).
210. SAINT DAHL, supra note 208, at, 26-27.
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plaintiffs deserve less deference in their choice of forum, is seen as unduly
discriminatory. 211
Another approach adopted by Latin American countries to discourage
defendants from seeking a forum non conveniens dismissal, is imported law
statutes. Such statutes attempt to apply the law of the courts where plaintiff
originally filed an action. 212 Hence, a Latin American court hearing a case
dismissed from the United States would apply U.S. law. Such statues also increase
the chances of enforcement of a judgment against U.S. defendants. 213
The response of U.S. courts to blocking statutes has been increasingly to
ignore them.214 Courts reason that many blocking statutes contain potential
exceptions that may allow a plaintiff to re-file. However, even where forum non
conveniens is outcome determinative (leaving a plaintiff with no available forum),
U.S. courts have determined that its application of the forum non conveniens
doctrine must not and cannot be precluded or undermined by foreign blocking
statutes.215 Although the issue of foreign plaintiffs in U.S. courts must not be a key
consideration in maritime liability reform, it is an issue that Congress and/or the
courts may need to consider when revising liability limits and requirements.

211. Id. at 27-28.

212. Walter W. Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens andRetaliatory Legislation: The Impact on the
Available Alternative Forum Inquiry and on the DesirabilityofForum Non Conveniens as a Defense
Tactic, 56 U. KAN. L. REv. 609, 628-34 (2008).

213. See id.at 660.
214. See Rivas ex rel. Estate of Gutierrez v. Ford Motor Co., No. 8:02 CV-676-T-17 EAJ, 2004
WL 1247018, at *4, *14 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2004) (the court rejected plaintiffs argument that a court
in Venezuela is not an available forum when applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens to a
wrongful death action against Ford Motor Company arising out of an accident in Venezuela); Morales
v. Ford Motor Co., 313 F. Supp. 2d 672, 674-76, 689-90 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (the court ruled that plaintiffs
who were Venezuelan nationals who had filed an action in the Southern District of Texas, could assert
jurisdiction in Venezuelan courts, despite affidavits from experts explaining that plaintiffs' assertions of
jurisdiction in a U.S. court divests jurisdiction in Venezuelan courts when filing in Venezuela after a
forum non conveniens decision in the United States). See also Sold, supra note 209, at 1460-61
(discussing both Rivas and Morales).
215. See Scotts Co. v. Hacienda Loma Linda, 2 So. 3d 1013, 1017-18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist.
2008):
Expressed another way, if our courts determine that a foreign forum is available and
adequate, it is the obligation of the plaintiff to assent to jurisdiction there and to support that
court's exercise ofjurisdiction over the matter and the parties. Further, that plaintiff may not
assume that a foreign country's preemption or blocking laws will be recognized here. If the
foreign country chooses to turn away its own citizen's lawsuit for damages suffered in that
very country, and if the other Kinney factors warrant dismissal here, it is difficult to
understand why Florida's courts should devote resources to the matter.
Id. at 1018. See also Chandler v. Multidata Systems Int'l Corp., 163 S.W.3d 537, 546-48 (Mo. Ct. App.

2005) ("As to Plaintiffs' argument that Panama is not an available forum, Plaintiffs merely recite
favorable testimony from Dr. Berrios and argue that 'the trial court had a legal obligation to conclude
that the Panamanian court system was not available to these Plaintiffs.' As stated above, the trial court
did not have a legal obligation to conclude that the Panamanian court system was unavailable.").

2013

ANTIQUATED U.S. MARITIME LIABILITY LIMITS

71

IV. THE MARITIME INSURANCE INDUSTRY'S CAPACITY TO HANDLE CLAIMS

The maritime insurance industry has generally argued against removal of
liability limits, claiming that vessels may be subject to claims that are uninsurable
due to excessive verdicts. 216 Maritime insurance is protection and indemnity
("P&I") insurance provided by P&I Clubs. The nature of this coverage is as
typical indemnity insurance, where an insurer is responsible to reimburse a
shipowner only for losses the shipowner paid. This varies from liability insurance
where the insured pays a set amount so the insurer will handle claims without
further payment from the insured.
P&I insurance present problems in collecting judgments for injured parties. A
P&I Club cannot be held directly accountable to pay a verdict. 217 The insured
shipowner must first pay.218 Only then will the P&I Club pay the insured. Where
a verdict leads a shipowner to file for bankruptcy, an injured party with a judgment
may not collect. 2 19 The P&I Club is not obligated to pay damages filed by a
220
judgment creditor in a bankruptcy proceeding against a shipowner.
The judgment creditor is generally barred from filing an action directly
against a P&I Club.221 Some states have modified this general rule, allowing third
party claims against a P&I Club, although third party actions raise additional
complications.222 When third party actions are allowed by state law, the P&I Club
is entitled to raise any defenses it has against the insured.223 The insured must
meet all terms and conditions in the policy before the P&I Club will pay a
judgment creditor.224 Policies typically include an arbitration clause.225 Courts
have held that a third party judgment creditor is subject to a policy's arbitration
clause.226
216. Professor Mendelsohn considered the shipping industry's position while advocating for reform
of liability limits in the aftermath of the Yarmouth Castle's drowning in 1965. Mendelsohn, supra note
47, at 803-05. Professor Mendelsohn notes the following arguments made by industry in arguing
against repeal of liability limits: (1) limitations on maritime claims is the international norm; (2)
unlimited liability would be the financial ruin of vessel owners and the U.S. shipping industry; and, (3)
a limited compensation promotes judicial economy by consolidating all actions through the procedure
of concursus. Id. The MLA has adopted these same arguments in its position paper advocating for
adoption of the LLMC. See MLA, REPORT, supra note 27, at 2-4.
217. Kimball, supra note 23, at 1149-50.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1153.
220. See Aasma v. Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass'n, 95 F.3d 400, 404-05 (6th Cir.
1996) ("The narrow question presented is whether, five years after the close of the bankruptcy of a
member, a maritime protection and indemnity association with a 'pay first' clause in its contract is
liable to seamen in direct actions. We conclude that the 'pay first' clause in this contract may not be set
aside and that it defeats plaintiffs' cause of action.").
221. See id.
222. Kimball, supra note 23, at 1153-55.
223. Id. at 1154 (referencing Morewitz v. W. of Eng. Ship Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass'n, 62
F.3d 1356, 1364 (1995)).
224. Id. at 1156-57.
225. Id. at 1152-53.
226. Id. at 1150-51.
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According to the maritime insurance industry, liability limits are necessary to
avoid these complications.227 Maritime insurers argue that limitation of liability
assures that claims will be paid, whereas unlimited liability may lead to excessive
verdicts that may not be paid by their P&I Clubs, driving shipowners to
bankruptcy.228 Rather than maintaining liability limits, the maritime industry could
shift away from P&I insurance to liability insurance. Using liability insurance, the
insured shipowner would be subject to a premium for insurance coverage in the
amount that the market will bear with the insurer handling claims.
The airline industry made arguments against eliminating liability limits,
similar to arguments of the maritime industry,229 prior to the signing of the IATA
Intercarrier Agreement in November 1996 that waived all liability limits of the
Warsaw Convention.230 The industry argued that unlimited liability would
bankrupt airlines due to uninsurable claims-a situation that neither benefits
injured claimants nor the airline industry. 231 Today, almost 20 years later, the
airline industry is not unduly burdened by removing the arcane limits provided in
the 1929 Warsaw Convention, and its progeny. Around 1996, most developed
countries accepted the proposition that the policy of protecting and subsidizing the
airline industry by way of limiting its liability to passengers was no longer relevant
or necessary.232 There can be no question that the same conditions exist in the
maritime industry today.
Moreover, with a highly developed airline insurance industry already
functioning well and efficiently without any liability limitations, there is every
likelihood that air insurers can fill the void if and when maritime P&I Clubs are
unable to provide adequate insurance when liability limits are lifted. In testimony
before a Congressional subcommittee in 1985, Professor Dean commented on the
capacity of the air insurance industry:
Considering that liability in other modes of domestic
transportation is unlimited-and that these modes of passenger
carriage are able to cover their unlimited risks by conventional
insurance-we seriously question the continuing validity of the
limitation of liability concept to passenger carriage. Air carriers
routinely cover passenger liability for aircraft carrying 400
passengers. Their insurance cost is [low]. We make this
recommendation fully recognizing that the market structure for
maritime insurance may differ from other transportation
insurance and that insurance capacity is not unlimited. However,
we have no indication that insurance coverage will be
227. See generally Mendelsohn, supra note 47, at 803-05.
228. Kimball, supra note 23, at 1149-50.
229. See Reed v. Wiser, Jr., 555 F.2d 1079, 1089 (2d Cir. 1977).
230. Doo Hwan Kim, The Innovation of the Warsaw System andthe IATA IntercarrierAgreement,
in THE UTILIZATION OF THE WORLD'S AIR SPACE AND FREE OUTER SPACE INTHE 21ST CENTURY 65,
68-70 (Chia-Jui Cheng & Doo Hwan Kim eds., 2000).
231. See Reed, 555 F.2d at 1089.
232. Doo Hwan Kim, supranote 230, at 68, 70-72.
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unavailable. Moreover our recommendation [to repeal liability
limits for personal injury] increases shipowners' incentives to
avoid loss. 233
It is difficult to imagine that the existence of maritime P&I Clubs would
somehow be endangered if the United States were to repeal its maritime liability
limits. First, the current arcane U.S. limit is frequently broken, rendering no
liability limit under the current law. 234 Hence, lifting the liability limit altogether is
unlikely to cause a flurry of excessive claims. Second, current P&I Clubs have the
capacity to insure in excess of their general policy limit of $30 million through a
special contract with Lloyds of London as the underwriter.235 Third, if and when a
profusion of foreign plaintiffs begin to seek remedies in U.S. courts, the maritime
industry can employ the same forum non conveniens defenses as the aviation
industry is employing so effectively today.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 was passed to protect and encourage a
nascent shipping industry. The act was a reaction to New Jersey Steam v.
Merchant's Bank, a case in which liability against a shipowner was seen as a
windfall. U.S. shipowners of the 1800's were in direct competition with British
vessels that had the advantage of liability limitation protections. Congress and the
Supreme Court in 1851, and the years thereafter, determined that U.S. shipowners
must have strong protections to develop maritime transport and encourage
commerce. In the late 1800s, limits not only served an economic purpose, but also
advanced the cause of equity by relieving shipowners from liability where they
were not responsible for an accident simply because they often had no control of
vessels operating at sea thousands of miles away. Today, shipowners are complex
corporations often exerting control over all aspects of operations, made possible by
modem technology.
Having inherited protections to U.S. shipowners from the 1851 Limitation of
Liability Act, U.S. maritime liability limits today only serve to protect owners of
foreign flagged cruise vessels. Only one cruise vessel today operates as a U.S.
flagged vessel, benefiting from the limit. The limit thus places U.S. citizens under
a threat of being undercompensated for loss of life or injuries occurring aboard
foreign-flagged passenger vessels.
To be sure, the MLA has adopted a contrary view. As recently as 2010, the
MLA stated, "[t]he majority of the Committee [MLA] feels that this purpose of
providing the global economic competitiveness of America's maritime industry
remains a valid policy supporting the Limitation Act." 236 However, this is an
overly simplified position that not only fails to recognize that there is only one

233. Dean's Statement, supra note 81, at 6-7.
234. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
235. Patrick J. Bonner, Marine Insurance Considerations, FREEHILL, HOGAN & MAHAR LLP,
http://www.freehill.com/articles/marineinsurance.cfm (last visited Jan. 23, 2014).
236. MLA, REPORT, supra note 27, at 2.
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U.S. flagged passenger vessel in existence today, but also fails to consider the
sophistication of modem shipping and their corporate owners. These corporations
and their owners reap benefits from registering their vessels outside the United
States, avoiding U.S. labor standards and taxes that apply to U.S. flagged vesselsall the while benefiting from U.S. liability limits at the expense of U.S. citizenclaimants.
Congress has considered the issue from time to time but has consistently
failed to repeal the limit, despite strong support from the State Department and
most Executive agencies in 1966, during congressional hearings after the
Yarmouth Castle sank. Congress passed the current limit as in interim measure in
1984, establishing a fund of $420 times the weight of the vessel, intending to pass
permanent reforms at a later time.237 Now, nearly 30 years later, Congress has not
reformed the law. This failure could produce inequitable outcomes, as Congress
noted in 2010 when Transocean attempted to use the Limitation of Liability Act to
limit its liability for personal injuries after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in April
2010.238 Hearings on the issue from 1966, 1984, and 1985 indicate that Congress
seems to have been overwhelmed by industry witnesses, representing and lobbying
for shipowners' interests. 239 But their arguments have no relevance in 2013, when
shipowners have the benefit of protections in modem corporate law, and corporate
shipowners exert control over all aspects of ship operation, a control that
shipowners of the 1850's did not have the technology to exert.
Congress must undertake a detailed inquiry into the capacity of the marine
insurance industry to handle maritime claims without the subsidy of current
limits. 240 Such an inquiry is more than likely to reveal the resilient capacity of the
industry to handle claims without a statutory limit-as is currently the case in all

237. REP. WALTER BEAMAN JONES SR., MARITIME SAFETY ACT OF 1983, H.R. REP. No. 98-525, at
10-11 (1983).
238. REP. JOHN CONYERS JR., CHAIRMAN, SECURING PROTECTIONS FOR THE INJURED FROM
LIMITATIONS ON LIABILITY ACT, H.R. REP. 111-521, at 11 (2010).
239. See Mendelsohn, supra note 47, at 802-05 (describing the industry arguments in the 1966
hearings); see also H.R. REP. No. 98-525, at 10-11; H.R. 277, 99th Cong. § 5 (1985); H.R. 3156, 99th
Cong. (1985).
240. Mendelsohn, supra note 47, at 805. Professor Mendelsohn articulated areas for congressional
inquiry in a paper published in 1969, analyzing options to reform LOLA in light of the Yarmouth Castle
incident in 1965. Id. These recommendations are still relevant today as they deal with the maritime
insurance industry's capacity to handle claims and include:
(1) what capacity the insurance market can withstand today; (2) to what extent or how this
capacity can be expanded in the face of the most urgent circumstances; (3) what would be
the incremental insurance cost to American flag owners if limits were repealed altogether or
if they were increased very substantially; (4) what would be the percentage increase in the
owner's gross operating expenses resulting from these incremental costs; and, finally, (5) if
the costs to the owner are, as they well may be, too high, is the government prepared to
increase direct public subsidies rather than continuing the present system of indirect private
subsidies through the means of depressing the recoveries of the victims and survivors of
disasters.

Id.
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modes of U.S. transport including air, rail, and road. 241 The Montreal Convention
of 1999 also provides unlimited liability for death and injury claims in
international air transportation. 242
The MLA supports adoption of the 1996 LLMC. 243 Both the 1996 LLMC and
the 2002 Athens Convention would increase the limit over the current one in U.S.
LOLA. But adoption of international conventions could potentially implement a
stricter standard for the breakability of limits, depending on U.S. courts'
interpretation. As written, both international conventions implement a "willful
misconduct" standard, as defined therein, that the drafters intended as almost
unbreakable. 244 Although both conventions provide higher compensation funds,
the adequacy of compensation would vary based on the number of passengers
making claims against a fund. Compensation could be inadequate, especially
applying the LLMC, which has the lower limit of the two. 245
The 2002 Athens Convention would at least provide the United States with an
option to opt out of all liability limits, through the opt-out clause in Article 7(2) of
the Convention, while enjoying the benefit of being part of an international
regime.246 Opting out of the liability limits may also provide an incentive at the
global level for other countries to do the same. Europe has indicated an interest in
negotiating with the IMO to repeal all maritime liability limits, making
international maritime law in this respect identical to international air law.
In the U.S. system of tort compensation, damages in personal injury and
wrongful death actions can be estimated by seemingly mystical actuarial data that
attempt to approximate intangibles such as life expectancy. An expert opinion is
needed to estimate earning potential, degree of dependence of survivors, and other
factors. Although the U.S. system of compensation is not perfect, U.S. courts
nonetheless manage to evaluate monetary compensation for injuries, and even the
incompensateable loss of life, to provide compensation that would be more just
than those that result from shipowners' liability limits. Congress should not wait
for the next maritime disaster to consider repeal of the "interim" liability limits it
set in 1984 in the now antiquated U.S. Limitation of Liability Act.

241. S. 3251, 89th Cong. §1(b) (1966), H.R. 10327, 89th Cong. (1966) & S. REP. No. 89-1483, at
10-20 (1966) (report of the Committee on Commerce about the bills at issue, stating endorsement of
agencies).
242. Montreal Convention, supra note 125, art. 21(2).
243. MLA, REPORT, supra note 27, at 7.
244. MARTINEZ GUTiERREZ, supra note 110, at 126.
245. Compare Protocol to LLMC, supra note 115, art. 4 (USD $268,752 multiplied by the number
of passengers the ship is authorized to carry), with Athens Convention, supra note 108, art. 7(1)
($614,290 multiplied by the number of passengers the ship is authorized to carry).
246. Athens Convention, supra note 108, art. 7(2).

A WAS TINGNI V.NICARAGUA RECONSIDERED: GROUNDING
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES' LAND RIGHTS IN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Bryan Neihart*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Inter-American Court on Human Rights ("IACHR") decided the Case of
the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua ("Awas Tingni") over
twelve years ago.' Since then, the decision has been the subject of many notes and
articles focusing primarily on the decision's impact on the collective land and
property rights of indigenous peoples.2 Indeed, the Awas Tingni decision has been
celebrated as a "landmark decision."3 It prompted the IACHR to form a distinct
body of jurisprudence for indigenous peoples, elaborated a canon of legal

* J.D./M.A. Candidate, 2014, University of Denver, Sturm College of Law/Josef Korbel School of
International Studies; B.A., French and International Relations, 2011, Wheaton College (IL). Thank you
to Professor Tom Farer and Professor Andrew Reid for lending their expertise and insightful comments
throughout the drafting process; to the DJILP staff for your hard work and friendship; and, of course, to
my lovely wife (Psalm 34:1).
1. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C.) No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001).
2. See, e.g., S. James Anaya & Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Protection of Indigenous Peoples'
Rights over Lands and Natural Resources Under the Inter-American Human Rights System, 14 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 33, 33 (2001) ("A discrete body of international human rights law up-holding the
collective rights of indigenous peoples has emerged and is rapidly developing."); Leonardo J. Alvarado,
Prospectsand Challenges in the Implementation of Indigenous Peoples' Human Rights in International
Law: Lessons from the Case of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua, 24 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 609, 613-18
(2007) (analyzing Awas Tingni and its significance for the development of communal property rights
for indigenous peoples); Jennifer A. Amiott, Note & Comment, Environment, Equality, andIndigenous
Peoples' Land Rights in the Inter-American Human Rights System: Mayagna (Sumo) Indigenous
Community of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua, 32 ENVTL. L. 873, 876 (2002) ("This case also illustrates the
convergence of environmental, sustainable development, and human rights issues in indigenous land
rights cases."); David E. Cahn, Note, Homelessfor Generations:Land Rights for the Chocoe Indians
From Mogue, Panama, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 232, 288 (2004) (discussing the significance of Awas
Tingni for collective land ownership rights of another indigenous group); Anne Debevoise Ostby, Note
& Comment, Will Foreign Investors Regulate Indigenous Peoples' Right to Self-Determination?, 21
Wis. INT'L L.J. 223, 235-36 (2003) (arguing that the validation of collective ownership rights in Awas
Tingni is important for indigenous self-determination and sovereignty rights in international trade);
Lindsey L. Wiersma, Note, Indigenous Lands as Cultural Property: A New Approach to Indigenous
Land Claims, 54 DUKE L.J. 1061 (2005).
3. Luis Rodriguez-Pinero, The Inter-American System and the U.N. Declarationon the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples: Mutual Reinforcement, in REFLECTIONS ON THE UN DECLARATION ON THE
RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 457,460 (Stephen Allen & Alexandra Xanthaki eds., 2011).
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interpretation uniquely for indigenous peoples, and was the first legally binding
decision by a regional court to recognize collective land rights.4
However, despite the Awas Tingni decision and the more recent adoption of
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples ("UNDRIP"),
a celebrated declaration recognizing the collective rights of indigenous peoples, 5
indigenous peoples continue to lose access to and possession of their land,
territory, and resources due to state expansion. For instance, within the last year,
Mayan leaders governing thirty-eight villages in Belize were excluded from
discussions between government officials and a U.S.-based oil company for oil
concessions on traditional Mayan lands; 6 San communities in Namibia have had
difficulty gathering food for themselves because commercial cattle farmers erected
illegal fences on their lands while the government ignores the problem; 7 and the
Nez Perce Tribe of northern Idaho protested the transportation of oil equipment on
the grounds that it damages historic and cultural resources and violates treaties.8
These recent examples illustrate that while the Awas Tingni decision and
international instruments like UNDRIP articulate the right of collective land
ownership for indigenous peoples, actual protection remains aspirational.
This note offers a new understanding of the Awas Tingni decision. Other
notes have focused exclusively on the majority opinion in the Awas Tingni
decision and its influence on conceptualizing collective ownership as a property
right.9 By contrast, this note centers on the concurring opinion by Judges
Trindade, G6mez, and Burelli and offers a freedom-of-religion-based defense of
collective land ownership. The concurring judges agreed with the court's decision
on the merits but jointly filed a separate opinion highlighting how the Awas Tingni
Community's land, territory, and resources must be understood as a part of their
spiritual existence because the Community believed that certain landscape features
were divine and performed their religious rituals on their land.

4. Id. at 458-61.
5. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/295, Annex (Sept. 13, 2007) ("[I]ndigenous peoples possess collective rights which are
indispensable for their existence, well-being and integral development as peoples.").
6. Campaign Update-Belize: Oil Company Attempts Bribery, Corruption of Traditional
Leaders, CULTURAL SURVIVAL (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/campaignupdate-belize-oil-company-attempts-bribery-corruption-traditional-leaders.
7. Delme Cupido, Land Grabs Threaten San in Namibia, OPEN Soc'Y INITIATIVE FOR S. AFR.
(June 7, 2013), http://www.osisa.orglindigenous-peoples/namibia/land-grabs-threaten-san-namibia.
8. Nez Perce Committee Members Arrested During Protest, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA
NETWORK (Aug. 6, 2013), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2013/08/06/breaking-nezperce-committee-members-arrested-during-protest- 150764.
9. Most commentary has focused on collective ownership rights as a property right, rather than
one based on religious freedom. See Wiersma, supra note 2, at 1078-79 (arguing for a more expansive
protection of indigenous peoples' land by treating the land as cultural property). But see Rhett B.
Larson, Holy Water and Human Rights: Indigenous Peoples' Religious-Rights Claims to Water
Resources, 2 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 81, 86-95 (2011) (examining indigenous peoples' religiousrights-based claims to water).
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Based on the concurring opinion, this note argues that collective ownership
rights for many indigenous peoples should also be grounded in the right to
religious freedom. This approach strengthens collective ownership claims because
religious freedom has been recognized as a basic human right since the
Reformation while the right to collective land ownership has only been recognized
recently.1o Because of its history, religious freedom is codified throughout the
world in many international instruments, regional documents, and domestic laws.
Defending collective property rights in terms of religious freedom is also effective
because even countries without collective rights most likely do have strong
jurisprudence protecting religious liberty."
Part II describes the Awas Tingni Community's spiritual relationship with
their land, briefly discusses the background of the Awas Tingni decision, and
reviews the court majority's decision while emphasizing the concurring opinion.
Part III addresses some of the most prominent critiques of collective rights
generally and responds to these criticisms through cases involving religious
minorities to illustrate the broader point that concepts of religious freedom are a
helpful lens through which to view indigenous peoples' claims to collective land
ownership. Part IV proposes that international law, and many regional and
domestic courts and governments, already acknowledges a special connection
between indigenous peoples' land and their spirituality making a freedom-ofreligion-based defense of collective property rights particularly useful. 12

10. MICHELINE R. ISHAY, THE HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE
GLOBALIZATION ERA 75-76 (2nd ed. 2008) ("[T]he rise of Protestantism reshaped prospects for

religious freedom and helped ultimately to launch the broader Enlightenment struggle for human
rights.").
11. See Clive Baldwin & Cynthia Morel, Using the United Nations Declarationon the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples in Litigation, in REFLECTIONS ON THE UN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 121, 131-32 (Stephen Allen & Alexandra Xanthaki eds., 2011).
12. Indeed, although Awas Tingni was decided in 2001, the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights has recently admitted two cases where indigenous peoples claim that failure to protect
their land, territory, and resources has led to an infringement of their spirituality making an analysis of
the connection between religious freedom and collective land ownership even more relevant. See Maho
Indigenous Cmty. v. Suriname, Pet. 1621-09, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 9/13, 2 (2013)
(petitioners claiming they "maintain[] a spiritual, cultural and physical survival relationship with [their]
lands, territories and natural resources" and that the state's concessions to third parties to "exploit the
land, territory and natural resources" has harmed the community); Raposa Serra do Sol Indigenous
46 (2010) (noting
Peoples v. Brazil, Pet. 250-04, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 125/10,
petitioners' argument that Brazil's "tolerance of the continuous presence of non-indigenous people on
the Raposa SerradoSol territory, who prevent the movement of the indigenous peoples and restrict their
access to sacred sites and natural resources used by said peoples to express their beliefs and practice
their culture").
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BACKGROUND

A.

FactualBackground

The Awas Tingni Community is an indigenous community of approximately
600 people who live in the Northern Atlantic Autonomous Region of the Atlantic
Coast of Nicaragua.1 3 The Community claimed ownership based on the fact that it
had lived in the territory for over 300 years. 14 Community members make their
living by farming, hunting, and fishing and seek to preserve their natural resources
by carefully selecting the things they consume.' 5 The territory is owned
collectively and only Awas Tingni members could use the land's resources.16 As
one member explained:
The lands are occupied and utilized by the entire Community. . .. If a
person does not belong to the Community, that person cannot utilize the
land. There is no right to expel anyone from the Community. To deny
the use of the land to any member of the Community, the matter has to
be discussed and decided by the Community Council. When a person
dies, his or her next of kin become the owners of those things that the
deceased person owned. But since lands are collective property of the
community, there is no way that one member can freely transmit to
another his or her rights in connection with the use of the land.' 7
In addition to owning the land collectively, the Awas Tingni Community
believes that its members share a spiritual relationship with their territory.

13. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C.) No. 79, 103 (Aug. 31, 2001).
14. Id. 83(a), 103.
15. Id.I83(a).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. This belief is not uncommon for indigenous peoples. For example, some indigenous peoples
believe the earth is a sacred, living, and breathing entity. See AKE HULTKRANTZ, THE RELIGIONS OF
THE AMERICAN INDIANS 46-47, 57-59, 281-85 (Monica Setterwall trans., 1967) (describing how rain,
wind, the moon, crops, trees, and stones are considered sacred by various indigenous peoples);
Stephanie Fried, Shoot the Horse to Get the Rider: Religion and ForestPolitics in Bentian Borneo, in
INDIGENOUS TRADITIONS AND ECOLOGY 71, 71-72 (John A. Grim ed., 2001) (describing how the
indigenous peoples of Indonesian Borneo have fought with logging companies to maintain
"ecologically oriented cultural practices" over their forests); Laurie Anne Whitt et al., Belonging to
Land: Indigenous Knowledge Systems and the Natural World, 26 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 701, 703-05
(2001); Valerie Taliman, Sacred Landscapes, SIERRA, Nov.-Dec. 2002, at 36, 36, 38-39 (noting the
sacredness of water to the Dind and the sacred sites of the Hopi and Lakota Sioux on natural terrain).
Indigenous peoples' spiritual relationship to land may be based on any number of rituals: a site may be
sacred because of "ancient myths or oral traditions"; traditional sites of ceremonial use such as
offerings, dances, or spiritual visions; and significant gathering places for fish, wildlife, plants, or other
natural resources. Andrew Gulliford, Sacred Sites and Sacred Mountains, in 3 AMERICAN INDIAN
RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 945, 945-61 (Suzanne J. Crawford & Dennis F. Kelley
eds., 2005).

2013

INDIGENOUS RIGHTS TO LAND THROUGH RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

81

Theodore Macdonald Jr., an anthropologist, explained how the hills located in the
territory were part of the Community's religious worldview:
The "spirits of the mountain" . . . which in Mayagna are called
"Asangpas Muigeni", live in them, and it is they who control the
animals throughout that region. To make use of those animals, one must
have a special relationship with the spirits. Oftentimes . . . [the spiritual

leaders] can maintain such a relationship with the spirits. Therefore, the
animals' presence and the possibility of hunting them is based on their
cosmovision and has much to do with the boundaries, because according
to them these masters of the mountain own the animals .1.. 9
To the Awas Tingni Community, hunting is "a spiritual act, and it has much
to do with the territory with [sic] they utilize." 20 Another anthropologist, Rodolfo
Stavenhagen Gruenbaum, acknowledged that the Community's land is a "symbolic
and religious space, with which the history and current dynamics of those people
are linked" and according to the Community "the land is seen as a spiritual place . .
. as it is linked to human beings, since it has sacred places ... ,,2 1 Based on these
beliefs, any amount of relocation, exploitation, or development necessarily inhibits
the Awas Tingni Community's ability to worship and perform rituals.
Transnational companies began exploring the Community's claimed lands
with the permission of the Nicaraguan government and in December 1993, the
Ministry of Environmental and Natural Resources ("MARENA") granted a
logging concession to a Dominican owned company Maderas Y Derivados de
Nicaragua, S.A. ("MADENSA") for logging on 43,000 acres of the Community's
lands.22 With the help of environmental and human rights activists, by May 1994
the Community negotiated a deal with MARENA and MADENSA whereby the
community would benefit economically from the logging and the government
would demarcate their traditional lands. 23 As the Community awaited official
demarcation of their property, on January 5, 1995, the National Forestry Service
approved a plan submitted by Sol Del Caribe, S.A. ("SOLCARSA") to harvest and
manage timber in areas traditionally used by Awas Tingni without consulting
them. 24 On July 11, 1995, the Awas Tingni submitted a letter to MARENA,
requesting that no further steps be taken by SOLCARSA without the Community's
approval.25 Despite this request, on March 13, 1996, MARENA granted

19. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty., Judgment, No. 79, 83(c). Expert Charles Rice Hale, an
indigenous cultures anthropologist also testified: "The sites for subsistence, such as hunting and fishing,
and the key sites which have spiritual or cultural value, are a factor defining the traditional territory.
There are key sites that are spiritual sites and are located within the area claimed." Id. 1830).
20. Id.183(c).
21. Id.T83(d).
22. S. James Anaya & Claudio Grossman, The Case of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua: A New Step in
the InternationalLaw of Indigenous Peoples, 19 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 3 (2002).
23. Id. at 3-4.
24. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty., Judgment, No. 79,11 83(e), 1030).
25. Id. 1l03(fi).
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SOLCARSA a 30-year logging concession to 62,000 hectares in the North Atlantic
Autonomous Region inhabited by the Awas Tingni Community, apparently under
the assumption that the disputed land was entirely government owned.26
On October 2, 1995, the Awas Tingni filed a petition with the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights ("Commission") to intervene to relieve the threats
to its land and resource tenure alleging violations of the right to property, the right
to cultural integrity, and other rights guaranteed by the American Convention on
Human Rights ("Convention"). 2 7 On September 11, 1995, and again on November
7, 1997, the Community filed an action for amparo (emergency relief) with the
Nicaraguan judicial system, but these requests were denied.28 The Commission
decided to take the case in May 1998.29 On June 4, 1998, the Commission filed a
complaint with the IACHR claiming that Nicaragua violated Article 25 (right to
judicial protection), Article 21 (right to property), and Article 1 (obligation to
respect rights, including freedom of conscience and religion) of the Convention.3o
B.

Majority Opinion

The IACHR began by assessing the Commission's claim that Nicaragua
violated Article 25 of the Convention which guarantees the right "to a competent
court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights
recognized by the constitution or laws ... or by this Convention . . ."31 The court
divided its Article 25 analysis into two parts: first, whether Nicaragua had a
sufficient procedure for demarcating and titling indigenous land and second,
"whether the amparo remedies submitted by members of the Community were
decided in accordance with Article 25."32 The court found that Nicaragua did not
have an effective procedure to demarcate and title indigenous communal lands
based on a lack of legislation and resources dedicated to the task and that the
Nicaraguan courts violated Article 25 by not responding to the Community's
requests for emergency relief within a reasonable amount of time. 33 The

26. Id. 103(k); S. James Anaya, The Mayagna Indigenous Community of Awas Tingni and Its
Effort to Gain Recognition of TraditionalLands: The Community's Case Before the Human Rights
Institutions of the Organization of American States, in LINKING HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 185, 187 (Romina Picolotti & Jorge Daniel Taillant eds., 2003). The Nicaraguan
government had a practice of assuming that land without a private title gave the government the rights
over that unclaimed land. Theodore Macdonald & S. James Anaya, DemarcatingIndigenous Territories
in Nicaragua:The Case of Awas Tingni, CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q., Fall 1995, at 69, 69.
27. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty., Judgment, No. 79,
1, 6; Anaya & Grossman, supra
note 22, at 5.
28. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty., Judgment, No. 79, IN 23, 103(p), 103(r).
29. Id.128.
30. Id. 1 2; Anaya & Grossman, supra note 22, at 2-3.
31. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty., Judgment, No. 79, 1 106; Organization of American
States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 25(1), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123.
32. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty., Judgment, No. 79,$ 115.
33. Id. 124-27, 137.
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Community's first request was ultimately decided almost a year and a half after it
was originally filed and the second request took more than eleven months to
process. 34
Next, the IACHR considered the application of Article 21 of the Convention
to the Awas Tingni Community's collective land ownership. Article 21 guarantees
"the right to the use and enjoyment of his property" and prohibits the deprivation
of property without just compensation for reasons of the public good or in
accordance with the law.3 5 After noting that Article 21 protected "the use and
enjoyment of ... property" rather than "private property," the court concluded that
the article covered the communal property rights of indigenous peoples. 36 This is
37
so even if domestic law does not recognize such a right of property.
Additionally, interpreting the term "property" in human rights treaties should be
done so as to "adapt to the evolution of the times and . . . current living
conditions,"3 and indigenous peoples' customary law, including the understanding
that possession may suffice as official recognition of that property. 39 Significantly,
the court emphasized that "[fjor indigenous communities, relations to the land are
not merely a matter of possession and production but a material and spiritual
element which they must fully enjoy . . . ."40 "[L]and must be recognized and
understood as the fundamental basis of [indigenous peoples'] cultures, their
spiritual life, their integrity, and their economic survival." 41
For the violation of Articles 21 and 25, the IACHR ordered Nicaragua to
demarcate and title the Awas Tingni Community's property, and, in recognition of
the Community's collective land ownership, instructed Nicaragua to do so "in
accordance with their customary law, values, customs and mores" and awarded
damages and litigation costs. 42
C.

ConcurringOpinion

Three judges filed a joint separate opinion voting in favor of the judgment but
adding a reflection "about one of [the case's] central aspects, namely, the
intertemporaldimension of the communal form of property prevailing among the
members of the indigenous communities."4 3 Their opinion quoted a member of the
Awas Tingni who explained the importance of one of the Community's sacred
hills:

34. Id. % 131-33.
35. American Convention on Human Rights, supranote 31, arts. 21(1)-(2).
145, 148.
36. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty., Judgment, No. 79,
37. Id. 1 146 ("The terms of an international human rights treaty have an autonomous meaning,
for which reason they cannot be made equivalent to the meaning given to them in domestic law.").
38. Id.
39. Id.1151.
40. Id. 1149.
41. Id.
42. Id. I1 164, 167, 169.
43. Id. 11 (joint separate opinion of Trindade, J., G6mez, J., & Burelli, J.).
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Cerro Urus Asang is a sacred hill since our ancestors because
therein we have buried our grandparents and therefore we call it sacred.
Our grandparents lived in this hill . . . . The utensils of war of our

ancestors, our grandparents, were the arrows. There they are stored. (. .
.) We maintain our history, since our grandparents. That is why we
have [it] as Sacred Hill. (. . .) Asangpas Muigeni is spirit of the hill, is

of equal form to a human [being], but is a spirit [who] always lives
under the hills."
The concurring judges found that indigenous peoples' right to collective
property ownership should be viewed in light of the spiritual connection the
Community has with the land; not only the landmarks themselves, like the hill that
is considered sacred, but also with the territory dedicated to rituals such as burials
and hunting. 45 The Community believes that human beings are integrated with
nature and the world and that there is a duty to preserve the communal lands for
46
future generations.
This communal conception "has a cosmovision of its own,
and an important intertemporal dimension, in bringing to the fore the bonds of
human solidarity that link those who are alive with their dead and with the ones
who are still to come." 47
The remainder of this note will attempt to analyze how the concurring
opinion's emphasis on linking the Community's religious beliefs with their efforts
to protect their land, territory, and natural resources could be implemented in
theory and practice.
III. RECONCILING GROUP RIGHTS WITH INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

Individuals have been the focus of international norms on human rights since
the inception of the concept of human rights.48 One of the challenges faced by
indigenous peoples, then, is how to claim group rights in the context of individual
protections. There are two primary conceptual challenges to recognizing collective
rights of indigenous peoples. The first is why the collective should be considered
new rights-holders, over and above the individual rights-holders in the group. The
second is how to address rights held by a group in the context of the traditional
prominence of individual rights in human rights discourse. Professor Jack
Donnelly poses five relevant questions that he believes need to be addressed in
44. Id. $T3-4 (footnote omitted).
45. Id. T 5.
46. Id. 9-10.
47. Id. $ 15.
48. But see NATAN LERNER, GROUP RIGHTS AND DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 8-14
(2d ed. 2003) (noting the abandonment of protections for national minorities after the failure of the
League of Nations protection scheme, especially the Nazi's manipulation of the scheme to justify
aggression against Poland and Czechoslovakia); WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A
LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS 57 (1995) [hereinafter KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL
CITIZENSHIP].
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order to overcome a "strong prima facie skepticism towards claims for the
recognition of group human rights."49
A.

Identifying Groups HoldingHuman Rights

First, Donnelly asks "[h]ow do we identify the groups that ought to hold
human rights?" 50 As he correctly notes, not all groups should hold rights and it is
necessary to select certain groups that do, and others that do not, hold rights.s'
Although there is no agreed upon definition of the term "indigenous peoples,"
scholars and international bodies have attempted to set the parameters for the
groups of people who are considered indigenous peoples.52 These factors include:
occupation of ancestral land, original habitation of land, a distinct culture,
especially vis-A-vis the dominant state, and involuntary displacement from
ancestral and historical land.53 Based on these factors, indigenous peoples are
frequently viewed as distinct from national, ethnic, religious, or linguistic minority
groups. 54 Simply by definition, identifying indigenous peoples as a group that
ought to hold human rights does not by itself risk extending human rights to all
groups.
It is even more unlikely that a religious-based right to collective property
ownership will be extended to other groups. There are several tests to evaluate the
legitimacy of claims based on religious practice or belief that could be extended to
evaluating land claims.55 For example, the substantial burden test allows the
government to substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only when the
burden "is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest" and "is the least

49. JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 49 (3d ed. 2013)
(Professor Donnelly actually presents seven questions in regards to group human rights, however, only
five are relevant for this note).
50. Id.
51. Id. (identifying "states, multinational corporations, gangs, and barbershop quartets" as
examples of groups that should not be rights-holders).
52. See, e.g., PATRICK THORNBERRY, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 37-40 (2002).
53. See International Labour Organization [LO], Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples in Independent Countries No. 169 art. 1, June 27, 1989, 1650 U.N.T.S. 383 [hereinafter ILO
Convention No. 169]; JOSE R. MARTINEZ COBO, 5 STUDY OF THE PROBLEM OF DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS: CONCLUSIONS, PROPOSALS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, at 1-2,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4, U.N. Sales No. E.86.XIV.3 (1987); S. JAMES ANAYA,
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES ININTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2d ed. 2004); THORNBERRY, supranote 52, at 37-40.
54. See, e.g., United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and Prot. of
Human Rights, Prevention of Discrimination Against and the Protection of Minorities: Working Paper
on the Relationship Between the Rights of Persons Belonging to Minorities and those of Indigenous
Peoples, 1 8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/10 (July 19, 2000) (explaining that one of the differences
between international instruments governing minority group and those governing indigenous peoples is
that instruments for indigenous peoples seek to give them "a high degree of autonomous development"
while minority instruments seek to ensure "a space for pluralism").
55. See, e.g., Larson, supra note 9, at 101-08 (arguing that the "substantial burden" framework,
the "economic analysis" framework, and the "customary law" framework could be used to evaluate
indigenous religious-based claims to water).
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restrictive means of furthering" that interest. 56 Another approach is the customary
law approach where courts evaluate whether a custom has developed based on the
elements of ancientness, reasonableness, certainty, and observation.
Scholars have also developed at least three theories justifying the extension of
group rights to indigenous peoples while withholding such rights from other
groups.5 8 The theories usually focus on the right to self-determination, which carry
all rights of sovereignty, including the right to own land.59 The first theory is
based on indigenous peoples' historical sovereignty that was taken from them by
colonization.6 0 Self-determination merely restores indigenous peoples' inherent
sovereignty. 6' Another theory is "that indigenous peoples need self-determination
to preserve their pre-modern way of life." 62 Finally, Professor James Anaya argues
that indigenous peoples are entitled to self-determination, and, consequently, to
collective land ownership, as a remedy to redress the wrongs of colonization.
Under this theory, indigenous peoples need special remedies because they have
been abused more systematically than other groups." While these justifications
are based on a history of systematic suffering, and could consequently be applied
to many groups, indigenous peoples need protection through group rights to the
extent that they cannot protect their interests through individual rights.
B.

Exercising Group Rights

Donnelly's second question asks "[w]ho exercises group rights?" 65 In other
words, who in the group acts as the group's "right-holder[],"?66
This question can be easily set aside because Donnelly admits it is less
applicable to indigenous peoples because they are normally "small, concentrated,
and homogenous groups with a strong tradition of collective action." 67 Instead, the

56. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) to (b) (2006).
57. Larson, supra note 9, at 106-07. See Alexkor Ltd. v. Richtersveld Cmty. & Others 2004 (5)
SA 460 (CC) at 25 para. 51 (S. Afr.) (noting that under the South African Constitution, courts must
apply customary law where applicable). For example, the Awas Tingni Community claimed ownership
based on its 300-year presence on the disputed territory. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v.
Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C.) No. 79,
83, 103
(Aug. 31, 2001).
58. See, e.g., ANAYA, supra note 53, at 107; WILL KYMLICKA, POLITICS IN THE VERNACULAR:
NATIONALISM, MULTICULTURALISM AND CITIZENSHIP 125-26 (2001) [hereinafter KYMLICKA,
POLITICS IN THE VERNACULAR].
59. KYMLICKA, POLITICS IN THE VERNACULAR, supra note 58, at 125-26.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 126.
ANAYA, supra note 53, at 106-10.
Id.
DONNELLY, supra note 49, at 50.
Id.
Id.
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problem of who exercises the right of the group is more applicable for "large,
heterogeneous, or widely dispersed" groups.68
C.

Necessity and Success of Group Rights

Donnelly's third and forth questions are related. He asks "[a]re the purported
group rights necessary?" and "[w]hy should we expect group rights to succeed
where individual rights have failed?" 69 The two questions are related because if
individual rights succeeded then group rights would not be necessary, and if group
rights would fail where individual rights have also failed, then group rights would
be useless.
Philosopher Will Kymlicka, one of the world's foremost scholars on issues of
multiculturalism, has developed a typology of the different types of minority rights
that ethnic and national groups can plausibly demand. 70 The first is "selfgovernment rights," which often demand political and territorial autonomy "so as
to ensure the full and free development of their cultures and the best interests of
their people."n Second, a defined group may demand "polyethnic rights." 72 These
rights usually involve public funding for cultural practices or "exemptions from
laws and regulations that disadvantage them." 73 The most common form of the
latter is exemptions from laws for religious reasons.74 One key difference between
polyethnic rights and self-government rights is that polyethnic rights are intended
to help minority groups maintain their cultural identity while participating in the
economic and political institutions of the dominant society. 75 Finally, "special
representation rights," is the right to a guaranteed seat in representative forms of
government.7 6
The group-differentiated right argued for in this note falls in between selfgovernment rights and polyethnic rights. The demands of the particular indigenous
group, and the extent to which they want to be separate from the dominant society,
will determine whether the group rights more closely resemble self-government,
polyethnic, or a mixture of the two. For example, if an indigenous group wants
total political autonomy, and part of that autonomy includes owning the land
collectively, then it is asking for self-government rights.77 However, if an
indigenous group merely wants to be exempt from property laws that only
recognize title vesting in an individual, then it is asking for polyethnic rights.

68. Id.
69. Id. at 51.
70. KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP, supra note 48, at 26-33.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 27.
Id. at 30-31.
Id. at 31.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 31-33.
Id. at 30.
Id.
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Under either scenario, collective land ownership rights are necessary for
indigenous peoples. Donnelly believes that the exercise of individual rights is
sufficient to protect against the intrusion of the state, 79 but Kymlicka argues this is
not necessarily true of minority groups: "Some groups are unfairly disadvantaged
in the cultural market-place, and political recognition and support [of groupdifferentiated rights] rectify this disadvantage." 80 This is true when indigenous
people may be "outbid or outvoted on resources and policies that are crucial to the
survival of their societal cultures." 81
For example, in Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, a number of Native
American tribes challenged the Forest Service's decision to allow a ski resort to
use recycled wastewater to create artificial snow and suppress fires on the San
Francisco Peaks ("Peaks") in northern Arizona.82 The tribes gather "plants, water,
and other minerals from the Peaks" to perform healing and religious ceremonies. 83
They believe the Peaks are a living entity whose spirituality is desecrated by the
wastewater, causing disasters around the world.84 Despite the spiritual significance
of the Peaks, the Ninth Circuit held that the use of recycled wastewater did not
substantially burden the tribes' religious exercise because it did not force them to
choose between their religion and a public benefit or coerce them to act contrary to
their religion.
While the use of wastewater diminished the tribes' "subjective,
emotional religious experience," "offen[ded their] religious sensibilities," and
"decrease[d] the spiritual fulfillment they get from practicing their religion on the
mountain," none of these factors were sufficient to find a substantial burden on the
tribes' religious practices.
This case highlights two key parts of Kymlicka's argument for the necessity
of group-differentiated rights.
First, government decisions, even those as
seemingly innocuous as ski resorts, have the capacity to seriously harm indigenous
peoples. Second, indigenous peoples are at a disadvantage to protect themselves

79. DONNELLY, supra note 49, at 51 (while Professor Donnelly does have "prima facie skepticism
toward . . . most group rights claims," he states that "Indigenous peoples probably present an
exception").
80. KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP, supra note 48, at 109.
81. Id.
82. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 2008).
83. Id. at 1064.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1070.
86. Id. This was not the first time the Indian tribes lost on a free exercise claim involving the Twin
Peaks. In 1982, the Navajo and Hopi tribes alleged a free exercise violation when the Forest Service
authorized a ski resort to construct parking, ski slopes, lodge facilities, and ski lifts on the mountain.
Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The court held, even after recognizing that the
tribes viewed the Peaks as a living deity often visited by important spirits, that the developments were
not a free exercise violation because the tribes continued to have access to the Peaks and therefore could
arguably still perform their religious ceremonies. Id. at 738, 744-45.
87. KYMLIcKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP, supra note 48, at 109 (noting that political
decisions made by the majority can undermine minority cultures).
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against these harms without specific group differentiated rights. 8 8 The groupdifferentiated rights, therefore, "ensure that members of the minority have the
same opportunity to live and work in their own culture as members of the
majority."89
Recognizing collective land ownership is also necessary for indigenous
peoples because certain things, like socialization processes and kinship structures,
can only be held by groups. 90 This is true of land ownership for many indigenous
peoples. As described above, certain indigenous peoples do not believe that land
can be owned individually.9' Indigenous peoples' relationship to the land is often
embedded in the historical continuity of the relationship with the land, the present
lives of peoples on the land, and the future transmission of the lands to the next
generations.92 As Professor Jr6mie Gilbert has written "land is not seen as a
simple commodity but a space of socio-economic, spiritual and cultural anchorage.
... Accordingly, the protection of Indigenous peoples' land rights fits more into
the category of cultural rights rather than the right to property . . . ."93 Therefore,

because land is essential to indigenous peoples' culture, and many indigenous
groups do not recognize private land ownership, it is impossible for those groups to
protect their land through individual private property rights without making a
fundamental change to their culture.94 However, if the value inherent in a group is
recognized, indigenous claims to land ownership has value in its protection of the
culture itself, in addition to the protection of its individuals.95
Unfortunately, there is no way to guarantee the success of group rights where
individual rights have failed. Indigenous peoples have been historically deprived
of their land based on property law that explicitly rejected their collective claims of
ownership. The common justification for dispossessing indigenous peoples was
that land inhabited by indigenous peoples was unoccupied because it was not
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Ronald R. Garet, Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1001,
1038 (1983).
91. See, e.g., Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C.) No. 79, 1 83(a) (Aug. 31, 2001).
92. Jdrdmie Gilbert & Cathal Doyle, A New Dawn over the Land: Shedding Light on Collective
Ownership and Consent, in REFLECTIONS ON THE UN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES 289, 294 (Stephen Allen & Alexandra Xanthaki eds., 2011).
93. Jr6mie Gilbert, Custodians of the Land: Indigenous Peoples, Human Rights and Cultural
Integrity, in CULTURAL DIVERSITY, HERITAGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERSECTIONS IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 31, 34-35 (Michele Langfield, William Logan & Mdirbad Nic Craith eds., 2010).
94. Id. Of course, this argument would not apply to those indigenous peoples who hold land
individually, but cultural differences between indigenous peoples groups is part of what makes groups
indigenous. See, e.g., LO Convention No. 169, supra note 53, art. 1(b) (defining indigenous peoples as
"peoples . . . who . . . retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political

institutions").
95. For example, the concept of cultural property necessarily involves recognizing the value of a
culture itself, not only for the present, but also for future generations. Wiersma, supra note 2, at 107483 (asking if we should "allow the owner of a Rembrandt to use it as a dartboard?").

90

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 42:1

agriculturally developed nor inhabited by nation states.96 While there is no
guarantee that indigenous peoples' land will ultimately be better protected by
recognizing collective ownership, their recent success internationally, provides
hope. 97
D.

Recognizing Group Rights

Finally, Donnelly asks whether "group rights [are] the best way to protect or
realize the interests, values, or desires of a group?"9 8 Specifically, he believes "we
must ask whether recognizing a new group human right-which by definition
would hold against all states for all groups of the designated type-is either
necessary or desirable." 99 Those who agree with Donnelly's skepticism of group
rights make a key distinction between a conceptual question and a substantive
question.100 For philosopher Michael Hartney, the conceptual question is divided
between moral and legal rights and questions whether rights "can ever inhere in
collectivities."101 The substantive question asks "whether the protection of
communities requires that they be endowed with rights."1 02
The moral conceptual question demands whether group rights are so "central
to the well-being of individuals" that there is a sufficient moral reason to generate
group rights.10 3 Siegfried Wiessner, an international expert on indigenous peoples,
has recognized that indigenous peoples derive their value from being members of
their indigenous groups and that being a group member is essential to the pursuit of
self-realization.'" This membership is heightened for indigenous peoples as they
are "characterized by the desire and practice of sharing virtually all aspects of life
together."t os Cultural integrity, including the preservation of sacred, ancestral

96. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 287 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press, Student ed. 1988) (1690) ("The Fruit, or Venison, which nourishes the wild Indian, who
knows no Inclosure, and is still a Tenant in common, must be his, and so his, i.e. a part of him, that
another can no longer have any right to it, before it can do him any good for the support of his life.").
97. XAkmok KAsek Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214,
86-87 (Aug. 24, 2010); Saramaka People v. Suriname,
Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172,
174-75 (Nov. 28, 2007); Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, IT 120-21, 124, 141 (June 17, 2005); Moiwana Cmty. v.
Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 124, 1$ 131, 133 (June 15, 2005) (all recognizing collective property rights).
98. DONNELLY, supra note 49, at 51.
99. Id.
100. Michael Hartney, Some Confusions Concerning Collective Rights, 4 CAN. J. L. & JURIs. 293,
301 (1991).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 304.
104. Siegfried Wiessner, The CulturalRights of IndigenousPeoples: Achievements and Continuing
Challenges, 22 EUR. J. INT'L L. 121, 124 (2011).
105. See id. at 125-26; see also W. Michael Reisman, InternationalLaw and the Inner Worlds of
Others, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 25, 35 (1996) ("[I]t is the integrity of the inner worlds of peoples-their
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land, is necessary for the continued fulfillment indigenous people share with their
group.
The legal conceptual question asks whether there are authoritative
pronouncements that confer legal rights on groups.' 06 In response to the legal
conceptual question, it is evident that courts, even those that are not normally
associated with recognizing group rights, have acknowledged that groups can
claim legal rights.' 07 For example, in Sindicatul "Pdstorulcel bun" v. Romania,
the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights held that the religious
autonomy rights of the Romanian Orthodox Church trumped the rights of dissident
priests to unionize. 08 The court commented that "[r]espect for the autonomy of
religious communities . . . implies . . . that the State should accept the right of such

communities to react, in accordance with their own rules and interests, to any
dissident movements" emerging from within their ranks.109 Thus, there is a basis
for collective legal rights because several jurisdictions have recognized this right.
Finally, the substantive question: do indigenous peoples require rights?
Professor Wiessner argues that indigenous peoples deserve group rights because
their claims are often directed at the state. Indigenous peoples' claims "are
essentially claims to be treated in a certain way by the governments of the nationstates wherein they find themselves. Such claims are, in their structure, identical to
the human rights claims of individual human beings."110 While Western thought
focuses on the relationship between the individual and the state, and the rights held
by the individual are rights against the state, indigenous peoples conceive
themselves as "social beings" who "naturally think of their rights as part of a
group.""' Therefore, enforcing an individual property right that is held and

rectitude systems or their sense of spirituality-that is their distinctive humanity. Without an
opportunity to determine, sustain and develop that integrity, their humanity-and ours-is denied.").
106. Hartney, supra note 100, at 301 ("The utterance of a legal authority ... that a right is being
conferred is conclusive evidence that a legal right has been conferred.").
107. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216, 222 (1972); Hofer v. Hofer, [1970] S.C.R. 958,
967-69, 974-75 (Can.) (both cases examining Amish communities).
108. Sindicatul "PAstorul cel bun" v. Romania, App. No. 2330/09, In 159-173 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 9,
2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i-001-122763; see also Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. E.E.O.C., 132 S. Ct. 694, 706 (2012) (recognizing rights of
churches to be exempt from employment discrimination laws as applied to ministers).
109. Sindicatul "Pastorulcel bun," App. No. 2330/09, T 165; see also Hosanna-TaborEvangelical
Lutheran Church, 132 S. Ct. at 706 (exempting churches from employment discrimination laws for
their ministers because the exemption is necessary to "protect[] a religious group's right to shape its
own faith and mission through its appointments"); Kichwa People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Case
12.465, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., 1 238 (Appl. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Apr. 26, 2013),
https://www.cidh.oas.org/demandas/12.465%2Sarayaku%2Ecuador%/2O26abr2OlO%20ENG.pdf
(using group rights to enforce individual rights violations).
110. Siegfried Wiessner, Re-Enchanting the World: Indigenous Peoples' Rights as Essential Parts
ofa Holistic Human Rights Regime, 15 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 239, 266 (2010) [hereinafter
Wiessner, Re-Enchanting the World].
111. Robert N. Clinton, The Rights ofIndigenous Peoples as Collective Group Rights, 32 ARiZ. L.
REV. 739, 742 (1990).
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exercised by a group is definitionally impossible, requiring the group to hold group
rights.
These counterarguments to Donnelly's skepticism of group rights are still
being developed. The point, however, is to illustrate that there are a number of
existent frameworks that can be applied to deal with many of the principle
criticisms of group rights generally.
IV. PROTECTING INDIGENOUS COLLECTIVE LAND OWNERSHIP THROUGH
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Though the debate on how to reconcile group rights and individual human
rights continues, it is more clear that religious freedom jurisprudence, as defined
by international law and regional and domestic courts, can serve as an additional
layer of protection for indigenous land ownership. Property possession is a
necessary correlate to the exercise of religious freedom.112 For many religious
organizations, owning property is the simplest way of gathering as a religious body
for collective worship, an essential part of their faith.1 13 As we have seen, property
4
ownership for indigenous peoples is often an even more pressing need.11 Whereas
some faiths worship the divine in a building, indigenous peoples often worship the
land as divine.115 This section analyzes how U.N. Declarations, international
treaties, U.N. Special Rapporteurs, regional commissions and courts, and some
domestic laws have interpreted the guarantee of religious freedom to include
protection of indigenous land, territory, and resources.
A.

U.N. Declarationsand InternationalTreaties

Given the spiritual relationship indigenous peoples have with their land, it is
no surprise that international law implicitly and explicitly covers indigenous land
use. Implicitly, many international instruments protect the right to manifest and
practice religion or belief. Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights ("UDHR") protects "the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion" which includes the ability to practice religion and worship in
community." 6 The Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights notes that
112. See United Nations, Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 22 (48) (art. 18), 14, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/2l/Rev.1/Add.4 (Sept. 27, 1993) [hereinafter General Comment No. 22].
113. See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and
Sen. Kennedy on the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000) ("The right to
assemble for worship is at the very core of the free exercise of religion. Churches and synagogues
cannot function without a physical space adequate to their needs and consistent with their theological
requirements. The right to build, buy, or rent such a space is an indispensable adjunct to the core First
Amendment right to assemble for religious purposes.").
114. See generally supra Part II(A).
115. Id.
116. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 18, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(lI) (Dec. 10, 1948); see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 18,
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55, pmbl., arts. 1(1), 6,
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the freedom to manifest religion or belief encompasses a broad range of activities
such as "ritual and ceremonial acts giving direct expression to belief . .. including
the building of places of worship [and] the use of ritual formulae and objects."
While international law has not precisely defined the word "religion," the
interpretation of freedom of religion should be broad and extends beyond
"traditional religions ... with institutional characteristics or practices analogous to
those of traditional religions."1 18 The right to worship, a necessary correlate to
religious freedom, includes the performance of rituals and ceremonies and
"building of places of worship [and] the use of ritual formulae and objects."l 1 9
Thus, although indigenous peoples are not explicitly mentioned in the text of any
of these instruments, each one covers individual indigenous people.
Explicitly, Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights ("ICCPR") guarantees that ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities be
able to enjoy their culture.120 In a general comment, the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights explained culture includes using land resources
"especially in the case of indigenous peoples."1 21 Article 15 of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights protects the right of everyone
to participate in "cultural life,"' 22 which includes "religion or belief systems."1 23
States must "respect the rights of indigenous peoples to their culture and heritage
and to maintain and strengthen their spiritual relationship with their ancestral lands
and other natural resources...."124

Perhaps most significantly, UNDRIP discusses the interaction between
religious freedom and indigenous peoples. Article 1 of UNDRIP incorporates the
right to religious freedom.125 UNDRIP specifically protects indigenous peoples'
spiritual relationship to their land as a group. Article 12 states "[i]ndigenous
peoples have the right to manifest, practise, develop and teach their spiritual and
religious traditions, customs and ceremonies; the right to maintain, protect, and
U.N. Doc. AIRES/36/55 (Nov. 25, 1981) (recognizing religion as "one of the fundamental elements in
[the] conception of life" and protecting the right "to establish and maintain places for these purposes"
and to "make, acquire and use .. .materials related to the rites or customs of a religion").
117. General Comment No. 22, supranote 112, 14.
118. Id.12.
119. Id. 14.
120. ICCPR, supranote 116, art. 27.
121. United Nations, Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 23 (50) (art. 27), 7, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5 (April 26, 1994).
122. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 15(1)(a), Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3.
123. United Nations, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 21: Right of
Everyone to Take Part in Cultural Life (art. 15, para. 1 (a), of the Intemational Covenant of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights), 1 13, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/21 (Nov. 21, 2009).
124. Id.T49(d).
125. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 5, art. 1
("Indigenous peoples have the right to the full enjoyment, as a collective or as individuals, of all human
rights and fundamental freedoms as recognized in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and international human rights law.").
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have access in privacy to their religious and cultural sites; the right to the use and
control of their ceremonial objects" and encourages the repatriation of "ceremonial
objects and human remains."l 26 Finally, Article 25 acknowledges "the right to
maintain and strengthen th[e] distinctive spiritual relationship with their
traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and used lands, territories, waters and
coastal seas."' 27 In total, nineteen of UNDRIP's forty-six articles relate to
indigenous peoples' land rights emphasizing the "huge importance of the question
for the survival of indigenous peoples."l 28
B.

U.N. SpecialRapporteurs

U.N. Special Rapporteurs have recently sought to safeguard indigenous land
through international religious freedom laws and have recognized the inherently
religious dimension of land for indigenous peoples and the necessity of preserving
indigenous land for the exercise of their religion. After visiting Argentina, the
Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Abdelfattah Amor,
acknowledged "[t]he principal problem regarding freedom of religion and freedom
to manifest one's religion or belief relates to the question of land." 29
In 2011, James Anaya, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples,
issued a report to the Human Rights Council on the plight of ten different
indigenous peoples.' 30 In his report, Anaya was highly critical of the 2008
decision by the Ninth Circuit in Navajo Nation v. U.S. ForestService.'3 ' Anaya's
report recommended that the United States consult with the tribes affected by the
ski resort and ensure that their government act in accordance with "international
standards that protect the right of Native American to practice and maintain their
religious traditions." 32 Anaya surveyed the beliefs of the Hopi and the Navajo and
concluded that the ski operation violated the right of the Native Americans to
maintain and practice their religion.133 Anaya urged the government to consider

126. Id. art. 12.
127. Id. art. 25.
128. Julian Burger, The UN Declarationon the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: From Advocacy to
Implementation, in REFLECTIONS ON THE U.N. DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES

41, 51 (Stephen Allen & Alexandra Xanthaki eds., 2011).
129. Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Civil and PoliticalRights, Including the
Question of Religious Intolerance, 112, Comm. on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/73/Add.1
(Jan. 16, 2002) (by Abdelfattah Amor).
130. Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Rep. of the SpecialRapporteur on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/18/35/Add.1 (August 25,
2011) (by James Anaya) [hereinafter Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples].
131. Id. at 43-52; see also supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
132. Rep. of the Special Rapporteuron the Rights ofIndigenous Peoples, supra note 130, at 52.
133. See id. at 44-46, 49-50. Neither did the ski operation pass one of the permissible limitations on
the right to religious freedom when a limitation is "necessary to protect public safety, order, health or
morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others." Id. at 50. Anaya expressed doubt that a
"private recreational ski facility is in furtherance of one of the specific public purposes" and suggested
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that any restrictions on indigenous peoples' exercise of religion "is subject to the
most exacting scrutiny under these international instruments" and doubted whether
the ski resort could pass such scrutiny. 134
C.

Regional Commissions

Regional commissions have also identified the important link between
indigenous land ownership and the exercise of religion. The Commission has
emphasized the inextricable link between indigenous peoples' exercise of religion
and their relationship to ancestral lands. The Commission reported:
Indigenous and tribal peoples' territories and natural resources are a
constitutive element of their worldview and religiousness, given that for
them, the notions of family and of religion are intimately connected to
the places where ancestral burial grounds, places of religious
significance and importance, and kinship patterns have developed from
their occupation and use of their physical territories.135
Given this relationship, states are obligated to respect indigenous territory,
land, and resources "to allow for the exercise of their spiritual life."'
In 2003, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights ("ACHIPR")
addressed the claims of the Endorois, a community of approximately 60,000
people in the Lake Bogoria area of Kenya, who were dispossessed of their
ancestral lands after the Kenyan government created a game reserve.1 3 7 The
Endorois claimed that the restricted access to their ancestral lands violated their
religious freedom guaranteed under the African Charter. 3 8 Specifically, the
Endorois believe that a lake on the reservation is "of fundamental religious
significance" as a site where they perform traditional ceremonies to appease their
ancestors, bury their ancestors, and pray and perform other religious rituals. 3 9 The
ACHPR concluded that Kenya unlawfully interfered with the Endorois' right to
religious freedom by forcibly removing them from their lands and ordered that the
Endorois have unrestricted access to the lake on their ancestral land.140 The
that the ski resort did not consider "the nature and severity of the limitation on religion, in relation to
the identified valid purpose and the manner in which the purpose is being pursued." Id. at 51.
134. Id. at 49 (emphasis added). In the United States, classifications based on religion are subject to
the most exacting scrutiny just like classifications of race and speech. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res.
of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 n.3 (1990) (this is an example of the application of the substantial
burden test). See also supra Part III(A).
135. Indigenous and Tribal Peoples' Rights over Their Ancestral Lands and Natural Resources,
Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., 150, OEA/Ser.JV/II., Doc. 56/09 (2009) (footnotes omitted).
136. Id. 151.
137. Centre for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group Int'l on behalf of the
Endorois Cmty. v. Kenya, Aft. Comm'n on Human & Peoples' Rights, Comm. No. 276/2003, $$ 1, 3,
5, (2006) [hereinafter Endorois Communication].
138. Id. $$ 1-2; Organization of African Unity, African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art.
8, June 27, 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 1520 U.N.T.S 217.
139. Endorois Communication, supra note 137, 79.
140. Id. at 80.
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ACHPR emphasized that removing the Endorois from their land "rendered it
virtually impossible for the community to maintain religious practices central to
their culture and religion."'41
D.

Regional Courts

The IACHR has continued to connect indigenous peoples' religious practices
to their ancestral land.142 In Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay,the
Yakye Axa Community, an indigenous community whose economy is primarily
based on hunting, fishing, and especially gathering, were resettled from their
traditional territory to inferior land that had no animals to hunt, proved poor for
domestic animals, and lacked water.14 3 The Yakye Axa Community could not
conduct their cultural practices freely because they had been removed from their
traditional settlement.'" The IACHR found that Paraguay violated the indigenous
peoples' right to property by failing to protect the community's traditional lands. 14
The court acknowledged that the Yakye Axa community's traditional lands were a
"part of their worldview, their religiosity, and therefore, of their cultural identity"
and that Article 21 must be interpreted as a mechanism to protect this aspect of the
community.146

141. Id. 173.
142. See, e.g., Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, 118 (Mar. 29, 2006) ("[T]he Court has considered that
the close ties the members of indigenous communities have with their traditional lands and the natural
resources associated with their culture thereof, as well as the incorporeal elements deriving therefrom,
must be secured under Article 21 of the American Convention."); Moiwana Cmty. v. Suriname,
Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124,
131, 133 (June 15, 2005) (citing Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Interqm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C.) No. 79, TT 149, 151 (Aug. 31, 2001))
(finding a violation of Moiwana community members' property right by failing to investigate the
massacre and noting indigenous peoples' "communal nexus with the ancestral territory is not merely a
matter of possession and production, but rather consists in [the] material and spiritual elements that
must be fully integrated and enjoyed by the community").
143. Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, %T50.3, 50.15 (June 17, 2005).
144. Id. T 50.15.
145. Id. 135, 156.
146. Id.
135, 137; see also Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, $ 95 (Nov. 28, 2007) ("Article
21 of the American Convention [supports] . . . the right of members of indigenous and tribal
communities to freely determine and enjoy their own social, cultural and economic development, which
includes the right to enjoy their particular spiritual relationship with the[ir] territory . . . .").

2013

INDIGENOUS RIGHTS TO LAND THROUGH RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

E.

97

Domestic Laws

Some domestic laws or practices also provide an opportunity for indigenous
peoples to protect their land, territory, and resources by appealing to religious
freedom. 147
For example, the Northern Territory Aboriginal Sacred Sites Act of Australia
requires that a person who proposes to work on land held by an aboriginal tribe
must apply to the Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority ("Authority") in order to
receive permission to work on that land.14 8 Only after the Authority has concluded
that the work will not result in "substantive risk of damage to or interference with a
sacred site on or in the vicinity of the land" or after the Aboriginals who have
responsibility for the site have come to agreement with the person or company
proposing to do the work can the work continue.149 Failing to abide by these
requests can result in penalties; entering a sacred site, working on a sacred site
without permission, and desecration of a sacred site all carry fines and the
possibility of imprisonment. 150
Another statute, although one that is less likely to be useful for indigenous
peoples in the short term,' 51 is the United States' Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA").152 RLUIPA "assert[s] the obvious
connections between religious exercise and land use"' 53 and prohibits governments
from implementing "a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial
burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or
institution" absent a compelling government interest. 154 RLUIPA case law has
held unconstitutional the exercise of eminent domain when it prevents the group
from "engaging in conduct or having a religious experience which the faith
mandates,"' 55 when it fails to issue permits to build temples,156 and when it fails to
accommodate religious practices, such as prayer.' 5 7 In each of these examples,
religious organizations and individuals were able to protect their land use rights

147. See, e.g., ANAYA, supra note 53, at 139-40 (noting how governments in Australia, New
Zealand, and Canada have all stopped different development projects on indigenous land based on their
recognition of the spiritual importance the land had for the indigenous groups).
148. Northern TerritoryAboriginalSacred Sites Act 1989 (NT) para 19B (Austl.).
149. Id. para 22(l)(a)-(b).
150. Id. pt lV.
151. See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1062-63 (decided under RLUIPA's
predecessor Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
152. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006).
153. Angela C. Carmella, RLUIPA: Linking Religion, Land Use, Ownership and the Common
Good, 2 ALB. Gov'T L. REV. 485, 498 (2009).
154. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1).
155. Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1227
(C.D. Cal. 2002), cited with approval in Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995).
156. GuruNanak Sikh Soc'y ofYuba City v. Cnty. of Sutter, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1140-41 (E.D.
Cal. 2003).
157. DiLaura v. Twp. of Ann Arbor, 112 F. App'x 445, 446 (6th Cir. 2004); Murphy v. Zoning
Comm'n, 148 F. Supp. 2d 173, 175-180 (D. Conn. 2001).
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through the enforcement of their religious exercise rights.15 8 The difficulty in
applying these cases to indigenous peoples is that courts misunderstand indigenous
peoples' spirituality, particularly their spiritual relationship with their land.1 59
While it appears that courts comprehend the significance of church buildings,
sacrifice, and prayer, they often fail to grasp the sacredness of land for indigenous
peoples.
Finally, several countries now require registration and demarcation of
indigenous peoples' lands that belonged to their ancestors.1so This process has
occurred in a variety of ways, including a peace treaty in Guatemala, constitutional
and statutory changes in Brazil, common-law modifications in Australia, Taiwan,
and Malaysia, and legal judgments in Botswana, South Africa, and Colombia.'6 1
New Zealand has even signed a treaty with members of Whanganui Iwi that settled
their claims to the Whanganui River. 162 The agreement recognizes the status of the
river as "an integrated, living whole" in accordance with Whanganui Iwi belief,
affords the river protection as a legal entity "reflecting the view of the River as a
living whole," and appoints two people to act on the river's behalf and protect "its
status and health and wellbeing." 63
This brief overview highlights how international law already acknowledges a
special relationship between indigenous peoples' land and their spirituality,
facilitating a freedom-of-religion-based defense of their property rights. And even
in countries that do not recognize collective land ownership, religious freedom
jurisprudence can be used to protect the land of indigenous peoples.
V.

CONCLUSION

Land, territory, and resource rights of indigenous peoples have
improved since the beginning of European world exploration.' 6
international law serves as a protector of indigenous peoples rather than a
conquering nations. This is most prominent in the IACHR's jurisprudence,

vastly
Today
tool of
mostly

158. See, e.g., DiLaura, 112 F. App'x at 446 (affirming judgment based on RLUIPA).
159. See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1097 (9th Cir. 2008) (Fletcher, J.,
dissenting) ("I do not think that the majority would accept that the burden on a Christian's exercise of
religion would be insubstantial if the government permitted only treated sewage effluent for use as
baptismal water, based on an argument that no physical harm would result and any adverse effect would
merely be on the Christians' 'subjective spiritual experience."').
160. Wiessner, Re-Enchanting the World, supra note 110, at 283-84.
161. Id.
162. Christopher Finlayson, Whanganui River Agreement Signed, BEEHIVE.GOV.NZ (Aug. 30,
2012), http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/whanganui-river-agreement-signed.
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., E. DE VATTEL, 3 THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAw 85
(Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Inst. of Wash., 1916) (1758) ("[Indigenous peoples'] uncertain
occupancy of these vast regions can not be held as a real and lawful taking of possession; and when the
Nations of Europe, which are too confined at home, come upon lands which the savages have no special
need of and are making no present and continuous use of, they may lawfully take possession of them
and establish colonies in them.").
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notably the Awas Tingni decision, and in the passage of UNDRIP. The assumption
of the spiritual importance indigenous peoples share with their ancestral land is
often embedded in the effort to safeguard indigenous land, territory, and resources.
Thus, religious liberty-based arguments have been successful in regional courts,
with U.N. Special Rapporteurs, and are consistently mentioned throughout
UNDRIP.
Similarly, domestic courts, statutes, and treaties have also
acknowledged the link between indigenous religion and land. This note explored a
religious-freedom based approach to effectuate and supplement indigenous
peoples' claims to their land, territory, and resources.
However, success at the U.N., in regional courts and commissions, and even
in domestic courts and legislation, marks the beginning, not the end, of the struggle
for indigenous peoples to gain real protection in countries where they have long
been ignored. As the examples that began this note illustrate, indigenous peoples
continue to experience existential harm at the behest of state governments. The
next step is to convert legal victories into actual change on the ground and security
in the everyday lives of the men, women, and children of indigenous people
groups.
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